has adopted rule in West Virginia

2004In Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 151 W.Va. 961 ; 158 S.E.2d 98 (1967), the Supreme Court of Appeals stated that though this State does not recognize the doctrine of attractive - nuisance, there is a similar rule for children: “Although the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is not recognized in this State, this Court has adopted a rule quite similar to that doctrine and has held that where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at aplace frequented by children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew,

2004In Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 151 W.Va. 961 ; 158 S.E.2d 98 (1967), the Supreme Court of Appeals stated that though this State does not recognize the doctrine of attractive - nuisance, there is a similar rule for children: “Although the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is not recognized in this State, this Court has adopted a rule quite similar to that doctrine and has held that where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at aplace frequented by children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew,

2013Our precedents, read together, demonstrate that although this Court has adopted a rule of substantial compliance with respect to the statutory requirement that a will be “signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature for execution of a will[,]” we have never upheld the validity of a will that contains no signature of any kind. 5 See Clark, 187 W.Va. at 370 , 419 S.E.2d at 310 (“The importance of a signature on a will is its indication of final testamentary intent.”); Briggs, 1

2013Our precedents, read together, demonstrate that although this Court has adopted a rule of substantial compliance with respect to the statutory requirement that a will be “signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature for execution of a will[,]” we have never upheld the validity of a will that contains no signature of any kind. 5 See Clark, 187 W.Va. at 370 , 419 S.E.2d at 310 (“The importance of a signature on a will is its indication of final testamentary intent.”); Briggs, 1

2013Our precedents, read together, demonstrate that although this Court has adopted a rule of substantial compliance with respect to the statutory requirement that a will be “signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature for execution of a will[,]” we have never upheld the validity of a will that contains no signature of any kind. 5 See Clark, 187 W.Va. at 370 , 419 S.E.2d at 310 (“The importance of a signature on a will is its indication of final testamentary intent.”); Briggs, 1

2013Our precedents, read together, demonstrate that although this Court has adopted a rule of substantial compliance with respect to the statutory requirement that a will be “signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature for execution of a will[,]” we have never upheld the validity of a will that contains no signature of any kind. 5 See Clark, 187 W.Va. at 370 , 419 S.E.2d at 310 (“The importance of a signature on a will is its indication of final testamentary intent.”); Briggs, 1

1994This Court has adopted the rule followed by federal courts under identical provisions of Rule 15, F.R.C.P.: amendments relate back to when the cause of action sought to be added “grow[s] out of the specified conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the original cause of action.” Roberts v. Wagner Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 163 W.Va. 559, 563 , 258 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1979) (citing 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3]).

1994This Court has adopted the rule followed by federal courts under identical provisions of Rule 15, F.R.C.P.: amendments relate back to when the cause of action sought to be added “grow[s] out of the specified conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the original cause of action.” Roberts v. Wagner Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 163 W.Va. 559, 563 , 258 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1979) (citing 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3]).

1994If, however, “the supplemental pleading creates an entirely new cause of action based on facts different from those in the original complaint, the amended pleading will not relate back for statute of limitations purposes.” Jones v. Jones, 184 W.Va. 297, 301 , 400 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1990).

1994If, however, “the supplemental pleading creates an entirely new cause of action based on facts different from those in the original complaint, the amended pleading will not relate back for statute of limitations purposes.” Jones v. Jones, 184 W.Va. 297, 301 , 400 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1990).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).

1987“An insurance contract should be given a construction which a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean.” Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430 , 345 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1986); see Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84 , 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986); Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., 168 W.Va. 172 , 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Thompson v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 122 W.Va. 551, 554 , 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).