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9 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Hollandgreen2 sentences2014Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 329 N.C. 646, 651 , 407 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and some brackets omitted; emphasis added). 2014Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 329 N.C. 646, 651 , 407 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and some brackets omitted; emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Jenkins v. Andersongreen2 sentences2001Westbrooks, 345 N.C. at 66 , 478 S.E.2d at 497 ; *157 see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L. 2001Westbrooks, 345 N.C. at 66 , 478 S.E.2d at 497 ; *157 see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Masongreen2 sentences1997This Court has adopted the test currently applied to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that “ [w]hether or not to exclude evidence under [Rule 403] is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731 , 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986). 1997This Court has adopted the test currently applied to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that “ [w]hether or not to exclude evidence under [Rule 403] is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731 , 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences1996E.g., State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 492-94 , 380 S.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1989) (expressly disavowing prior decisions of this Court stating otherwise). 1996E.g., State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 492-94 , 380 S.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1989) (expressly disavowing prior decisions of this Court stating otherwise). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Freemangreen2 sentences1991This Court has adopted the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for purposes of determining “whether a beneficiary of an agreement made by others has a right of action on that agreement.” Snyder, 300 N.C. at 221 , 266 S.E.2d at 604 (using identical 1973 version of Restatement); see also Vogel v. Supply Co. and Supply Co. v. Developers, Inc., 277 N.C. 119 , 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970). 1991This Court has adopted the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for purposes of determining “whether a beneficiary of an agreement made by others has a right of action on that agreement.” Snyder, 300 N.C. at 221 , 266 S.E.2d at 604 (using identical 1973 version of Restatement); see also Vogel v. Supply Co. and Supply Co. v. Developers, Inc., 277 N.C. 119 , 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Vogel v. Reed Supply Companygreen2 sentences1991This Court has adopted the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for purposes of determining “whether a beneficiary of an agreement made by others has a right of action on that agreement.” Snyder, 300 N.C. at 221 , 266 S.E.2d at 604 (using identical 1973 version of Restatement); see also Vogel v. Supply Co. and Supply Co. v. Developers, Inc., 277 N.C. 119 , 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970). 1991This Court has adopted the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for purposes of determining “whether a beneficiary of an agreement made by others has a right of action on that agreement.” Snyder, 300 N.C. at 221 , 266 S.E.2d at 604 (using identical 1973 version of Restatement); see also Vogel v. Supply Co. and Supply Co. v. Developers, Inc., 277 N.C. 119 , 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Spicer v. . Gambillgreen1 sentence1943See Spicer v. Gambill, 93 N. C., 378 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tyson.
green
2 sentences2019The State notes that we stated in Lachat that "[w]hen a mistrial is declared properly for such reasons [as a deadlocked jury], 'in legal contemplation there has been no trial.' " 317 N.C. at 82 , 343 S.E.2d at 877 (quoting State v. Tyson , 138 N.C. 627 , 629, 50 S.E. 456 , 456 (1905) ). 2019The State notes that we stated in Lachat that "[w]hen a mistrial is declared properly for such reasons [as a deadlocked jury], 'in legal contemplation there has been no trial.' " 317 N.C. at 82 , 343 S.E.2d at 877 (quoting State v. Tyson , 138 N.C. 627 , 629, 50 S.E. 456 , 456 (1905) ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Lachat
green
2 sentences2019As the sole support for its theory that this Court has adopted the principle that jeopardy is deemed never to have previously attached at the point that the trial court declares a mistrial, the State points to a single statement from this Court's decision in State v. Lachat , 317 N.C. 73 , 343 S.E.2d 872 (1986). 2019As the sole support for its theory that this Court has adopted the principle that jeopardy is deemed never to have previously attached at the point that the trial court declares a mistrial, the State points to a single statement from this Court's decision in State v. Lachat , 317 N.C. 73 , 343 S.E.2d 872 (1986). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Westbrooks
green
2 sentences2001Westbrooks, 345 N.C. at 66 , 478 S.E.2d at 497 ; *157 see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L. 2001Westbrooks, 345 N.C. at 66 , 478 S.E.2d at 497 ; *157 see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Pipkin v. . Adams
neutral
2 sentences1943“But the time during which the party recovering or owning such judgment shall be, or shall have been, restrained from proceeding thereon by an order of injunction, or other order, or by the operation of any appeal, or by a statutory prohibition, does not constitute any part of the ten years aforesaid, as against the defendant in such judgment . . .” There is no other savings clause in the statute and, as stated in Pipkin v. Adams, 114 N. C., 201 , 19 S. E., 105 , this Court has adopted the principle that it is in the interest of public policy that this statute should be strictly construed. 1943“But the time during which the party recovering or owning such judgment shall be, or shall have been, restrained from proceeding thereon by an order of injunction, or other order, or by the operation of any appeal, or by a statutory prohibition, does not constitute any part of the ten years aforesaid, as against the defendant in such judgment . . .” There is no other savings clause in the statute and, as stated in Pipkin v. Adams, 114 N. C., 201 , 19 S. E., 105 , this Court has adopted the principle that it is in the interest of public policy that this statute should be strictly construed. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Town of Tarboro v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1931In Potter v. Dixie Transit Co., 196 N. C., 824 , a nonexpert witness, who had not qualified himself by a statement of his previous observation -and experience, was permitted to testify after objection as to the speed of a bus traveling on the highway, and it was held that there was no error in the admission of the evidence. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.