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13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cort v. Ashgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Schooner Peggygreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Chambersgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.green2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
Ziffrin, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durhamgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmondgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
Hamling v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. David Loren Frostgreen1 sentence2025To evaluate a defendant’s claim that the police omitted material facts from an affidavit of probable cause, this Court has adopted the test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Alexander, K., Aplt.green1 sentence2024See Alexander, 243 A.3d at 197 (“We apply the Marks rule.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Duffeygreen2 sentences2012In addressing whether a result is a direct or collateral consequence of pleading guilty, this Court has stated, “[T]he distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of a guilty plea has been effectively defined by this Court as the distinction between a criminal penalty and a civil requirement over which a sentencing judge has no control.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211 , 956 A.2d 399, 404 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436 , 639 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1994)). 8 In determining whether a provision is a criminal penalty or a civil requirement, this Court has adopted t 2012In addressing whether a result is a direct or collateral consequence of pleading guilty, this Court has stated, “[T]he distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of a guilty plea has been effectively defined by this Court as the distinction between a criminal penalty and a civil requirement over which a sentencing judge has no control.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211 , 956 A.2d 399, 404 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436 , 639 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1994)). 8 In determining whether a provision is a criminal penalty or a civil requirement, this Court has adopted t | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leidiggreen2 sentences2012In addressing whether a result is a direct or collateral consequence of pleading guilty, this Court has stated, “[T]he distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of a guilty plea has been effectively defined by this Court as the distinction between a criminal penalty and a civil requirement over which a sentencing judge has no control.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211 , 956 A.2d 399, 404 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436 , 639 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1994)). 8 In determining whether a provision is a criminal penalty or a civil requirement, this Court has adopted t 2012In addressing whether a result is a direct or collateral consequence of pleading guilty, this Court has stated, “[T]he distinction between a direct and collateral consequence of a guilty plea has been effectively defined by this Court as the distinction between a criminal penalty and a civil requirement over which a sentencing judge has no control.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211 , 956 A.2d 399, 404 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436 , 639 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1994)). 8 In determining whether a provision is a criminal penalty or a civil requirement, this Court has adopted t | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ernstgreen2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co.green2 sentences1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . 1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . | 1 | 1 |
| Beers v. Mount Pleasant Townshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
United States of America Ex Rel. The Honorable Edwin A. Robson v. Frank W. Olivergreen2 sentences1978Robson v. Oliver, supra at 13; United States v. Seale, supra; see ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft, 1972) (judge has power to punish willful obstructions) and § 7.2(i) (Approved Draft, 1972) (contempt available for “willfully contemptuous” conduct). 1978Robson v. Oliver, supra at 13; United States v. Seale, supra; see ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft, 1972) (judge has power to punish willful obstructions) and § 7.2(i) (Approved Draft, 1972) (contempt available for "willfully contemptuous" conduct). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Against Robert F. Williamsgreen2 sentences1978Commonwealth v. Washington, 466 Pa. 506 , 353 A.2d 806 (1976); accord, Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3rd Cir. 1977); In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949, 960 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Brown, supra, this Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemner “knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 470 Pa. at 203 , 368 A.2d at 265 ; accord, Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 466 Pa. at 508 , 353 A.2d at 807 ; United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 87 1978Commonwealth v. Washington, 466 Pa. 506 , 353 A.2d 806 (1976); accord, Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3rd Cir. 1977); In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949, 960 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Brown, supra, this Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemner "knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful." Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 470 Pa. at 203 , 368 A.2d at 265 ; accord, Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 466 Pa. at 508 , 353 *370 A.2d at 807; United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874 | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Richard B. Marxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers Appeal of Abraham E. Freedman, Esquiregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yassin Aref v. Loretta Lynch
green
2 sentences2024To evaluate due process claims arising from a prison inmate’s placement in disciplinary segregation, this Court has adopted the test created in Aref, 833 F.3d at 242 : [The court must] consider (i) the conditions of confinement relative to administrative segregation, (ii) the duration of that confinement generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners serving similar sentences. 2024This Court has adopted the test announced in Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016), for determining whether a legally cognizable liberty interest has been adversely affected by the inmate’s housing: [The court must] consider (i) the conditions of confinement relative to administrative segregation, (ii) the duration of that confinement generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners serving similar sentences. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
green
2 sentences1995On appeal to this court, 6 the Department argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Bowman and Gibson were not equally qualified for the permanent Park Ranger 2 position and its conclusion that the Department’s affirmative action policy was merely a pretext for sex discrimination. 7 In analyzing claims of sex discrimination arising under Section 905.1 of the Act, this court has adopted the standard of proof originally set forth by our Supreme Court in Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124 1995On appeal to this court, 6 the Department argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Bowman and Gibson were not equally qualified for the permanent Park Ranger 2 position and its conclusion that the Department’s affirmative action policy was merely a pretext for sex discrimination. 7 In analyzing claims of sex discrimination arising under Section 905.1 of the Act, this court has adopted the standard of proof originally set forth by our Supreme Court in Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124 | 2 | 1991–1995 |
Commonwealth v. Saunders
green
2 sentences1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. 1981Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 110-11 , 381 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (1977) (Opinion in Support of Reversal): *240 I This Court has adopted the principle that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406 , 409 n.5, 322 A.2d 102 , 103 n.5 (1974); accord, Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , 94 S.Ct. 2887 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 , 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. | 2 | 1977–1981 |
Marks v. United States
green
1 sentence2024This Court has adopted the rule of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
2 sentences2012See Lehman, supra (employing Smith test in determining whether Federal Gun Control Act is punitive, ex post facto law); Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487 , 832 A.2d 962 (2003) (employing Smith test in determining whether Megan’s Law II is punitive). 2012See Lehman, supra (employing Smith test in determining whether Federal Gun Control Act is punitive, ex post facto law); Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487 , 832 A.2d 962 (2003) (employing Smith test in determining whether Megan’s Law II is punitive). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Com. Dept. of Health v. Nwogwugwu
green
2 sentences1995This standard of proof first requires that the corn- plainant make out a prima facie case of discrimination by producing sufficient evidence which, if believed and unexplained, indicates that more likely than not discrimination has occurred. 8 Department of Health v. Nwogwugwu, 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 33 , 594 A.2d 847 (1991). 1995This standard of proof first requires that the corn- plainant make out a prima facie case of discrimination by producing sufficient evidence which, if believed and unexplained, indicates that more likely than not discrimination has occurred. 8 Department of Health v. Nwogwugwu, 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 33 , 594 A.2d 847 (1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Henderson v. Office of the Budget
green
2 sentences1991Henderson v. Office of the Budget, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 607 , 560 A.2d 859 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 524 Pa. 633 , 574 A.2d 73 (1990). 5 *38 This standard of proof first requires that the complainant make out a prima facie case of discrimination, which he does by producing sufficient evidence and, if believed and otherwise unexplained, indicates that more likely than not discrimination has occurred. 1991Henderson v. Office of the Budget, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 607 , 560 A.2d 859 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 524 Pa. 633 , 574 A.2d 73 (1990). 5 *38 This standard of proof first requires that the complainant make out a prima facie case of discrimination, which he does by producing sufficient evidence and, if believed and otherwise unexplained, indicates that more likely than not discrimination has occurred. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commonwealth v. Woodhouse
green
2 sentences1981Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242 , 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979). 1981Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242 , 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1981Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242 , 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979). 1981Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242 , 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.
green
2 sentences1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . 1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.
green
2 sentences1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . 1980See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., supra, 452 Pa. at 93 , 306 A.2d at 317 ; Barnes & Tucker I, supra, 455 Pa. at 418 , 319 A.2d at 885 ; Barnes & Tucker II, supra, 472 Pa. at 123 , 371 A.2d at 465 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth v. Washington
green
2 sentences1978Commonwealth v. Washington, 466 Pa. 506 , 353 A.2d 806 (1976); accord, Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3rd Cir. 1977); In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949, 960 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Brown, supra, this Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemner "knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful." Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 470 Pa. at 203 , 368 A.2d at 265 ; accord, Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 466 Pa. at 508 , 353 *370 A.2d at 807; United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874 1978Commonwealth v. Washington, 466 Pa. 506 , 353 A.2d 806 (1976); accord, Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3rd Cir. 1977); In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949, 960 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Brown, supra, this Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemner "knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful." Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 470 Pa. at 203 , 368 A.2d at 265 ; accord, Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, 466 Pa. at 508 , 353 *370 A.2d at 807; United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Bobby G. Seale
green
2 sentences1978Robson v. Oliver, supra at 13; United States v. Seale, supra; see ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft, 1972) (judge has power to punish willful obstructions) and § 7.2(i) (Approved Draft, 1972) (contempt available for “willfully contemptuous” conduct). 1978Robson v. Oliver, supra at 13; United States v. Seale, supra; see ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft, 1972) (judge has power to punish willful obstructions) and § 7.2(i) (Approved Draft, 1972) (contempt available for "willfully contemptuous" conduct). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Clark v. Meade green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Rubin v. Bailey green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Sablosky v. Messner green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Cali v. Philadelphia green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Lighton v. Abington Township green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Kelley v. Baldwin, Auditor General green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Tranter v. Alleghency County Co. Authority green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Allentown School District Mercantile Tax Case green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Land Holding Corp. v. Board of Finance & Revenue green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.