20 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ake v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2019This three-factor due process test is comprised of the following: -4- (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State,” (2) “the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided,” and (3) “the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.” [Kennedy, 502 Mich at 215 , quoting Ake, 470 US at 77 .] With respect to the first two factors, the Ake Court observed that both the state and the individual h 2019Now, when a trial court analyzes an indigent defendant’s request for government funds to procure an expert, it must consider the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State,” (2) “the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided,” and (3) “the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.” [Id. at 215, quoting Ake, 470 US at 77 .] With respect to the first two factors, | 1 | 4 |
Bolt v. City of Lansinggreen2 sentences2025The first factor requires a valid user fee to have a regulatory purpose and not a general revenue- raising purpose. 24 The second factor requires a user fee to be proportionate to the required costs of the service. 25 And the third factor requires a user fee to be voluntary. 26 These 21 Id. at 161-167 . 22 Id. at 158 . 23 Id. at 161 . 24 Id. 25 Id. at 161-162 . 26 Id. at 162 . 11 criteria “are not to be considered in isolation,” and no single factor is generally dispositive. 27 Applying the first two factors, the Bolt Court first determined that the service charge at issue had a general revenu 2025The first factor requires a valid user fee to have a regulatory purpose and not a general revenue- raising purpose. 24 The second factor requires a user fee to be proportionate to the required costs of the service. 25 And the third factor requires a user fee to be voluntary. 26 These 21 Id. at 161-167 . 22 Id. at 158 . 23 Id. at 161 . 24 Id. 25 Id. at 161-162 . 26 Id. at 162 . 11 criteria “are not to be considered in isolation,” and no single factor is generally dispositive. 27 Applying the first two factors, the Bolt Court first determined that the service charge at issue had a general revenu | 1 | 3 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2019See also Matthews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976).] Regarding the first two factors, the interests of the state and the defendant will generally converge in a criminal case which places the defendant’s liberty at risk—the accuracy of the proceedings being the chief concern. 2019See also Matthews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976).] Regarding the first two factors, the interests of the state and the defendant will generally converge in a criminal case which places the defendant’s liberty at risk—the accuracy of the proceedings being the chief concern. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Ewinggreen1 sentence2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 | 1 | 1 |
Braverman v. Grangergreen2 sentences2020See id. at ___; slip op at 3.4 Thus, plaintiff is entitled to worker’s compensation benefits because his injury “was a circumstance of employment.” Id. 4 Additionally, even if buying candy was only part of the reason plaintiff left school the day of the accident—for example if plaintiff combined the trip to buy candy with going somewhere to buy lunch—that would be sufficient to fulfill the requirement of the fourth factor listed in Smith: that “the travel comprised a dual purpose combining employment-related business needs with the personal activity of the employee.” See Smith, ___ Mich App at 2020See id. at ___; slip op at 3.4 Thus, plaintiff is entitled to worker’s compensation benefits because his injury “was a circumstance of employment.” Id. 4 Additionally, even if buying candy was only part of the reason plaintiff left school the day of the accident—for example if plaintiff combined the trip to buy candy with going somewhere to buy lunch—that would be sufficient to fulfill the requirement of the fourth factor listed in Smith: that “the travel comprised a dual purpose combining employment-related business needs with the personal activity of the employee.” See Smith, ___ Mich App at | 1 | 1 |
In re TKgreen1 sentence2019See In re TK, 306 Mich App at 706-707 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People of Michigan v. Johnny Ray Kennedy
green
2 sentences2022Trial courts must analyze an indigent defendant’s request for funding to hire experts under a due-process framework that considers: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State, (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided, and (3) the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. [People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 215 ; 917 NW2d 355 (2018) (cleaned up).] “With respect to the first tw 2022Trial courts must analyze an indigent defendant’s request for funding to hire experts under a due-process framework that considers: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State, (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided, and (3) the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. [People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 215 ; 917 NW2d 355 (2018) (cleaned up).] “With respect to the first tw | 3 | 2019–2022 |
Bostock v. Clayton County
green
2 sentences2022This might seem like a “battle of labels” (i.e., calling the employee homosexual versus saying he is attracted to men), but Justice Alito says that “[s]omething that is not sex discrimination cannot be converted into sex discrimination by slapping on that label.” Id. 16 The majority contends that the third factor is duplicative of the first two factors, as “sexual orientation in this context is simply a helpful shorthand for the combination of sex and sex preference . . . .” The framing matters, however. 2022This might seem like a “battle of labels” (i.e., calling the employee homosexual versus saying he is attracted to men), but Justice Alito says that “[s]omething that is not sex discrimination cannot be converted into sex discrimination by slapping on that label.” Id. 16 The majority contends that the third factor is duplicative of the first two factors, as “sexual orientation in this context is simply a helpful shorthand for the combination of sex and sex preference . . . .” The framing matters, however. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Granderson
green
2 sentences2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Coulter
green
2 sentences2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 2024However, while this is a factor to consider, it, alone, does not outweigh the significance of the first two factors which weigh heavily in favor of the prospective-only application of Beck. 2 Cf Poole, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12 (holding the new rule under People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 ; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), rendering mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year- old defendants unconstitutional was substantive because it applied to a category of punishment for a class of defendants on the basis of their status, and was thus retroactive). 3 See, e.g., People v Rose, 485 Mich 1027 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Adair v. State
green
1 sentence2022Adair, 470 Mich at 121 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
J & J Construction Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1
green
2 sentences2004The majority justifies its refusal to decide the substantive issue by referencing a principle of judicial review that “questions of constitutionality should not be decided if the case may be disposed of on other grounds.” J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 468 Mich 722, 734 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003). 2004The majority justifies its refusal to decide the substantive issue by referencing a principle of judicial review that “questions of constitutionality should not be decided if the case may be disposed of on other grounds.” J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 468 Mich 722, 734 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Carines
green
2 sentences2004The majority now chooses to dodge the substantive issue — whether the defendant’s silence was admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief — by skipping over the first two factors in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), whether error occurred and whether the error was plain, and moving directly to whether any hypothetical error would be harmless. 4 In declining to address whether error occurred, the major ity leaves unanswered the question whether a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 2004The majority now chooses to dodge the substantive issue — whether the defendant’s silence was admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief — by skipping over the first two factors in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), whether error occurred and whether the error was plain, and moving directly to whether any hypothetical error would be harmless. 4 In declining to address whether error occurred, the major ity leaves unanswered the question whether a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Vernor v. Secretary of State
green
2 sentences2003Such a measure will be upheld by the courts when plainly intended as a police regulation, and the revenue derived therefrom is not disproportionate to the cost of issuing the license, and the regulation of the business to which it applies.” [Id. at 162, quoting Vemor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157, 167 ; 146 NW 338 (1914).] Defendant’s increased fees for tapping into the water and sewer systems are not wholly out of proportion to its actual costs of supplying the services. 2003Such a measure will be upheld by the courts when plainly intended as a police regulation, and the revenue derived therefrom is not disproportionate to the cost of issuing the license, and the regulation of the business to which it applies.” [Id. at 162, quoting Vemor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157, 167 ; 146 NW 338 (1914).] Defendant’s increased fees for tapping into the water and sewer systems are not wholly out of proportion to its actual costs of supplying the services. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Yennior
green
2 sentences1987In addition, by reversing the Court of Appeals decision in Yennior , this Court looked beyond the first two factors of the three-part test defined by the lead opinion today, since in that case the defendant, having made no comment at sentencing concerning his guilt or innocence, did not affirmatively "maintain his innocence” (as required by the first factor), and the Court of Appeals, in the decision we reversed, explicitly held that the sentence was proper because at sentencing "the court made no attempt to elicit an admission of guilt from defendant” (as required by the second factor) 72 Mic 1987In addition, by reversing the Court of Appeals decision in Yennior , this Court looked beyond the first two factors of the three-part test defined by the lead opinion today, since in that case the defendant, having made no comment at sentencing concerning his guilt or innocence, did not affirmatively "maintain his innocence” (as required by the first factor), and the Court of Appeals, in the decision we reversed, explicitly held that the sentence was proper because at sentencing "the court made no attempt to elicit an admission of guilt from defendant” (as required by the second factor) 72 Mic | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.