first two factors in Texas

2022When, as here, Shepard’s statements are being offered by the State to inculpate Dixon, the first two factors are “not relevant.” Id. (citing Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim.

2021“When the statement is offered by the State to inculpate the defendant, as in the case before us, the first two factors are not relevant.” Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42.

2024See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 .

2015The term “probative value” refers to “the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation—coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 806 (citing Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim.

2015The term “probative value” refers to “the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation—coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 806 (citing Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim.

2009See id.; see also Deberry, 457 A.2d at 751 n. 5, 751-52 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)) (holding that evidence with potential exculpatory value is discoverable and that “the State’s duty to disclose evidence includes a duty to preserve it as well”).

2009See id.; see also Deberry, 457 A.2d at 751 n. 5, 751-52 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)) (holding that evidence with potential exculpatory value is discoverable and that “the State’s duty to disclose evidence includes a duty to preserve it as well”).

2009See id.; see also Deberry, 457 A.2d at 751 n. 5, 751-52 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)) (holding that evidence with potential exculpatory value is discoverable and that “the State’s duty to disclose evidence includes a duty to preserve it as well”).

2009See id. ; see also Deberry , 457 A.2d at 751 n.5, 751-52 (citing Brady v. Maryland , 737 U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 (1976)) (holding that evidence with potential exculpatory value is discoverable and that "the State's duty to disclose evidence includes a duty to preserve it as well").

2018See Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812 (defendant could have suffered little anxiety or concern where he did not know about indictment until he was arrested and did not spend time in jail prior to his arrest).

2018See Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812 (defendant could have suffered little anxiety or concern where he did not know about indictment until he was arrested and did not spend time in jail prior to his arrest).

2011Smith, though, did not testify Johnson lacked reasonable vision, 24 Kelly also challenges the first two factors of negligence per se, citing Freudiger v. Keller, 104 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).

2011Kelly also challenges the first two factors of negligence per se, citing Freudiger v. Keller, 104 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).

2011Lopez-Juarez responds that these factors are met, citing North American Van Lines, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 103, 123 (Tex. App.––Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).

2011Lopez-Juarez responds that these factors are met, citing North American Van Lines, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 103, 123 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).

2008See Russell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo, 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2008See Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2008See Russell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo, 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2008See Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2013Id.

2004Logan v. Mullis, 686 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.1985).

2022Keeping in mind the inverse relationship between the State’s culpability and the defendant’s burden in the Barker analysis, see Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280–81, we conclude that (1) Moreno’s burden to assert the right to a speedy trial and show prejudice was lessened by the weight of the first two factors against the State, and (2) the balance of the Barker factors supports a conclusion that Moreno was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

2016See Barker, 407 U.S. at 536 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (“[W]e would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.”); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (“The constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges.”).

2025Barlow v. Buc-ee’s, Ltd., No. 01-20-00295-CV, 2021 WL 497236 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing 8 Because the first two factors overlap, we consider them together. 17 Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2007)).

2025See id. at 78–79, 105 S. Ct. at 1093–94; Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 337 .

2025See id. at 78–79, 105 S. Ct. at 1093–94; Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 337 .

2024The first two factors—a policy or custom and a policy maker—establish a municipality’s culpability by ensuring a municipality is only held liable for conduct “directly 13 attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.” See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 403–04 (“Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the muni

2024The first two factors—a policy or custom and a policy maker—establish a municipality’s culpability by ensuring a municipality is only held liable for conduct “directly 13 attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.” See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 403–04 (“Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the muni

2021See Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 95–96 (noting that when improperly admitted opinion testimony concerns defendant’s credibility against complainant’s, evidence from other sources undermining defendant’s credibility supports conclusion that admitting opinion was harmless).

2016See Neinast, 217 F.3d at 278 (“The third factor, the ultimate use of the funds, thus becomes our critical question.”); Marcus v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1311 (10th Cir.1999) (“[T]he critical inquiry focuses on the. purpose of the assessment and the ultimate use of the funds.”).

2016Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315 (where defendant was in prison during much of the delay, the court was “mainly concerned with whether or not [his] ability to defend himself was prejudiced by the delay”) (citing McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)); see Bailey v. State, 885 S.W.2d 193, 202 (Tex.App. – Dallas 1994, pet. ref’d) (concerns about “oppressive pretrial incarceration” do not apply while the defendant is confined for other crimes and instead the focus must be on the issue of prejudice).