82 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sollami v. Eatongreen2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 35 (citing Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 447-48 (reasonable foreseeability), and Sollami, 201 Ill. 2d at 17 (likelihood)). ¶ 45 Having disposed of the first two factors as was to be expected in an open-and-obvious case with no exception, the court turned to the remaining two factors. 2014In Lerma, which defendants urge is controlling here and which plaintiff argues is flawed for failing to conduct the traditional duty analysis, 6 two 6 But see Sollami, 201 Ill. 2d at 15, 17 (holding that the “open and obvious” doctrine implicates only the first two factors of the traditional duty analysis: likelihood and reasonable foreseeability of injury). -9- children entered a river near a dam and drowned downstream of the dam while attempting to rescue another child who had been playing in the river. | 7 | 8 |
Belluomini v. STRATFORD GREEN CONDOMINIUM ASSOC.green2 sentences2017“Where an exception to the open and obvious rule applies, the outcome of the duty analysis with respect to the first two factors is ‘reversed.’ ” Id. (quoting Belluomini v. Stratford Green Condominium Ass’n, 346 Ill. 2017“Where an exception to the open and obvious rule applies, the outcome of the duty analysis with respect to the first two factors is ‘reversed.’ ” Id. (quoting Belluomini v. Stratford Green Condominium Ass’n, 346 Ill. | 4 | 6 |
Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Districtgreen2 sentences2022LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 389 ; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 47 Where the danger is open and obvious, the first two factors of the duty analysis— the foreseeability and likelihood of injury—weigh against the imposition of a duty. 2020LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 389 ; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 22 The first two factors carry little weight. | 3 | 15 |
Ward v. K Mart Corp.green2 sentences2021Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 19 ; see also Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 147-148 . 2006Even assuming the foreseeability-of-the-injury factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on the defendant, “foreseeability alone provides an inadequate foundation upon which to base the existence of a legal duty.” Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990), citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987). | 3 | 3 |
Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Coopergreen2 sentences2017Union Cemetery Ass’n, 414 Ill. at 34 (the Care Act was enacted to remedy the evils relating to possible frauds or mismanagement in the handling of care funds and in the advertising and sales of services to which the funds for care were to be devoted). 2016Union Cemetery Ass'n of the City of Lincoln, 414 Ill. at 34 (the Care Act was enacted to remedy the evils relating to possible frauds or mismanagement in the handling of care funds and in the advertising and sales of services to which the funds for care were to be devoted). | 3 | 3 |
In Re GOgreen2 sentences2015See G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55 . ¶ 62 Addressing the first two factors together, the record shows that defendant was 15 years old and in ninth grade when he was questioned by police. 2014See G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55 . ¶ 62 Addressing the first two factors together, the record shows that defendant was 15 years old and in ninth grade when he was questioned by police. | 3 | 3 |
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc.green2 sentences2020“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows trial courts to give effect to the strong public policy favoring the peaceful settling of claims, and at the same time allows trial courts to be on guard for any evidence of unfair dealing, collusion, or wrongful conduct by the settling parties.” Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (2001). 2020“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows trial courts to give effect to the strong public policy favoring the peaceful settlement of claims, and at the same time allows trial courts to be on guard for any evidence of unfair dealing, collusion, or wrongful conduct by the settling parties.” Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Quirozgreen2 sentences2020People v. Quiroz, 257 Ill. 2019The first two factors are considered to be the “most important.” People v. Quiroz, 257 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp.green2 sentences2017Greenspon’s Son Pipe Corp., 381 Ill. 615, 619-20 (1943)). ¶ 19 The first two factors suggest that the tower is lienable. 2016Greenspon’s Son Pipe Corp., 381 Ill. 615, 619-20 (1943)). ¶ 19 The first two factors suggest that the tower is lienable. | 2 | 2 |
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filangreen2 sentences2011See Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill.2d 653, 664 , 297 Ill.Dec. 471 , 837 N.E.2d 922 (2005) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation on the court's jurisdiction). ¶ 27 The open and obvious doctrine addresses the first two factors of the traditional duty analysis: the likelihood and reasonable foreseeability of the injury. 2011See Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill.2d 653, 664 , 297 Ill.Dec. 471 , 837 N.E.2d 922 (2005) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation on the court's jurisdiction). ¶ 27 The open and obvious doctrine addresses the first two factors of the traditional duty analysis: the likelihood and reasonable foreseeability of the injury. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Singletongreen2 sentences2007Singleton, 278 Ill. 2007Singleton, 278 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Centergreen2 sentences2006Even assuming the foreseeability-of-the-injury factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on the defendant, “foreseeability alone provides an inadequate foundation upon which to base the existence of a legal duty.” Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990), citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987). 2006Even assuming the foreseeability-of-the-injury factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on the defendant, “foreseeability alone provides an inadequate foundation upon which to base the existence of a legal duty.” Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990), citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation. Appeal of a & W Bottling, Inc.green2 sentences2005Because the first two factors tend to restate the interdependence involved in parallel pricing, the most important evidence will generally involve the third factor, noneconomic evidence of an " 'actual, manifest agreement not to compete.' " In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation , 385 F.3d at 360-61 , quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation , 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) . 2005Because the first two factors tend to restate the interdependence involved in parallel pricing, the most important evidence will generally involve the third factor, noneconomic evidence of an “ ‘actual, manifest agreement not to compete.’ ” In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d at 360-61 , quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). | 2 | 2 |
Knecht v. Radiac Abrasives, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Knecht , 219 Ill. 2004See Knecht, 219 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Bujnowski v. Birchland, Inc.green2 sentences2021In other words, where a condition is open and obvious and no exception applies, the first two factors of the four-factor test for the existence of a legal duty (the reasonable foreseeability of the injury and the likelihood of the injury) establish the absence of a duty, and the last two factors (the - 19 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200660-U magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant), “ ‘however strongly they militated in favor of a duty, cannot outweigh the first two factors.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Bujnowsk 2021No published premises-liability negligence case that we have found held both (1) that the open-and-obvious rule applied without exception and (2) that the defendant nonetheless owed the plaintiff a duty.” Id. ¶ 57 Here, plaintiff does not argue that the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on Realington outweigh the first two factors. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sommervillegreen1 sentence2026App. 3d 801, 810 (2004); see also People v. Sommerville, 193 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Victorsgreen1 sentence2026C.L.’s Statements to Officer Lohmeyer ¶ 51 In support of his argument that C.L.’s statements to Officer Lohmeyer were not excited utterances, defendant points to the following three factors: (1) Officer Lohmeyer was not the first person she saw or spoke to after the occurrence, (2) the statements were made in response to his questioning, and (3) C.L. “had approximately 16 minutes to speak with Schmitt before she would have been able to speak to [Officer] Lohmeyer, giving her time to reflect upon what had occurred.” - 11 - ¶ 52 Initially, we note that in support of the first two factors identif | 1 | 1 |
| Sandoval v. City of Chicagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goral v. Kulysgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Muskat v. Sternberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McTushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bruns v. City of Centralia
green
2 sentences2025With that said, absent an exception, if a dangerous condition is open and obvious, the first two factors weigh against imposing a duty because “the foreseeability of harm and the likelihood of injury will be slight.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 19 . ¶ 17 Plaintiff invokes the deliberate-encounter exception to the open-and-obvious rule. 2022Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 14 . ¶ 15 The first two factors, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury, do not lend toward imposing a duty. | 12 | 2016–2025 |
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2019Id. at 290-91 . 2018Id. | 3 | 2018–2019 |
Maswamba Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc. And Shalabh Kumar
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 750 . 2019Id. at 750 . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015"Application of the open and obvious rule affects the first two factors of the duty analysis: the foreseeability of injury, and - 17 - the likelihood of injury. [Citation.] Where the condition is open and obvious, the foreseeability of harm and the likelihood of injury will be slight, thus weighing against the imposition of a duty." Id. ¶ 45 In this case, plaintiff argues that the remaining two factors of the duty analysis— the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendants—weigh in his favor. 2012Jackson, 185 Ill.2d at 425 , 235 Ill.Dec. 905 , 706 N.E.2d 460 . ¶ 27 Our supreme court has held that the open-and-obvious doctrine implicates the first two factors of the traditional duty analysis: likelihood and foreseeability of injury. | 3 | 2012–2015 |
Flores v. Westmont Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences2022Id. ¶ 29 Turning to the first two factors of the duty analysis, we find that the reasonable foreseeability and likelihood of the injury in this case weigh in favor of the CTA. 2021Id. ¶ 30 Turning to the first two factors of the duty analysis, we find that the reasonable foreseeability and likelihood of the injury in this case weigh in favor of the CTA. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
LaFever v. Kemlite Co.
green
2 sentences2022LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 389 ; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 47 Where the danger is open and obvious, the first two factors of the duty analysis— the foreseeability and likelihood of injury—weigh against the imposition of a duty. 2020LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 389 ; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 22 The first two factors carry little weight. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Johnson v. United Airlines
green
2 sentences2020Later, in granting the motion to reconsider, the court addressed the first two factors again, finding (1) as to the first factor, the fact that decedent provided his own respirator diminished Hartley’s potential liability, but the factor still weighed against a good-faith finding, and (2) as to the second factor, even though the parties were related through marriage, the evidence established that the settlement was 12 Nos. 1-19-2619, 1-19-2620 (cons.) reached through arm’s-length negotiations, making that factor “neutral.” Thus, after the second order, two of the factors weighed against a good 2020Later, in granting the motion to reconsider, the court addressed the first two factors again, finding (1) as to the first factor, the fact that decedent provided his own respirator diminished Hartley’s potential liability, but the factor still weighed against a good-faith finding, and (2) as to the second factor, even though the parties were related through marriage, the evidence established that the settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiations, making that factor “neutral.” Thus, after the second order, two of the factors weighed against a good-faith finding, while two were neutra | 2 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Marriage of Gosney
green
2 sentences2019Gosney, 394 Ill. 2018Gosney , 394 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Atchley v. University of Chicago Medical Center
green
2 sentences2018The existence of an open and obvious dangerous condition affects the first two factors in the duty analysis, as “[w]here the condition is open and obvious, the foreseeability of harm and the likelihood of injury will be slight, thus weighing against the imposition of a duty.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 19 ; Atchley, 2016 IL App (1st) 152481, ¶ 33 . ¶ 25 Turning to the two remaining factors, we find the magnitude of the burden and consequences of placing the burden on C3 to prevent concertgoers from slipping on mud at an outdoor park are significant. 2017Bruns , 2014 IL 116998 , ¶ 19, 386 Ill.Dec. 765 , 21 N.E.3d 684 ; Atchley , 2016 IL App (1st) 152481 , ¶ 33, 407 Ill.Dec. 982 , 64 N.E.3d 781 . ¶ 25 Turning to the two remaining factors, we find the magnitude of the burden and consequences of placing the burden on C3 to prevent concertgoers from slipping on mud at an outdoor park are significant. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
In Re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation Mdl
green
2 sentences2005Because the first two factors tend to restate the interdependence involved in parallel pricing, the most important evidence will generally involve the third factor, noneconomic evidence of an " 'actual, manifest agreement not to compete.' " In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation , 385 F.3d at 360-61 , quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation , 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) . 2005Because the first two factors tend to restate the interdependence involved in parallel pricing, the most important evidence will generally involve the third factor, noneconomic evidence of an “ ‘actual, manifest agreement not to compete.’ ” In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d at 360-61 , quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Busch
green
1 sentence2026C.L.’s Statements to Officer Lohmeyer ¶ 51 In support of his argument that C.L.’s statements to Officer Lohmeyer were not excited utterances, defendant points to the following three factors: (1) Officer Lohmeyer was not the first person she saw or spoke to after the occurrence, (2) the statements were made in response to his questioning, and (3) C.L. “had approximately 16 minutes to speak with Schmitt before she would have been able to speak to [Officer] Lohmeyer, giving her time to reflect upon what had occurred.” - 11 - ¶ 52 Initially, we note that in support of the first two factors identif | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026He specifically argues that the trial court failed to consider three factors in mitigation that he contends apply, namely, that he (1) neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another, (2) did not contemplate that his -9- criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to another, and (3) had no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime. ¶ 33 Regarding the first two factors in mitigation, “[t]he plain error rule does not allow reviewing courts to consid | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Marriage of Moorthy
green
1 sentence2026“Indeed, it would be unfair to the obligor to include in the calculations of income *** the retained earnings necessary for the continuing viability of a - 34 - corporation[, which is] not available to the obligor.” Id. ¶ 94 Here, the first two factors may weigh in favor of concluding the business’s retained earnings are income for purposes of calculating child support and maintenance. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Holland v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Sandholm v. Kuecker green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Park v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Garrido v. Arena green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Hammons v. Society of Permanent Cosmetic Professionals green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Womick v. Jackson County Nursing Home green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Winters v. MIMG LII Arbors at Eastland, LLC green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Simpkins v. CSX Transportation green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Tomei green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Coty green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Suchy v. The City of Geneva green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), Antonio Calhoun, Claimant-Appellant green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Christopher K. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Lewis v. Champaign County VFW Post No. 5520 neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Curatola v. Village of Niles green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Barker v. Wingo green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Stead v. Valentine green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Scott v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.