Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of New Jersey v. Alice O'Donnellgreen1 sentence2022See State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Szalontai v. Yazbo's Sports Cafégreen1 sentence2019Affirmed. 4 Because plaintiff failed to establish either of the first two factors required for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is unnecessary to consider or decide whether plaintiff satisfied the third factor—that "there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary act or neglect," Szalontai, 183 N.J. at 398 (citation omitted)—other than to note that the undisputed facts presented to the motion court do not directly address this factor. | 1 | 1 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1992Finally, it is necessary that we address the question of whether the new rule should have limited retroactivity to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final, such as the United States Supreme Court decided in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 715 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 661 (1987). 1992Finally, it is necessary that we address the question of whether the new rule should have limited retroactivity to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final, such as the United States Supreme Court decided in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 715 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 661 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Linkgreen1 sentence1986In State v. Link, 197 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.
green
2 sentences2006The Court said that the first two factors of the Schmid test, "are best considered together, for in this case they are most closely interrelated." Id., at 357, 650 A. 2d 757 . 1995The Court held that the first two factors of the Schmid test—the normal use of the property and the nature and extent of the public invitation—are best considered together where “they are most closely interrelated.” Id. at 357, 650 A.2d 757 . | 3 | 1994–2006 |
State v. Sands
green
1 sentence2025As the Supreme Court held in Sands, "[t]he key to exclusion is remoteness," which "cannot ordinarily be determined by the passage of time alone" but also includes "the nature of the convictions" as "probably . . . a significant factor." 76 N.J. at 144 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2022Johnson, 193 N.J. at 550 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Priester
green
1 sentence2020The first two factors -- the nature of the inmate’s illness and the effect of continued incarceration on his health -- are “[t]he predicate for relief.” Id. at 135 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Phelps
green
2 sentences2017The first two factors "reflect notions that an agent's statements are vicariously attributable to a principal." Id. at 510 . 2017The third factor "reduces the fear that a defendant might be convicted or held liable in damages solely on the basis of evidence that he has had no opportunity to impeach or refute." Id. at 510-11 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2008Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203 , 85 S.Ct. 398 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1964); City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 154 N.J. 555, 575-76 , 713 A. 2d 472 (1998). [6] After the hearing officer rendered his report and recommendation, the PBA moved to reopen the hearing. 2008Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203 , 85 S.Ct. 398 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1964); City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 154 N.J. 555, 575-76 , 713 A. 2d 472 (1998). [6] After the hearing officer rendered his report and recommendation, the PBA moved to reopen the hearing. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n
green
2 sentences2008Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203 , 85 S.Ct. 398 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1964); City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 154 N.J. 555, 575-76 , 713 A. 2d 472 (1998). [6] After the hearing officer rendered his report and recommendation, the PBA moved to reopen the hearing. 2008Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203 , 85 S.Ct. 398 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1964); City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 154 N.J. 555, 575-76 , 713 A. 2d 472 (1998). [6] After the hearing officer rendered his report and recommendation, the PBA moved to reopen the hearing. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re the Commissioner of Insurance's Issuance of Orders A-92-189 & A-92-212
green
1 sentence2003The first two factors focus attention on whether the particular action was intended: (1) “to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public” and (2) “to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons.” The third and fourth factors ask whether the action was (3) “designed to operate only in future eases ... prospectively” and (4) “prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization.” The fifth factor is phrased in the alternative | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation
green
1 sentence2003The first two factors focus attention on whether the particular action was intended: (1) “to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public” and (2) “to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons.” The third and fourth factors ask whether the action was (3) “designed to operate only in future eases ... prospectively” and (4) “prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization.” The fifth factor is phrased in the alternative | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Williams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1999Williams, supra, 59 N.J. at 233 , 281 A. 2d 273 . 1999Williams, supra, 59 N.J. at 233 , 281 A. 2d 273 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Darmanin v. Darmanin
green
2 sentences1992Id. at 431 , 540 A. 2d 913 ; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. [1] Success is thus not a prerequisite for an award of counsel fees. 1992Id. at 431 , 540 A. 2d 913 ; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. [1] Success is thus not a prerequisite for an award of counsel fees. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.