14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
B.R. v. Westgreen1 sentence2018See id. | 1 | 1 |
Kaysville City v. Mulcahygreen1 sentence2011See Roybal, 2010 UT 34 , ¶¶ 14 n. 2, 20-21, 232 P.3d 1016 (holding that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to pull over a suspected drunk driver based solely on information provided by his girlfriend despite the fact that the officer had not made observations specifically corroborating the girlfriend's report); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (suggesting that where an informant's information regarding an intoxicated driver is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion, it is more important for an officer to stop a suspect before an accident occurs than for the officer to corroborate the tip by wa | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roybalgreen2 sentences2011See Roybal, 2010 UT 34 , ¶¶ 14 n. 2, 20-21, 232 P.3d 1016 (holding that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to pull over a suspected drunk driver based solely on information provided by his girlfriend despite the fact that the officer had not made observations specifically corroborating the girlfriend's report); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (suggesting that where an informant's information regarding an intoxicated driver is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion, it is more important for an officer to stop a suspect before an accident occurs than for the officer to corroborate the tip by wa 2011See Roybal, 2010 UT 34 , ¶¶ 14 n. 2, 20-21, 232 P.3d 1016 (holding that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to pull over a suspected drunk driver based solely on information provided by his girlfriend despite the fact that the officer had not made observations specifically corroborating the girlfriend's report); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (suggesting that where an informant's information regarding an intoxicated driver is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion, it is more important for an officer to stop a suspect before an accident occurs than for the officer to corroborate the tip by wa | 1 | 1 |
Taylor Ex Rel. Taylor v. Ogden City School Districtgreen2 sentences2005Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). ¶ 13 Both sides concede that “the first two factors do not shield the State” from suit. 2005Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). ¶ 13 Both sides concede that "the first two factors do not shield the State" from suit. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hodsongreen2 sentences2005See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (outlining the first two factors and stating that the third factor is “[w]eighed against these individual interests”); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining that “the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first two [factors] ... was considerable, and the critical determination is whether the third factor ... can shift the balance”). ¶28 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure used by Wah-lin and Steed “threatenfed] the safety or health of’ Defendant. 2005See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (outlining the first two factors and stating that the third factor is "[w]eighed against these individual interests"); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining that "the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first two [factors] ... was considerable, and the critical determination is whether the third factor ... can shift the balance"). ¶ 28 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure used by Wahlin and Steed "threaten[ed] the safety or health of" Defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Winston v. Leegreen2 sentences2005See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (outlining the first two factors and stating that the third factor is "[w]eighed against these individual interests"); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining that "the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first two [factors] ... was considerable, and the critical determination is whether the third factor ... can shift the balance"). ¶ 28 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure used by Wahlin and Steed "threaten[ed] the safety or health of" Defendant. 2005See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (outlining the first two factors and stating that the third factor is "[w]eighed against these individual interests"); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining that "the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first two [factors] ... was considerable, and the critical determination is whether the third factor ... can shift the balance"). ¶ 28 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure used by Wahlin and Steed "threaten[ed] the safety or health of" Defendant. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Naisbittgreen1 sentence1993STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “this court will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Newland
green
2 sentences2014Yet if all three factors were of equal weight or of "mathematically equal importance," as D.L.H. contends, see Newland, 2010 UT App 380, ¶ 26 , 253 P.3d 71 , then the third factor would have no effect whenever the first two factors favored expungement. 2014Yet if all three factors were of equal weight or of "mathematically equal importance," as D.L.H. contends, see Newland, 2010 UT App 380, ¶ 26 , 253 P.3d 71 , then the third factor would have no effect whenever the first two factors favored expungement. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Manzanares v. Byington
green
1 sentence2022Id. ¶27 “[W]e note that the factual and mixed findings described above may contain embedded legal questions.” Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 47 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re A.B.
green
1 sentence2021As to the third factor, where the 20200342-CA 6 2021 UT App 91 In re A.B. application of a statute to the facts lies in the vein of statutory interpretation—which is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Soules, 2012 UT App 238, ¶ 2 , 286 P.3d 25—sound policy dictates that application of statute be reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the juvenile court. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Soules
green
2 sentences2021As to the third factor, where the 20200342-CA 6 2021 UT App 91 In re A.B. application of a statute to the facts lies in the vein of statutory interpretation—which is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Soules, 2012 UT App 238, ¶ 2 , 286 P.3d 25—sound policy dictates that application of statute be reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the juvenile court. 2021As to the third factor, where the 20200342-CA 6 2021 UT App 91 In re A.B. application of a statute to the facts lies in the vein of statutory interpretation—which is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Soules, 2012 UT App 238, ¶ 2 , 286 P.3d 25—sound policy dictates that application of statute be reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the juvenile court. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021And because we recognized that ―[n]ot every factor is created equal,‖ we characterized the first two factors as ―‗plus‘ factor[s]—used to impose a duty where one would otherwise not exist,‖ and the latter three factors as ―‗minus‘ factors—used to eliminate a duty that would otherwise exist.‖ See id. ¶17 Before moving on, we take this opportunity to express what has been implied by our developing case law following Jeffs: The third factor regarding foreseeability has since taken on an elevated role in this court‘s duty analyses, represented in both Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, ¶ 2021And because we recognized that ―[n]ot every factor is created equal,‖ we characterized the first two factors as ―‗plus‘ factor[s]—used to impose a duty where one would otherwise not exist,‖ and the latter three factors as ―‗minus‘ factors—used to eliminate a duty that would otherwise exist.‖ See id. ¶17 Before moving on, we take this opportunity to express what has been implied by our developing case law following Jeffs: The third factor regarding foreseeability has since taken on an elevated role in this court‘s duty analyses, represented in both Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, ¶ | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Layton City v. Brierley
green
1 sentence2016Brierley, 2016 UT App 207, ¶ 16 , 357 P.3d 1018 (citing Souza, 223 F.3d at 1204 ). ¶16 The court of appeals concluded that the first two factors weighed in favor of the City; that the third factor weighed “against the City, but not strongly”; and that testimony of the officers suggested the fourth factor weighed in favor of the City. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mulder v. State
green
1 sentence2016Brierley, 2016 UT App 207, ¶ 16 , 357 P.3d 1018 (citing Souza, 223 F.3d at 1204 ). ¶16 The court of appeals concluded that the first two factors weighed in favor of the City; that the third factor weighed “against the City, but not strongly”; and that testimony of the officers suggested the fourth factor weighed in favor of the City. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States of America, -Appellee v. Larry Souza
green
1 sentence2016Brierley, 2016 UT App 207, ¶ 16 , 357 P.3d 1018 (citing Souza, 223 F.3d at 1204 ). ¶16 The court of appeals concluded that the first two factors weighed in favor of the City; that the third factor weighed “against the City, but not strongly”; and that testimony of the officers suggested the fourth factor weighed in favor of the City. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Levin
green
2 sentences2007However, "uniform application is of high importance [and], as in the context of Fourth Amendment protections, ... policy considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts." Levin, 2006 UT 50 at 1 23, 144 P.3d 1096 ; see also id. at 126 (noting that "(elven where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit that deference"). 2007However, "uniform application is of high importance [and], as in the context of Fourth Amendment protections, ... policy considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts." Levin, 2006 UT 50 at 1 23, 144 P.3d 1096 ; see also id. at 126 (noting that "(elven where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit that deference"). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Brake
green
2 sentences2007State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15 , 103 P.3d 699 . . 2007State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15 , 103 P.3d 699 . . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Birkner v. Salt Lake County
green
1 sentence1994“If the employee acts ‘from purely personal motives ... in no way connected with the employer’s interests’ or if the conduct is ‘unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous,’ then the master is not liable.” Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057 (quoting W. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.