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19 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
San Juan Cellular Telephone Company, Etc. v. Public Service Commission of Puerto Ricogreen2 sentences2017In regard to the first two factors—the entity that imposes the assessment and the entity that must pay the assessment—"[a]n assessment imposed directly by the legislature is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed by an administrative agency" and "[a]n assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed upon a narrow class." Bidart, 73 F.3d at 931 , citing San Juan, 967 F.2d at 685 . 2012San Juan at 685. {¶ 29} In regard to the first two factors — the entity that imposes the assessment and the entity that must pay the assessment — “[a]n assessment imposed directly by the legislature is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed by an administrative agency” and “[a]n assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed upon a narrow class.” Bidart, 73 F.3d at 931 , citing San Juan, 967 F.2d at 685 . {¶ 30} Most assessments fall somewhere near the middle of the spectrum between a fee and a tax; in such cases, the use of t | 1 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 651 . | 1 | 1 |
First National Bank of Louisville v. J. W. Brewer Tire Companygreen1 sentence2020Brewer Tire Co., 680 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir.1982). {¶ 41} The trial court determined appellants satisfied the first two factors, but not the third, without any discussion of the inference pertaining to the third test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watsongreen1 sentence2016(E) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of this section, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant factors, and any other relevant factors, against a transfer under that division: (1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged. (2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged. (3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person. (4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or h | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colongreen2 sentences2008Colon I , 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917 , at ¶ 51 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting). 2008Colon I , 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917 , at ¶ 51 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
DeRolph v. Stategreen2 sentences2001The dissent in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193 , 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), offered a compelling explanation why the first two factors cut in favor of the conclusion that the Education Clause of the Ohio Constitution commits to the General Assembly the power to define what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” system of schools. 2001The dissent in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193 , 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), offered a compelling explanation why the first two factors cut in favor of the conclusion that the Education Clause of the Ohio Constitution commits to the General Assembly the power to define what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” system of schools. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Flickingergreen2 sentences2001Although the appellant only challenges the trial court's disposition with regards to the first two factors, we note that Davis v. Flickinger , supra , at 417, holds that the record must support all three of these conclusions or the custody modification is contrary to law. 13 Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 . 14 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 599 , 604-605 , citing Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 ; see, also, Hetterich v. Hetterich (April 9, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-06-122, unreported. 15 Musson v. Musson (June 10, 1998), Hardin App. No. 6-98-01, unreported, c 2001Although the appellant only challenges the trial court's disposition with regards to the first two factors, we note that Davis v. Flickinger , supra , at 417, holds that the record must support all three of these conclusions or the custody modification is contrary to law. 13 Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 . 14 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 599 , 604-605 , citing Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 ; see, also, Hetterich v. Hetterich (April 9, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-06-122, unreported. 15 Musson v. Musson (June 10, 1998), Hardin App. No. 6-98-01, unreported, c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bidart Brothers, a California Corporation v. The California Apple Commission
green
2 sentences2017In regard to the first two factors—the entity that imposes the assessment and the entity that must pay the assessment—"[a]n assessment imposed directly by the legislature is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed by an administrative agency" and "[a]n assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed upon a narrow class." Bidart, 73 F.3d at 931 , citing San Juan, 967 F.2d at 685 . 2012San Juan at 685. {¶ 29} In regard to the first two factors — the entity that imposes the assessment and the entity that must pay the assessment — “[a]n assessment imposed directly by the legislature is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed by an administrative agency” and “[a]n assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed upon a narrow class.” Bidart, 73 F.3d at 931 , citing San Juan, 967 F.2d at 685 . {¶ 30} Most assessments fall somewhere near the middle of the spectrum between a fee and a tax; in such cases, the use of t | 2 | 2012–2017 |
Ungar v. Sarafite
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 67- 68. {¶31} In this case, Ames argues that the factors that the Ohio Supreme Court delineated in Unger support granting his motion for a continuance immediately preceding trial on the basis that there was a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the delay referenced by the trial court was not supported by the record. -16- Case No. 1-19-02 {¶32} Ames argues that the first two factors of Unger, (1) the length of delay requested and (2) whether other continuances have been requested or received, weigh in his favor. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re M.P.
green
2 sentences2019If the first two factors are met, then the juvenile court “must then continue the proceeding for a full investigation.” In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445 , 2010-Ohio-599 , 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 12 , citing R.C. 2152.12(C) and Juv.R. 30(C). 2019If the first two factors are met, then the juvenile court “must then continue the proceeding for a full investigation.” In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445 , 2010-Ohio-599 , 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 12 , citing R.C. 2152.12(C) and Juv.R. 30(C). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Blakemore v. Blakemore
green
1 sentence2018The trial court found that Charlene was William's wife of 27 years, whereas Linda was William's biological sister. ( Id. ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.
green
1 sentence2015Franklin No. 13AP-1004, 2014-Ohio-2913, ¶ 28 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Brown, Ca2008-08-021 (5-11-2009)
green
1 sentence2013No. CA2008-08-021, 2009-Ohio-2204, ¶ 59 , quoting Rotte v. Rotte, 12th Dist. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 08ca009324 (1-12-2009)
neutral
1 sentence2011“A reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder, but must uphold the finding if it is supported by ‘some competent, credible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Jenkins, 2009-Ohio-75, at ¶5 ). {¶9} Regarding the first two factors, Ms. Guggenbiller has argued that the evidence established that she has lived with her father, not her boyfriend, since the time of the divorce. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Peck v. Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors
green
2 sentences2005Id., 572 Pa. at 256 , 814 A.2d at 189 . {¶ 57} The Petersburg Defendants fit the first two factors since they owned and operated the quarry. 2005Id., 572 Pa. at 256 , 814 A.2d at 189 . {¶ 57} The Petersburg Defendants fit the first two factors since they owned and operated the quarry. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Edmonson
green
1 sentence2004However, in my view, the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4)(b) was based upon facts not in the record and thus the court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. {¶ 93} R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4)(b) permits the imposition of consecutive sentences if the court finds: {¶ 94} "At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Edmonson
green
1 sentence2004However, in my view, the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4)(b) was based upon facts not in the record and thus the court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. {¶ 93} R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4)(b) permits the imposition of consecutive sentences if the court finds: {¶ 94} "At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wyss v. Wyss
green
2 sentences2001Although the appellant only challenges the trial court's disposition with regards to the first two factors, we note that Davis v. Flickinger , supra , at 417, holds that the record must support all three of these conclusions or the custody modification is contrary to law. 13 Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 . 14 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 599 , 604-605 , citing Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 ; see, also, Hetterich v. Hetterich (April 9, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-06-122, unreported. 15 Musson v. Musson (June 10, 1998), Hardin App. No. 6-98-01, unreported, c 2001Although the appellant only challenges the trial court's disposition with regards to the first two factors, we note that Davis v. Flickinger , supra , at 417, holds that the record must support all three of these conclusions or the custody modification is contrary to law. 13 Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 . 14 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 599 , 604-605 , citing Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 ; see, also, Hetterich v. Hetterich (April 9, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-06-122, unreported. 15 Musson v. Musson (June 10, 1998), Hardin App. No. 6-98-01, unreported, c | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh
green
1 sentence2001Although the appellant only challenges the trial court's disposition with regards to the first two factors, we note that Davis v. Flickinger , supra , at 417, holds that the record must support all three of these conclusions or the custody modification is contrary to law. 13 Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 . 14 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 599 , 604-605 , citing Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412 ; see, also, Hetterich v. Hetterich (April 9, 2001), Butler App. No. CA2000-06-122, unreported. 15 Musson v. Musson (June 10, 1998), Hardin App. No. 6-98-01, unreported, c | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Chapman v. Adia Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1997Considering the factors set forth in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679-680 , 102 S.Ct. at 2091-2092 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 427 , we find that the first two factors favor the state. 1997Considering the factors set forth in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679-680 , 102 S.Ct. at 2091-2092 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 427 , we find that the first two factors favor the state. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
American Financial Leasing & Services Co. v. Miller
green
1 sentence1981We have discussed the issue of liquidated damages in the case of American Financial Leasing v. Miller (1974), 41 Ohio App. 2d 69 [70 O.O(.2d 64]. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.