first two factors in Iowa

2019The first two factors require a movant to “affirmatively show he intended to defend and took steps to do so, but because of some misunderstanding, accident, or excusable neglect failed to do so.” Brandenburg, 603 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978)).

1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978) (“The movant must affirmatively show he intended to defend and took steps to do so, but because of. some misunderstanding, accident, or excusable neglect failed to do so.”); Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., 256 Iowa 700, 707 , 128 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1964) (holding that district court has discretion to set aside a default and default judgment when the defendant (1) acts promptly, (2) in good faith intends to defend, and (3) shows a meritorious defense).

2017We, however, have generally considered the Penn Central test to be a two-part test, merging the first two factors described in Kaiser Aetna— (1) “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,]’ ” and (2) “the ‘character of the government action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’ ” Harms, 702 N.W

2017We, however, have generally considered the Penn Central test to be a two-part test, merging the first two factors described in Kaiser Aetna— (1) “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,]’ ” and (2) “the ‘character of the government action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’ ” Harms, 702 N.W

2009Some courts view the Supreme Court’s precedent as according greater weight to the first two factors, see, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (“It bears emphasis, however, that the United States Supreme Court has placed far greater weight—indeed, it invariably has placed dispositive weight—on the first two factors, that is, whether the group has been the subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and whether the group’s distinguishing characteristic bears no relation to the ability of the group members to perform or function in society.”), or as suggesting the factors are alternative me

2009Some courts view the Supreme Court’s precedent as according greater weight to the first two factors, see, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (“It bears emphasis, however, that the United States Supreme Court has placed far greater weight—indeed, it invariably has placed dispositive weight—on the first two factors, that is, whether the group has been the subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and whether the group’s distinguishing characteristic bears no relation to the ability of the group members to perform or function in society.”), or as suggesting the factors are alternative me

2024Cf. id. (concluding challenge by bar operators to governor’s COVID-19 public health order was of a public nature); Women Aware v. Reagen, 331 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1983) (determining agency’s decision not to implement benefit increase expressly required by the legislature “arguably is a matter of substantial public interest”). 7 Aspire claims that resolving this question would provide guidance to Iowans who have executed or are considering executing a power of attorney.

2023See id. at 861 (stating the “passage of time abated the barrage of media coverage which occurred when the story first broke”).

2020Nevertheless, a legal dictionary defines the term to mean, “A real-property owner who rents substandard housing units in a crowded, economically depressed area and allows the units to fall into further disrepair, esp. while charging unfairly high rents,” or simply “the owner of any run-down rental property.” Slumlord, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th. ed. 2019); see also Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Del. 1998) (finding an article that describes the plaintiff as a “slumlord” “may convey the inaccurate impression that [the plaintiff] does, in fact, own a sizable amount of sub-standard ren

2009But see Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609-14 (holding sexual-orientation-based legislation is not entitled to heightened scrutiny because gay and lesbian people are not politically powerless, even though other factors are satisfied); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974 (determining plaintiffs failed to show homosexuality is an immutable trait *889 and consequently holding sexual-orientation-based distinctions do not demand closer judicial scrutiny). 17 .

2009See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 , 433–34, 104 S. Ct. 1879 , 1882–83, 80 L.

2009See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 , 433–34, 104 S. Ct. 1879 , 1882–83, 80 L.

2002See Guinness Import *900 Co. v. Mark VII Distrib., Inc., 153 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir.1998).

1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978) (“The movant must affirmatively show he intended to defend and took steps to do so, but because of. some misunderstanding, accident, or excusable neglect failed to do so.”); Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., 256 Iowa 700, 707 , 128 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1964) (holding that district court has discretion to set aside a default and default judgment when the defendant (1) acts promptly, (2) in good faith intends to defend, and (3) shows a meritorious defense).

1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978) (“The movant must affirmatively show he intended to defend and took steps to do so, but because of. some misunderstanding, accident, or excusable neglect failed to do so.”); Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., 256 Iowa 700, 707 , 128 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1964) (holding that district court has discretion to set aside a default and default judgment when the defendant (1) acts promptly, (2) in good faith intends to defend, and (3) shows a meritorious defense).

1996Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Iowa 1989) (Hulme I).