12 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bush v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Miss.1991). 2001Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Miss.1991). | 3 | 5 |
Thorson v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Puckett, 788 So.2d at 757 ; Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 898 (Miss.1994) (Smith, J., dissenting); Bush v. State, 585 So.2d at 1267-68 . 1999Puckett, 788 So. 2d at 757 ; Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 898 (Miss. 1994) (Smith, J., dissenting); Bush v. State, 585 So.2d at 1267-68 . | 2 | 2 |
Randall v. Stategreen1 sentence2020“Thus, the pivotal question is whether the opponent of the strike has met the burden of showing that proponent has engaged in a pattern of strikes based on race or gender, or in other words the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Randall v. State, 716 So. 2d 584, 587 (¶11) (Miss. 1998)); see also 6 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 . ¶9. | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2020“Thus, the pivotal question is whether the opponent of the strike has met the burden of showing that proponent has engaged in a pattern of strikes based on race or gender, or in other words the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Randall v. State, 716 So. 2d 584, 587 (¶11) (Miss. 1998)); see also 6 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 . ¶9. | 1 | 1 |
Powers v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2020The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991), modified the requirements for a prima facie showing of discrimination; the decision “in essence eliminated the first two factors required by Batson.” Ryals, 794 So. 2d at 166 (¶13) (citing Puckett v. State, 788 So. 3d 752 , 757 (¶10) (Miss. 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Ryals v. Stategreen1 sentence2020The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991), modified the requirements for a prima facie showing of discrimination; the decision “in essence eliminated the first two factors required by Batson.” Ryals, 794 So. 2d at 166 (¶13) (citing Puckett v. State, 788 So. 3d 752 , 757 (¶10) (Miss. 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Puckett v. State
green
2 sentences2002Thus, the pivotal question is "whether the opponent of the strike has met the burden of showing that proponent has engaged in a pattern of strikes based on race or gender, or in other words `the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.'" Puckett v. State, 788 So.2d 752 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 2001Puckett, 788 So.2d at 757 ; Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 898 (Miss.1994) (Smith, J., dissenting); Bush v. State, 585 So.2d at 1267-68 . | 3 | 1999–2002 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2022Clearly, the length of delay between arrest and trial—almost three years—was “extraordinary,” and “a good part of that [delay] was attributable to the [State]’s failure or inability to try [Eubanks] . . . .” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533-34 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mitchell v. Craft
green
1 sentence2018So, looking to the first two factors, the injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred in Mississippi. 13 And though the first two factors initially weigh in favor of Mississippi, this Court has made clear that the place where the injury occurred often "bears little relationship to any relevant considerations for choosing one law against another in a particular tort case." Mitchell , 211 So.2d at 513 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Entex, Inc. v. McGuire
green
2 sentences2014Acey argues that factor one, whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, is satisfied, because she arrived at the accident scene within minutes; her daughter was continuing to be injured as a result of the accident, since her body was still smoking and her skin was flaking, and A.A. was still located at the accident scene.5 Entex, 414 So. 2d at 5 For the sake of thoroughness, Acey contends that she arrived at the accident scene in seven minutes; however, this is based upon the usual travel time between where Acey was located when she learned of the accident and the accident s 2014Acey argues that factor one, whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, is satisfied, because she arrived at the accident scene within minutes; her daughter was continuing to be injured as a result of the accident, since her body was still smoking and her skin was flaking, and A.A. was still located at the accident scene. 5 Entex, 414 So.2d at 444 (citing Dillon, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d at 920 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences2014Acey argues that factor one, whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, is satisfied, because she arrived at the accident scene within minutes; her daughter was continuing to be injured as a result of the accident, since her body was still smoking and her skin was flaking, and A.A. was still located at the accident scene. 5 Entex, 414 So.2d at 444 (citing Dillon, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d at 920 ). 2014Acey argues that factor one, whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, is satisfied, because she arrived at the accident scene within minutes; her daughter was continuing to be injured as a result of the accident, since her body was still smoking and her skin was flaking, and A.A. was still located at the accident scene. 5 Entex, 414 So.2d at 444 (citing Dillon, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d at 920 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. McGrone
green
1 sentence2007The final factor under McGrone is a demonstration that "the prosecution's destruction of the evidence must have been in bad faith." Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Folk v. State
green
2 sentences1991As noted in the recent case of Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss. 1991), our legislature has enacted what is known as "the 270 day rule." The problem of delays in the processing and prosecution of criminal charges has plagued this nation for many years. 1991As noted in the recent case of Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss. 1991), our legislature has enacted what is known as "the 270 day rule." The problem of delays in the processing and prosecution of criminal charges has plagued this nation for many years. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.