first two factors in Florida

2001"The first two factors are jurisdictional, and an assessment of jurisdiction must be made prior to reaching the third." Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So.2d 694 , 698 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see also Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998) ("[I]t is settled law that, as a condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal.").

2001“The first two factors are jurisdictional, and an assessment of jurisdiction must be made prior to reaching the third.” Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So.2d 694 , 698 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see also Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998) (“[I]t is settled law that, as a condition precedent to invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal.”).

2015Id. at 97-100, 123 S.Ct. 1140 . 4 The Supreme Court acknowledged that Alaska’s statute might deter future crimes (the fourth factor), but emphasized that the statute’s provisions were rationally connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which was advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in the community (the sixth factor).

2013The third factor requires us to determine whether Miller is one of those “fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding.” Witt, 387 So.2d at 929 .

2009Further support for this conclusion appears in Progressive Express Insurance Co. v. Reed, 971 So.2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)(holding that abatement or stay of declaratory judgment action on insurance coverage issues while underlying tort action was pending was a departure from the essential requirements of law), and Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Ridenour, 629 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(granting certiorari to quash order abating declaratory judgment action on duty to defend pending outcome of underlying action against insureds).

2009Further support for this conclusion appears in Progressive Express Insurance Co. v. Reed, 971 So.2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)(holding that abatement or stay of declaratory judgment action on insurance coverage issues while underlying tort action was pending was a departure from the essential requirements of law), and Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Ridenour, 629 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(granting certiorari to quash order abating declaratory judgment action on duty to defend pending outcome of underlying action against insureds).

1994However, while we recognize the broad discretion vested in the trial court to make determinations in cases such as this, Wells v. Wells, 501 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), we do not agree with the application of the remaining factors to the evidence or the ultimate conclusion that the move would not be in the best interests of the children.

1985Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982), iterated three types of situations which can subject the governmental entity to liability: (1) [T]he necessary warning or correction of a known dangerous condition; (2) the necessary and proper maintenance of existing improvements, as explained and illustrated in Commercial Carrier, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); and (3) the proper construction or installation and design of *1304 the improvement plan, as explained in Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). (emphasis in original) In our view the facts in the case at bar display the existence of

1985Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982), iterated three types of situations which can subject the governmental entity to liability: (1) [T]he necessary warning or correction of a known dangerous condition; (2) the necessary and proper maintenance of existing improvements, as explained and illustrated in Commercial Carrier, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); and (3) the proper construction or installation and design of *1304 the improvement plan, as explained in Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). (emphasis in original) In our view the facts in the case at bar display the existence of

1936Reports, 604, 88 P. 734 , it was held: "Although, in an ordinary action for divorce, the court has no jurisdiction to dispose of the separate property of either party, yet, where the wife instituted a dual action for *Page 592 divorce, and to quiet her title against the husband to one-half of the property conveyed to her by the husband as her separate estate, and issues were joined upon the complaint and upon the cross-complaint of the husband claiming title to the whole property, and the case was tried upon its merits without objection by either party, the court had power to determine the iss