113 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Toshred2 sentences2016We then commented that this "analysis requires a particularized harmlessness inquiry utilizing the three factors set out in Jones" and that "in our evaluation of the third of the three harmlessness factors in prosecutorial misconduct cases . . . [w]e must avoid using this factor and the weight of the inculpatory evidence as a default, a shortcut past careful comparison of the often competing influences of the first two factors." Tosh, 278 Kan. at 93, 97 . 2014See Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012 ; State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 97 , 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (“Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that both the K.S.A. 60-261 and the Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. | 8 | 30 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2024Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. 2024Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. | 4 | 101 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences2015The third factor can override the first two factors only if the State can prove “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (recognizing that while the State must prove harmlessness under both statutory and constitutional standards, the outcome turns on the constitutional sta 2015The third factor can override the first two factors only if the State can prove “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (recognizing that while the State must prove harmlessness under both statutory and constitutional standards, the outcome turns on the constitutional sta | 2 | 6 |
State v. Albrightgreen2 sentences2011Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 [ reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." State v. 2010Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is inconsistent with substantial justice] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 [ 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." McReynolds, 288 Kan. at 323 , 202 P.3d 658 . | 1 | 10 |
State v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences2014See Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012 ; State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 97 , 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (“Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that both the K.S.A. 60-261 and the Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. 2014Ed. 2d 705 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), have been met.” State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989 , Syl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 306 P.3d 244 (2013). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2007Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial), *1145 have been met." State v. White, 284 Kan. 333 , Syl. ¶ 2, 161 P.3d 208 (2007). 2007Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial), *1145 have been met." State v. White, 284 Kan. 333 , Syl. ¶ 2, 161 P.3d 208 (2007). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Naputigreen2 sentences2012The third factor of the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct test may not override the first two factors unless the State proves “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record/ ” State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 58 , 260 P.3d 86 (2011) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011]). 2012The third factor of the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct test may not override the first two factors unless the State proves “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record/ ” State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 58 , 260 P.3d 86 (2011) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011]). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Ortega-Cadelangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seymour v. United States
green
2 sentences2011Turning to the third factor, whether the evidence against the defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of the jurors, in the past we frequently stated the third factor cannot override the first two factors unless we are able to say the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had 2011Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 [ reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." State v. | 28 | 2007–2015 |
State v. McReynolds
green
2 sentences2011Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 [ reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." State v. 2011Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 [ reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." State v. | 9 | 2010–2022 |
State v. Bryant
green
2 sentences2011Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial) have been met." State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970 , Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008). 2011Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial) have been met." State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970 , Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008). | 9 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Swinney
green
2 sentences2008Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors, unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is inconsistent with substantial justice] and Chapman [ v. California ], 386 U.S. 18 , [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial)], have been met. [Citations omitted.]" Swinney, 280 Kan. at 780 , 127 P.3d 261 . 2008Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors, unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is inconsistent with substantial justice] and Chapman [ v. California ], 386 U.S. 18 , [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial)], have been met. [Citations omitted.]" Swinney, 280 Kan. at 780 , 127 P.3d 261 . | 9 | 2006–2008 |
Berger v. New York
green
2 sentences2011Turning to the third factor, whether the evidence against the defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of the jurors, in the past we frequently stated the third factor cannot override the first two factors unless we are able to say the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had 2011Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , [22,] 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 [ reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 ] (1967) [conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428 [ 153 P.3d 497 ]." State v. | 8 | 2007–2011 |
State v. McCaslin
green
2 sentences2013Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) . . . , have been met.” [Citation omitted.]’ State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 715-16 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). 2013Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) . . . , have been met.” [Citation omitted.]’ State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 715-16 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). | 5 | 2011–2013 |
State v. Richmond
green
2 sentences2011Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of tire trial), have been met.’ ” State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 440 , 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (quoting State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970 , Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 [2008]). 2011Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of tire trial), have been met.’ ” State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 440 , 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (quoting State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970 , Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 [2008]). | 4 | 2010–2011 |
State v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2016Ed. 2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial), have been met.” Simmons, 292 Kan. 406 , Syl. ¶ 2. 2011Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed tire result of the trial), have been met.” State v. Simmons, 292 Kan. 406 , Syl. ¶ 2, 254 P.3d 94 (2011). | 2 | 2011–2016 |
State v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2015The third factor can override the first two factors only if the State can prove “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (recognizing that while the State must prove harmlessness under both statutory and constitutional standards, the outcome turns on the constitutional sta 2015No single factor is controlling, but the third factor can override the first two factors only if “ ‘die party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (noting application of both statutory and constitutional harmlessness analysis under Chapma | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Bingham v. United States
green
2 sentences2015The third factor can override the first two factors only if the State can prove “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (recognizing that while the State must prove harmlessness under both statutory and constitutional standards, the outcome turns on the constitutional sta 2015No single factor is controlling, but the third factor can override the first two factors only if “ ‘die party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 417 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]) (noting application of both statutory and constitutional harmlessness analysis under Chapma | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Ward, 292 Kan. at 549 ; State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 66-67 , 253 P.3d 5 (2011); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93 , 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). 2012See, e.g., Ward, 292 Kan. at 549 ; State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 66-67 , 253 P.3d 5 (2011); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93 , 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). | 2 | 2011–2012 |
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2011Ed. 2d 705 (1967), harmlessness tests have been met.” State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54 , Syl. ¶¶ 17-18, 183 P.3d 801 (2008). 2011Ed. 2d 705 (1967), harmlessness tests have been met.” State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54 , Syl. ¶¶ 17-18, 183 P.3d 801 (2008). | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Hunt
green
2 sentences2010State v. McRey- *836 nolds, 288 Kan. 318, 323 , 202 P.3d 658 (2009); Hunt, 285 Kan. at 872 . 2009State v. Hunt, 285 Kan. 855, 871-72 , 176 P.3d 183 (2008). *1117 In the present case, the district court held a hearing on the issues raised in Shadden’s motion in limine. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
State v. Donesay
green
2 sentences2008We also regard the prosecutorial misconduct case as an appropriate one for application of the dual standard discussed in [State v.] Donesay, 265 Kan. [60,] 88[, 959 P.2d 862 (1998)]. 2008We also regard the prosecutorial misconduct case as an appropriate one for application of the dual standard discussed in [ State v.] Donesay , 265 Kan. [60,] 88[, 959 P.2d 862 (1998)]. | 2 | 2004–2008 |
State v. Betts
green
1 sentence2025State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191 , 197, 514 P.3d 341 (2022) (statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review). 13 With that background, we begin with a review of the evidence used to support the AG's motion for injunctive relief, particularly the first two factors: (1) the probability of irreparable injury to the State if the injunction is not granted and (2) a substantial likelihood the State will eventually prevail on the merits of its mandamus action. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Akins
green
1 sentence2015Ed. 2d 705 (1967), have been met.” Akins, 298 Kan. 592 , Syl. ¶ 2. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Dull
green
1 sentence2014Ed. 2d 705 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), have been met.’ State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989 , Syl. ¶ ¶ 14, 15, 306 P.3d 244 (2013).” Dull, 298 Kan. at 836 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Inkelaar
green
1 sentence2012Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 431 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2012Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967) ..., have been met. [Citations omitted.]” Martinez, 290 Kan. at 1012 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. 2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. 2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Stieben
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. 2011See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___ , ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 , Syl. *95 ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539 , 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Murray green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Whitaker
green
2 sentences2010"When a defendant claims that a prosecutor committed reversible misconduct, the prejudicial nature of alleged errors is analyzed in the context of the trial record as a whole." State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 511 , 174 P.3d 407 (2008) (citing State v. Whitaker, 255 Kan. 118, 134 , 872 P.2d 278 [1994]). 2010"When a defendant claims that a prosecutor committed reversible misconduct, the prejudicial nature of alleged errors is analyzed in the context of the trial record as a whole." State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 511 , 174 P.3d 407 (2008) (citing State v. Whitaker, 255 Kan. 118, 134 , 872 P.2d 278 [1994]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Landmark National Bank v. Kesler green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Decker green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Warledo green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Carter green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Kessler green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Dixon green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Elnicki green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.