American rule in Oklahoma

1983City National Bank & Trust v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977); Hanska v. Hanska, Okl., 395 P.2d 648 (1964). 3 The American rule seeks to maintain freedom of access to the courts by requiring both parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

1983City National Bank & Trust v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977); Hanska v. Hanska, Okl., 395 P.2d 648 (1964). 3 The American rule seeks to maintain freedom of access to the courts by requiring both parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

1977Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever ‘overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.’ Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).

1977Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever ‘overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.’ Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).

1977Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever ‘overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.’ Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).

1977Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever ‘overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.’ Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).

1977Courts have long recognized that attorney fees may be awarded when an opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason, 2 or where a successful litigant has conferred a substantial benefit upon a class of person and the court’s shifting of the fees operates to spread the costs proportionately among the members of the benefited class. 3 Additionally, courts have also recognized a “private attorney general” rationale. 4 The United States Supreme Court, in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1943 , 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973), in addressing an issue involving the awardin

1977Courts have long recognized that attorney fees may be awarded when an opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason, 2 or where a successful litigant has conferred a substantial benefit upon a class of person and the court’s shifting of the fees operates to spread the costs proportionately among the members of the benefited class. 3 Additionally, courts have also recognized a “private attorney general” rationale. 4 The United States Supreme Court, in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1943 , 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973), in addressing an issue involving the awardin

1957In fact, in discussing the “American rule” or “rule of reasonable use”, we quoted from Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623 , 74 A. 379, 385 , 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 465, as follows: (The rule of reasonable use) “ ‘does not prevent the proper user by any landowner of the percolating waters subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation, or otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining or the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may thus be interfered with or diverted, but it does prevent the withdrawal of undergroun

1957In fact, in discussing the “American rule” or “rule of reasonable use”, we quoted from Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623 , 74 A. 379, 385 , 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 465, as follows: (The rule of reasonable use) “ ‘does not prevent the proper user by any landowner of the percolating waters subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation, or otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining or the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may thus be interfered with or diverted, but it does prevent the withdrawal of undergroun

2025City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens , 1977 OK 86 565 P.2d 4 If no offer of judgment or counteroffer of judgment is accepted and the judgment awarded the plaintiff is less than one or more offers of judgment, the defendant shall be entitled to reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the defendant with respect to the action or the claim or claims included in the offer of judgment from and after the date of the first offer of judgment which is greater than the judgment until the date of the judgment.

2025Bays Exploration, Inc. v. Jones , 2007 OK CIV APP 111 172 P.3d 217 de novo whether the decision that each party bear their own attorney's fees was authorized by law. ¶10 Oklahoma follows the "American rule" that a party cannot recover attorney's fees unless provided by statute or contract.

2025Bays Exploration, Inc. v. Jones , 2007 OK CIV APP 111 172 P.3d 217 de novo whether the decision that each party bear their own attorney's fees was authorized by law. ¶10 Oklahoma follows the "American rule" that a party cannot recover attorney's fees unless provided by statute or contract.

2020Co. , 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001) and Antal's Restaurant, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. , 680 A.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C.1996) and observations on the majority rule in several states); Kent General Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc. , 442 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Del.1982) ("Courts distinguish between assignment of a policy by an insured, which might change the risk, and assignment of the mere right to receive payment, which is a fixed obligation of the insurer, enforcing contract provisions barring the former [ i.e. , assignment of a policy], but not those barring the l

2020Co. , 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001) and Antal's Restaurant, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. , 680 A.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C.1996) and observations on the majority rule in several states); Kent General Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc. , 442 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Del.1982) ("Courts distinguish between assignment of a policy by an insured, which might change the risk, and assignment of the mere right to receive payment, which is a fixed obligation of the insurer, enforcing contract provisions barring the former [ i.e. , assignment of a policy], but not those barring the l

2020Insurance , supra , at § 749. 24 See, e.g., Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation , 63 So.3d 955 , 961 & n. 9 (La.2011) (prevailing American rule distinguishes between pre-loss and post-loss assignments), citing Conrad Brothers v. John Deere Ins.

2020Insurance , supra , at § 749. 24 See, e.g., Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation , 63 So.3d 955 , 961 & n. 9 (La.2011) (prevailing American rule distinguishes between pre-loss and post-loss assignments), citing Conrad Brothers v. John Deere Ins.

2020Co. , 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001) and Antal's Restaurant, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. , 680 A.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C.1996) and observations on the majority rule in several states); Kent General Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc. , 442 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Del.1982) ("Courts distinguish between assignment of a policy by an insured, which might change the risk, and assignment of the mere right to receive payment, which is a fixed obligation of the insurer, enforcing contract provisions barring the former [ i.e. , assignment of a policy], but not those barring the l

2020Co. , 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001) and Antal's Restaurant, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. , 680 A.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C.1996) and observations on the majority rule in several states); Kent General Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc. , 442 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Del.1982) ("Courts distinguish between assignment of a policy by an insured, which might change the risk, and assignment of the mere right to receive payment, which is a fixed obligation of the insurer, enforcing contract provisions barring the former [ i.e. , assignment of a policy], but not those barring the l

2013"Exceptions to the American Rule are narrowly defined." Eagle Bluff, L.L.C. v. Taylor, 2010 OK 47, ¶ 16 , 237 P.3d 173, 179 .

2013"Exceptions to the American Rule are narrowly defined." Eagle Bluff, L.L.C. v. Taylor, 2010 OK 47, ¶ 16 , 237 P.3d 173, 179 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2005Hough v. Hough, 2004 OK 45, ¶ 13 , 92 P.3d 695, 702 ; Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 1996 OK 133, ¶ 13 , 930 P.2d 213, 219-20 ; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 20, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 ; Moses v. Hoebel, 1982 OK 26 , ¶ 5, 646 P.2d 601, 603 (under the American rule that is followed in Oklahoma, attorney's fees are not ordinarily allowed unless their recovery is authorized by statute or contract). [12] For a discussion of the procedural alternatives to certiorari, see Part II infra. [13] McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, ¶ 12 , 979 P.2d 252, 257 .

2004Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 7, 690 P.2d 1048, 1049 ; Garner v. City of Tulsa, 1982 OK 104, ¶ 32 , 651 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 .

2004Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70 , ¶ 7, 690 P.2d 1048, 1049 ; Garner v. City of Tulsa, 1982 OK 104, ¶ 32 , 651 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 .

2003Morgan v. Galilean Health Enterprises Inc., 1998 OK 130 , 977 P.2d 357 .

2003Morgan v. Galilean Health Enterprises Inc., 1998 OK 130 , 977 P.2d 357 .

1999Bradley, 1990 OK 73, n. 10 , 804 P.2d at 428 , specifically noted that the specialization inquiry must focus “on the scope of the contract work, rather than on an individual task of the injured worker.” (Emphasis added.) Applying Bradley's “sharp tool” to the principles outlined in Murphy , we can only conclude that the relevant inquiry had to include consideration of the fabrication of the curtains. ¶ 16 Because the evidence presented to the trial court did not include any information concerning the facts necessary to determine whether all of the contract work which Shackelford’s employer was

1999Bradley, 1990 OK 73, n. 10 , 804 P.2d at 428 , specifically noted that the specialization inquiry must focus “on the scope of the contract work, rather than on an individual task of the injured worker.” (Emphasis added.) Applying Bradley's “sharp tool” to the principles outlined in Murphy , we can only conclude that the relevant inquiry had to include consideration of the fabrication of the curtains. ¶ 16 Because the evidence presented to the trial court did not include any information concerning the facts necessary to determine whether all of the contract work which Shackelford’s employer was

1985The Supreme Court of our neighbor state has expressed the same thoughts: "We now declare, in accord with what appears to be the American rule, that an `interest' necessary to disqualify a judge must be a present pecuniary interest in the result . . . and not some indirect, remote, speculative, theoretical or possible interest." State v. Scarborough , 410 P.2d 732 , 734 (N.M. 1966).

1985The Supreme Court of our neighbor state has expressed the same thoughts: "We now declare, in accord with what appears to be the American rule, that an `interest' necessary to disqualify a judge must be a present pecuniary interest in the result . . . and not some indirect, remote, speculative, theoretical or possible interest." State v. Scarborough , 410 P.2d 732 , 734 (N.M. 1966).

1984Peabody Galion Corp. v. Kropp, Okl., 658 P.2d 1155 (1983); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Miskovsky, Okl., 654 P.2d 596 (1982).

1984Peabody Galion Corp. v. Kropp, Okl., 658 P.2d 1155 (1983); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Miskovsky, Okl., 654 P.2d 596 (1982).

1983City National Bank & Trust v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977); Hanska v. Hanska, Okl., 395 P.2d 648 (1964). 3 The American rule seeks to maintain freedom of access to the courts by requiring both parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

1983City National Bank & Trust v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977); Hanska v. Hanska, Okl., 395 P.2d 648 (1964). 3 The American rule seeks to maintain freedom of access to the courts by requiring both parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

1957In fact, in discussing the “American rule” or “rule of reasonable use”, we quoted from Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623 , 74 A. 379, 385 , 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 465, as follows: (The rule of reasonable use) “ ‘does not prevent the proper user by any landowner of the percolating waters subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation, or otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining or the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may thus be interfered with or diverted, but it does prevent the withdrawal of undergroun

1957In fact, in discussing the “American rule” or “rule of reasonable use”, we quoted from Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623 , 74 A. 379, 385 , 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 465, as follows: (The rule of reasonable use) “ ‘does not prevent the proper user by any landowner of the percolating waters subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation, or otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining or the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may thus be interfered with or diverted, but it does prevent the withdrawal of undergroun

1952Defendant calls attention to the fact that the so-called American rule as to the placing of a lessee in possession required only that he be placed in legal possession, while the other, or English rule, holds that there is an implied covenant to place the lessee in actual possession (see Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356 , 70 A.L.R. 141 ), and asserts that the American rule is generally prevalent in the United States.

1952Defendant calls attention to the fact that the so-called American rule as to the placing of a lessee in possession required only that he be placed in legal possession, while the other, or English rule, holds that there is an implied covenant to place the lessee in actual possession (see Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356 , 70 A.L.R. 141 ), and asserts that the American rule is generally prevalent in the United States.