American rule in Maryland

2023As is well established, “Maryland generally adheres to the common law, or American rule, that each party to a case is responsible for the fees of its own attorneys, regardless of the outcome.” Friolo v. Frankel, 403 Md. 443, 456 , 942 A.2d 1242, 1250 (2008) (citations omitted).

2023As is well established, “Maryland generally adheres to the common law, or American rule, that each party to a case is responsible for the fees of its own attorneys, regardless of the outcome.” Friolo v. Frankel, 403 Md. 443, 456 , 942 A.2d 1242, 1250 (2008) (citations omitted).

2008In Bausch & Lomb, 355 Md. 566, 591-92 , 735 A.2d 1081, 1095 (1999) (quoting Collier v. MD-Individual Practice, 327 Md. 1, 16-17 , 607 A.2d 537, 542-45 (1992)), we stated as follows: “From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff’s action on a liability insurance policy for breach of a promise to defend, or to pay the cost of defense, should include counsel fees in prosecuting the breach of contract action, when successful plaintiffs’ actions for other breaches of insurance contracts, or for breaches of other contracts,

2008In Bausch & Lomb, 355 Md. 566, 591-92 , 735 A.2d 1081, 1095 (1999) (quoting Collier v. MD-Individual Practice, 327 Md. 1, 16-17 , 607 A.2d 537, 542-45 (1992)), we stated as follows: “From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff’s action on a liability insurance policy for breach of a promise to defend, or to pay the cost of defense, should include counsel fees in prosecuting the breach of contract action, when successful plaintiffs’ actions for other breaches of insurance contracts, or for breaches of other contracts,

1999See, e.g, Mesmer v. M.A.I.F., 353 Md. 241, 264 , 725 A.2d 1053, 1064 (1999) (“damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend [the insured against liability claims] are limited to the insured’s expenses, including attorney fees, in defending the underlying tort action, as well as the insured’s expenses and attorney fees in a separate contract or declaratory judgment action if such action is filed to establish that there exists a duty to defend”); Litz v. State Farm, supra, 346 Md. at 232, 695 A.2d at 573; Hess Construction v. Board of Education, supra, 341 Md. at 160 , 669 A.2d at 1354 (“

1999See, e.g, Mesmer v. M.A.I.F., 353 Md. 241, 264 , 725 A.2d 1053, 1064 (1999) (“damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend [the insured against liability claims] are limited to the insured’s expenses, including attorney fees, in defending the underlying tort action, as well as the insured’s expenses and attorney fees in a separate contract or declaratory judgment action if such action is filed to establish that there exists a duty to defend”); Litz v. State Farm, supra, 346 Md. at 232, 695 A.2d at 573; Hess Construction v. Board of Education, supra, 341 Md. at 160 , 669 A.2d at 1354 (“

2012Section 12-103 is an exception to the “American rule,” the general rule in Maryland that requires litigants to be responsible for their own legal fees, Thomas v. Gladstone, 386 Md. 693, 699 , 874 A.2d 434, 437 (2005) (“Under the common law ‘American Rule’ applied in Maryland, the prevailing party in a lawsuit may not recover the attorneys’ fees as an element of damages or costs unless ... there is a statute that allows the imposition of such”).

2012Section 12-103 is an exception to the “American rule,” the general rule in Maryland that requires litigants to be responsible for their own legal fees, Thomas v. Gladstone, 386 Md. 693, 699 , 874 A.2d 434, 437 (2005) (“Under the common law ‘American Rule’ applied in Maryland, the prevailing party in a lawsuit may not recover the attorneys’ fees as an element of damages or costs unless ... there is a statute that allows the imposition of such”).

2008In Bausch & Lomb, 355 Md. 566, 591-92 , 735 A.2d 1081, 1095 (1999) (quoting Collier v. MD-Individual Practice, 327 Md. 1, 16-17 , 607 A.2d 537, 542-45 (1992)), we stated as follows: “From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff’s action on a liability insurance policy for breach of a promise to defend, or to pay the cost of defense, should include counsel fees in prosecuting the breach of contract action, when successful plaintiffs’ actions for other breaches of insurance contracts, or for breaches of other contracts,

2008In Bausch & Lomb, 355 Md. 566, 591-92 , 735 A.2d 1081, 1095 (1999) (quoting Collier v. MD-Individual Practice, 327 Md. 1, 16-17 , 607 A.2d 537, 542-45 (1992)), we stated as follows: “From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff’s action on a liability insurance policy for breach of a promise to defend, or to pay the cost of defense, should include counsel fees in prosecuting the breach of contract action, when successful plaintiffs’ actions for other breaches of insurance contracts, or for breaches of other contracts,

2024When statements fall within the privilege, a “putative tortfeasor is protected ‘even if his [or her] purpose or motive was malicious, he [or she] knew that the statement was false, or his [or her] conduct was otherwise unreasonable[,]’” because courts “give the privilege a broad and comprehensive interpretation, so as to foster the free and 12 unfettered administration of justice.” Id. at 651-52 (quoting Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 404 (1985) (internal quotes omitted)).

2024When statements fall within the privilege, a “putative tortfeasor is protected ‘even if his [or her] purpose or motive was malicious, he [or she] knew that the statement was false, or his [or her] conduct was otherwise unreasonable[,]’” because courts “give the privilege a broad and comprehensive interpretation, so as to foster the free and 12 unfettered administration of justice.” Id. at 651-52 (quoting Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 404 (1985) (internal quotes omitted)).

2011See Korb, 285 Md. at 702 , 402 A.2d at 898 (“It was perfectly competent for this court ... to follow and adopt the ...

1981See Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179 , 14 A. 500 (1888), followed in Schaub v. O’Ferrall, 116 Md. 131 , 81 A. 789 (1911). [ 285 Md. at 701-2 ], We quoted approvingly, and at length, from Hunckel v. Voneiff, supra, at 198-99, which explained why, in this State, we would grant the unconditional English privilege to a witness while maintaining the conditional, relevance-based American rule with respect to attorneys: The great importance to the administration of justice that witnesses should testify with minds absolutely free from the apprehension of being annoyed by civil actions for any thing they

2009See also Hatch v. T & L Associates, 726 A.2d 308 , *397 310 (1999) (“We are persuaded that there are sound policy reasons consistent with the philosophy of the American rule for not construing the typical attorney-fees provision as including post-judgment services.

2009See also Hatch, 726 A.2d at 309 (“Thus, while we recognize that parties may include fee-shifting provisions in their agreements, a corollary of our commitment to the so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees is that such agreements will be strictly construed.”).

2002See, e.g., Mesmer v. M.A.I.F., 353 Md. 241, 264 , 725 A.2d 1053, 1064 (1999) (‘damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend [the insured against liability claims] are limited to the insured’s expenses, including attorney fees, in defending the underlying tort action, as well as the insured’s expenses and attorney fees in a separate contract or declaratory judgment action if such action is filed [by the insured] to establish .that there exists a duty to defend’).... ‘From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff

2002See, e.g., Mesmer v. M.A.I.F., 353 Md. 241, 264 , 725 A.2d 1053, 1064 (1999) (‘damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend [the insured against liability claims] are limited to the insured’s expenses, including attorney fees, in defending the underlying tort action, as well as the insured’s expenses and attorney fees in a separate contract or declaratory judgment action if such action is filed [by the insured] to establish .that there exists a duty to defend’).... ‘From the standpoint of a strict application of the American rule, there is no logical reason why the successful plaintiff

2001Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 263-64 , 95 S.Ct. 1612 , 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (holding that in the absence of statutory authorization or contractual agreement, under the American rule, each party in federal litigation must pay its own attorney’s fees; when Congress has not explicitly authorized such fees, courts should not award them simply to further public policy).

2001Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 263-64 , 95 S.Ct. 1612 , 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (holding that in the absence of statutory authorization or contractual agreement, under the American rule, each party in federal litigation must pay its own attorney’s fees; when Congress has not explicitly authorized such fees, courts should not award them simply to further public policy).

2023As such, generally, a prevailing party is not awarded attorney’s fees, with a few recognized narrow exceptions: “(1) the parties to a contract have an agreement to that effect, (2) there is a statute that allows the imposition of such fees, (3) the wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or (4) a plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution.” Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 405 Md. 435, 445 , 952 A.2d 275, 281 (2008) (cleaned up).

2023As such, generally, a prevailing party is not awarded attorney’s fees, with a few recognized narrow exceptions: “(1) the parties to a contract have an agreement to that effect, (2) there is a statute that allows the imposition of such fees, (3) the wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or (4) a plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution.” Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 405 Md. 435, 445 , 952 A.2d 275, 281 (2008) (cleaned up).

2025In Poole v. Bureau of Support Enf’t, 238 Md.

2025In Poole, we held, relying on the plain language of the statute, that FL § 12-103 is applicable in constructive civil contempt actions brought “to recover arrearages of child support” and “to enforce a decree of child support.” 238 Md.

2025The court’s references to “substantial justification” and discussion of Father’s finances are consistent with language in FL § 12-103(b), and its invocation of “a provision in the Family 41 Law Article which authorizes an award” in “a proceeding involving custody and efforts to obtain custody” is consistent with language in FL § 12-103(a). 17 The Supreme Court of Maryland instructed in Davis v. Petito, 425 Md. 191, 200 (2012), that FL § 12-103 constitutes “an exception to the ‘American rule[]’” allowing a court to award attorneys’ fees in cases where that statute is applicable.

2016Accubid Excavation, Inc. v. Kennedy Contractors, Inc., 188 Md.App. 214, 230 , 981 A.2d 727, 737 (2009). 1st Team’s other contention, however, is that the legal fees and litigation expenses incurred by it should be paid out of the common fund created by the litigation.

2016Accubid Excavation, Inc. v. Kennedy Contractors, Inc., 188 Md.App. 214, 230 , 981 A.2d 727, 737 (2009). 1st Team’s other contention, however, is that the legal fees and litigation expenses incurred by it should be paid out of the common fund created by the litigation.

2011Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 294 , 992 A.2d 446, 450-51 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

2011Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 294 , 992 A.2d 446, 450-51 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

2008Several courts refuse to imply such fee-shifting into contracts, and instead require the explicit use of the phrase “attorney’s fees.” See, e.g., Woodhaven Homes & Realty v. Hotz, 396 F.3d 822 (7th Cir.2005) (“Wisconsin courts will not construe an obligation to pay attorney fees unless contract language ‘clearly and unambiguously so provides’ ”); Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.1986) (indemnity clause in a securities agreement that protected “against any and all loss, damage or liability due to or arising out of a breach of any representation or warranty,” with no mention

2008Several courts refuse to imply such fee-shifting into contracts, and instead require the explicit use of the phrase “attorney’s fees.” See, e.g., Woodhaven Homes & Realty v. Hotz, 396 F.3d 822 (7th Cir.2005) (“Wisconsin courts will not construe an obligation to pay attorney fees unless contract language ‘clearly and unambiguously so provides’ ”); Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.1986) (indemnity clause in a securities agreement that protected “against any and all loss, damage or liability due to or arising out of a breach of any representation or warranty,” with no mention

2008See, e.g., Tubb v. Bartlett, 862 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Ct.App.1993).

2008See, e.g., Tubb v. Bartlett, 862 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Ct.App.1993).