10 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Palmer v. Connecticut Railway & Lighting Co.green2 sentences2023Cir. 2003) (claiming Story Parchment Co. “states the American rule on damages”); see also Palmer v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 561 (1941) (“Certainty in the fact of damage is essential. 2023Cir. 2003) (claiming Story Parchment Co. “states the American rule on damages”); see also Palmer v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 561 (1941) (“Certainty in the fact of damage is essential. | 1 | 1 |
Texas American Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.green2 sentences2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. 2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. | 1 | 1 |
Gamble v. Northstore Partnershipgreen2 sentences2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. 2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. | 1 | 1 |
Rockstad v. Eriksongreen2 sentences2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. 2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. | 1 | 1 |
Rockstad v. Global Finance & Investment Co.green1 sentence2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. | 1 | 1 |
Presley of Southern California v. Whelangreen2 sentences2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. 2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. | 1 | 1 |
Hatch v. T & L ASSOCIATESgreen2 sentences2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. 2011Co., 41 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 2002). [19] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). [20] Id. at 33. [21] Id. at 32. [22] Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). [23] 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska 2001). [24] Id. at 291 (quoting Presley of S. Cal. v. Whelan, 146 Cal.App.3d 959 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (1983)). [25] 113 P.3d 1215, 1224 (Alaska 2005). [26] Id. [27] See, e.g., Hatch v. T & L Assocs., 319 N.J.Super. 644 , 726 A.2d 308, 309 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1999) (discussing the "so-called American rule of litigants paying their own fees"); see also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. | 1 | 1 |
Home Savings Bank, F.S.B., by Its Conservator, the Resolution Trust Corporation v. Robert B. Gillamgreen1 sentence1997See Home Savings Bank v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1991) (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. | 1 | 1 |
Singh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.green2 sentences1996Singh, 860 P.2d at 1197 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , and determining attorney’s fees under its guidelines rather than those of Rule 82); Hayer v. National Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (applying Truth-in-Lending Act, and determining at *756 torney’s fees under its guidelines). 1996Singh, 860 P.2d at 1197 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , and determining attorney’s fees under its guidelines rather than those of Rule 82); Hayer v. National Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (applying Truth-in-Lending Act, and determining at *756 torney’s fees under its guidelines). | 1 | 1 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Societyred2 sentences1996See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247-60 , 95 S.Ct. at 1616-23 . 1996See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247-60 , 95 S.Ct. at 1616-23 . | 1 | 1 |
City of Klawock v. George E. M. Gustafson, Trustee for the Townsite of Klawockgreen2 sentences1996City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir.1978) (“The common fund doctrine may be the earliest exception to the ‘American’ rule that losers in litigation are not hable for winners’ attorney fees.”). 1996City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir.1978) (“The common fund doctrine may be the earliest exception to the ‘American’ rule that losers in litigation are not hable for winners’ attorney fees.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hayer v. National Bank of Alaskagreen2 sentences1996Singh, 860 P.2d at 1197 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , and determining attorney’s fees under its guidelines rather than those of Rule 82); Hayer v. National Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (applying Truth-in-Lending Act, and determining at *756 torney’s fees under its guidelines). 1996Singh, 860 P.2d at 1197 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , and determining attorney’s fees under its guidelines rather than those of Rule 82); Hayer v. National Bank of Alaska, 663 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (applying Truth-in-Lending Act, and determining at *756 torney’s fees under its guidelines). | 1 | 1 |
Farnsworth v. Steinergreen1 sentence1981Farnsworth v. Steiner, 601 P.2d 266, 272 (Alaska 1979) (footnote omitted). [2] Moore describes the policies underlying the doctrine as follows: The general American doctrine is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, but in the interests of uniformity of treatment to litigants, and of stability and certainty in the law will follow the relevant rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the legal rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions and that more good than harm would come by departing from | 1 | 1 |
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.green2 sentences1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). 1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.
green
2 sentences1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). 1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.
green
2 sentences2023Certainty as to the amount goes no further than to require a basis for a reasoned conclusion.”). 23 Story Parchment Co., 282 U.S. at 565 . -25- 7651 definiteness the extent of the harm” suffered as a result.24 The Second Restatement explains the rationale behind this approach: while it may be “desirable” that there be “definiteness of proof of the amount of damage as far as is reasonably possible[, i]t is even more desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived of substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered.”25 2023Certainty as to the amount goes no further than to require a basis for a reasoned conclusion.”). 23 Story Parchment Co., 282 U.S. at 565 . -25- 7651 definiteness the extent of the harm” suffered as a result.24 The Second Restatement explains the rationale behind this approach: while it may be “desirable” that there be “definiteness of proof of the amount of damage as far as is reasonably possible[, i]t is even more desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived of substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered.”25 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. 2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Department of Transportation v. Goike
green
2 sentences2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. 2016Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.1987); Dep't of Transp. v. Goike, 220 Mich.App. 614 , 560 N.W.2d 365 (1996) (applying the American rule); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va. 272 , 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952) (applying the American rule)); Thomas R. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Roth v. United States
green
2 sentences1997“It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions ... and this opportunity is to be afforded for ‘vigorous advocacy’ no less than ‘abstract discussion.’ ” Id. 1997"It is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions .. . and this opportunity is to be afforded for `vigorous advocacy' no less than `abstract discussion.'" Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1997The First Amendment is reflective of “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721 . 1997The First Amendment is reflective of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert
green
2 sentences1996Boeing, 444 U.S. at 481 , 100 S.Ct. at 750-51 . 1996Boeing, 444 U.S. at 481 , 100 S.Ct. at 750-51 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank
green
2 sentences1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). 1980Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 , 59 S.Ct. 777, 780 , 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-392 , 90 S.Ct. 616, 625 , 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Rommell v. Walsh
green
2 sentences1977Since Rule 82 not only specifically authorizes but requires the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil cases, the Court's reasoning in Alyeska would not be applicable to the instant case. [8] See Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366 , 216 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949) in which the court, quoting from Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16 , 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940), stated: [T]he function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exerci 1977Since Rule 82 not only specifically authorizes but requires the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil cases, the Court's reasoning in Alyeska would not be applicable to the instant case. [8] See Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366 , 216 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949) in which the court, quoting from Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16 , 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940), stated: [T]he function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exerci | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences1977The policy behind the award of attorney’s fees to “private attorneys general” was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 , 88 S.Ct. 964 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). 1977The policy behind the award of attorney’s fees to “private attorneys general” was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 , 88 S.Ct. 964 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Continental Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
green
1 sentence1977Since Rule 82 not only specifically authorizes but requires the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil cases, the Court's reasoning in Alyeska would not be applicable to the instant case. [8] See Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366 , 216 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949) in which the court, quoting from Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16 , 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940), stated: [T]he function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exerci | 1 | 1977–1977 |
B'd of Adj'm't of City of Ft. Worth v. Stovall
green
2 sentences1977Since Rule 82 not only specifically authorizes but requires the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil cases, the Court's reasoning in Alyeska would not be applicable to the instant case. [8] See Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366 , 216 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949) in which the court, quoting from Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16 , 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940), stated: [T]he function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exerci 1977Since Rule 82 not only specifically authorizes but requires the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil cases, the Court's reasoning in Alyeska would not be applicable to the instant case. [8] See Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366 , 216 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949) in which the court, quoting from Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16 , 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940), stated: [T]he function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exerci | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.