American privilege in Louisiana

2018First American's motion for summary judgment does not , as the majority concludes, require a determination of "subjective facts such as intent, motive, malice, knowledge or good faith." Penalber v. Blount , 550 So.2d 577 , 583 (La.1989).

2018First American's motion for summary judgment does not , as the majority concludes, require a determination of "subjective facts such as intent, motive, malice, knowledge or good faith." Penalber v. Blount , 550 So.2d 577 , 583 (La.1989).

2009Arias v. Stolthaven New Orleans, L.L.C., 08-1111 (La.9/26/08), 992 So.2d 972 .

2005The trial court sustained American's exception of no right of action and motion for summary judgment, and this court affirmed that judgment. [2] Elmore v. Kelly, 39,080 (La.App. 2d Cir.12/15/04), 889 So.2d 1173 .

1996Lutwak v. U.S. , 344 U.S. 604 , 73 S.Ct. 481 .

1996Lutwak v. U.S. , 344 U.S. 604 , 73 S.Ct. 481 .

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 . `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 3

1977P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 .

1977P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 .

1977The First Circuit Court of Appeal, in its decision reported at 324 So.2d 528 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1976), reversed the trial court, granting judgment for plaintiff, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.

1974Tetreault, Francis L., The Hull Policy: The "Inchmaree" Clause, 41 Tulane Law Review 325 (1966). [4] A hidden defect * * * not manifest, but hidden or concealed, and not visible or apparent; a defect hidden from knowledge as well as from sight; * * * a defect which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal; one which could not have been discovered by inspection * * * by any known and customary test. [5] As to the distinction between the English and the American rule on the presence or absence of a warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy, see Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office v. S

1971Pest Control Service, Inc. v. LaBurre, 247 La. 315 , 170 So.2d 855 (1965): “* * -* when an act seeks to amend certain sections of a general law by simple reference to the section to be amended, the amendment must be limited in its scope to the subject matter of the sections proposed to be amended.” This principle is in accord with the general American rule on statutory construction.

1971Pest Control Service, Inc. v. LaBurre, 247 La. 315 , 170 So.2d 855 (1965): “* * -* when an act seeks to amend certain sections of a general law by simple reference to the section to be amended, the amendment must be limited in its scope to the subject matter of the sections proposed to be amended.” This principle is in accord with the general American rule on statutory construction.

1971As stated at Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 1908, pp. 347-48 (3d ed. 1943): "If the title specifies the section or sections to be amended in an act or in a code or revision, no other section can be amended * * * Under any other rule the title might refer to an inconsequential section of the prior law, yet the amendment might alter the entire act without warning." See also State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 106 La. 553 , 31 So. 181 (1901).

1971As stated at Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 1908, pp. 347-48 (3d ed. 1943) : “If the title specifies the section or sections to be amended in an act or in a code or revision, no other section can be amended * * * Under any other rule the title might refer to an inconsequential section of the prior law, yet the amendment might alter the entire act without warning.” See also State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 106 La. 553 , 31 So. 181 (1901).

1853McMillan & Ewart v. Union Insurance Company of Charleston, 1838, is extracted from the Charleston Courier, February 26,1839, we are therefore obliged to take it as it is given in the text, and can only say that if correctly reported, it is in violation of a principle established by the highest authorities in an infinite variety of cases, Cleveland v. Union Insurance Company, 8 Mass. 308 , is the last case cited as illustrating this subject, and proof of the adoption in Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina, that a temporary non-compliance with this implied warranty does not discharge the

1853McMillan & Ewart v. Union Insurance Company of Charleston, 1838, is extracted from the Charleston Courier, February 26,1839, we are therefore obliged to take it as it is given in the text, and can only say that if correctly reported, it is in violation of a principle established by the highest authorities in an infinite variety of cases, Cleveland v. Union Insurance Company, 8 Mass. 308 , is the last case cited as illustrating this subject, and proof of the adoption in Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina, that a temporary non-compliance with this implied warranty does not discharge the