72 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1885–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Insurancegreen2 sentences2015Co., 47 NY2d 12, 21-22 [1979]). 2015Co., 47 NY2d 12, 21-22 [1979]). | 3 | 3 |
Hooper Associates Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc.green2 sentences2023Prevailing parties are not ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees as part of the long-standing "American rule." The awarding of attorneys' fees "is contrary to the well-understood rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney's fees" ( Hooper Assocs., Ltd. v AGS Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d 487, 492 [1989]). 2010There is no provision in the stipulation requiring a deviation from the American rule, and we decline to read one into the stipulation (Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487 [1989]). | 2 | 6 |
North 7-8 Investors, LLC v. Newgardengreen2 sentences2022Where the respondent in an RPAPL 881 proceeding has not refused access but rather seeks reasonable terms for access, attorneys' fees, including those incurred in opposing the petition, are not an incident of litigation but rather part of the process of negotiating a license agreement ( Matter of North 7-8 Invs., LLC v Newgarden , 43 Misc 3d 623, 631 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2014]). 2022Where the respondent in an RPAPL 881 proceeding has not refused access but rather seeks reasonable terms for access, attorneys' fees, including those incurred in opposing the petition, are not an incident of litigation but rather part of the process of negotiating a license agreement ( Matter of North 7-8 Invs., LLC v Newgarden , 43 Misc 3d 623, 631 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2014]). | 2 | 2 |
Indosuez International Finance v. National Reserve Bankgreen2 sentences2022Fin. v National Reserve Bank , 304 AD2d 429, 431 [1st Dept 2003] [internal citations omitted]). 2022Fin. v National Reserve Bank , 304 AD2d 429, 431 [1st Dept 2003] [internal citations omitted]). | 2 | 2 |
Bovis v. Crab Meadow Enterprises, Ltd.green2 sentences2014Co., 71 AD3d 958, 961 [2010]; Bovis v Crab Meadow Enters., Ltd., 67 AD3d 846, 848 [2009]). 2014Co., 71 AD3d 958, 961 [2010]; Bovis v Crab Meadow Enters., Ltd., 67 AD3d 846, 848 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Majawalla v. Utica First Insurancegreen2 sentences2014Co., 71 AD3d 958, 961 [2010]; Bovis v Crab Meadow Enters., Ltd., 67 AD3d 846, 848 [2009]). 2014Co., 71 AD3d 958, 961 [2010]; Bovis v Crab Meadow Enters., Ltd., 67 AD3d 846, 848 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
U.S. Underwriters Insurance v. City Club Hotel, LLCgreen2 sentences2011Co. v City Club Hotel, LLC, 3 NY3d 592, 597-598 [2004] [the rationale behind the exception is that an insurer’s duty to defend its insured extends to the defense of any action arising out of the occurrence, including a defense against that insurer’s declaratory judgment action].) There have been instances where an insured, who took the affirmative step of commencing a declaratory judgment action to settle its rights under a policy, was able to recover attorneys’ fees (see City of New York v Zurich-American Ins. 2011Co. v City Club Hotel, LLC, 3 NY3d 592, 597-598 [2004] [the rationale behind the exception is that an insurer’s duty to defend its insured extends to the defense of any action arising out of the occurrence, including a defense against that insurer’s declaratory judgment action].) There have been instances where an insured, who took the affirmative step of commencing a declaratory judgment action to settle its rights under a policy, was able to recover attorneys’ fees (see City of New York v Zurich-American Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Societyred2 sentences1995Under the "American rule,” to which this State adheres (see, e.g., Chapel v Mitchell, 84 NY2d 345 ), the prevailing litigant ordinarily cannot collect its reasonable attorneys’ fees from its unsuccessful opponents (see, Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Socy., 421 US 240, 247 ; Hooper Assocs. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 491 ). 1992None of these items are viewed as a significant inroad upon the American rule in relation to legal fees, under which each party bears its own litigation costs (see, Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Socy., 421 US 240, 247 [1975]). | 1 | 4 |
Shindler v. Lambgreen2 sentences1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c 1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c | 1 | 3 |
Frankel v. Frankelgreen2 sentences2025"This is a dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses," and it has long been held that the statute was designed " 'to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse' and ensure that 'the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet' " ( Frankel v Frankel , 2 NY3d 601, 606-607 [2004], quoting O'Shea v O'Shea , 93 NY2d 187, 190 [1999]; see Mohamed v Abuhamra , 222 AD3d 1344, 1347-1348 [4th Dept 2023]). 2025"This is a dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses," and it has long been held that the statute was designed " 'to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse' and ensure that 'the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet' " ( Frankel v Frankel , 2 NY3d 601, 606-607 [2004], quoting O'Shea v O'Shea , 93 NY2d 187, 190 [1999]; see Mohamed v Abuhamra , 222 AD3d 1344, 1347-1348 [4th Dept 2023]). | 1 | 2 |
Zuckerman v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2019The court correctly denied American's motion for summary judgment, as the movant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the absence of any material issue of fact ( see Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 562-563 [1980]). 2003American failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). | 1 | 2 |
A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezakgreen2 sentences1989Lezak (supra) and Ltown (supra) are in my opinion but the latest Court of Appeals restatement of the so-called American rule under which each party bears the burden of its own attorney’s fees. 1989Lezak (supra) and Ltown (supra) are in my opinion but the latest Court of Appeals restatement of the so-called American rule under which each party bears the burden of its own attorney’s fees. | 1 | 2 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences2026As enacted, the CPL refers to "criminal transaction" and CPL 40.20 (2) inverts the common law default, declaring that a person "may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction," a deliberate departure from the prevailing American rule that had treated separate prosecution as the norm (Denzer, Prac Commentary, McKinney's CPL 40.20 [1971 ed.] at 106-107; see 397 US 436, 453—454 [1970] [Brennan, J., concurring]). 2026As enacted, the CPL refers to "criminal transaction" and CPL 40.20 (2) inverts the common law default, declaring that a person "may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction," a deliberate departure from the prevailing American rule that had treated separate prosecution as the norm (Denzer, Prac Commentary, McKinney's CPL 40.20 [1971 ed.] at 106-107; see 397 US 436 , 453—454 [1970] [Brennan, J., concurring]). | 1 | 1 |
Kefalas v. Valiotisgreen2 sentences2025Only a prevailing party is entitled to recover an attorney's fee, and to "be considered a prevailing party, a party must be successful with respect to the central relief sought" ( Blinds to Go [U.S.], Inc. v Times Plaza Dev., L.P. , 191 AD3d at 942 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kefalas v Valiotis , 197 AD3d 698, 703 ). 2025Only a prevailing party is entitled to recover an attorney's fee, and to "be considered a prevailing party, a party must be successful with respect to the central relief sought" ( Blinds to Go [U.S.], Inc. v Times Plaza Dev., L.P. , 191 AD3d at 942 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kefalas v Valiotis , 197 AD3d 698, 703 ). | 1 | 1 |
O'Shea v. O'Sheagreen2 sentences2025"This is a dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses," and it has long been held that the statute was designed " 'to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse' and ensure that 'the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet' " ( Frankel v Frankel , 2 NY3d 601, 606-607 [2004], quoting O'Shea v O'Shea , 93 NY2d 187, 190 [1999]; see Mohamed v Abuhamra , 222 AD3d 1344, 1347-1348 [4th Dept 2023]). 2025"This is a dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses," and it has long been held that the statute was designed " 'to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse' and ensure that 'the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet' " ( Frankel v Frankel , 2 NY3d 601, 606-607 [2004], quoting O'Shea v O'Shea , 93 NY2d 187, 190 [1999]; see Mohamed v Abuhamra , 222 AD3d 1344, 1347-1348 [4th Dept 2023]). | 1 | 1 |
Fugazy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Ernst & Ernstgreen1 sentence2020Under this rule, "[i]f, through the wrongful act of [a] present adversary, a person is involved in earlier litigation with a third person in bringing or defending an action to protect his [or her] interests, he [or she] is entitled to recover the reasonable value of attorneys' fees and other expenses thereby suffered or incurred" ( Shindler v Lamb , 25 Misc 2d 810, 812 [Sup Ct, NY County 1959], affd 10 AD2d 826 [1960], affd 9 NY2d 621 [1961]; see Hermann v Bahrami , 236 AD2d 516, 516 [1997]; Badik v Murphy , 160 AD2d 1199, 1200 [1990]; Fugazy Travel Bur. v Ernst & Ernst , 31 AD2d 924, 925 [196 | 1 | 1 |
| Badik v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Sharpgreen1 sentence2020As to his claim for reimbursement from Howard and Adirondack for his litigation expenses against Erie, plaintiff acknowledges the established "American rule" that a litigant can only recover counsel fees and disbursements from an adversary where authorized by statute, contract or otherwise ( Hunt v Sharp , 85 NY2d 883, 885 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and thus relies upon the exception known as the Shindler rule. | 1 | 1 |
Hermann v. Bahramigreen1 sentence2020Under this rule, "[i]f, through the wrongful act of [a] present adversary, a person is involved in earlier litigation with a third person in bringing or defending an action to protect his [or her] interests, he [or she] is entitled to recover the reasonable value of attorneys' fees and other expenses thereby suffered or incurred" ( Shindler v Lamb , 25 Misc 2d 810, 812 [Sup Ct, NY County 1959], affd 10 AD2d 826 [1960], affd 9 NY2d 621 [1961]; see Hermann v Bahrami , 236 AD2d 516, 516 [1997]; Badik v Murphy , 160 AD2d 1199, 1200 [1990]; Fugazy Travel Bur. v Ernst & Ernst , 31 AD2d 924, 925 [196 | 1 | 1 |
| Basso v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mister Money Israel, Ltd. v. Leibowitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodrigues v. Samarasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lybrand v. Levittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Union Fire Insurance v. Robert Christopher Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cruz v. New York City Housing Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Healy v. ARP Cable, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co. Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc. v. Upstate Testing Laboratory, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| N. V. Madison, Inc. v. Saurweingreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Probate of the Will of O'Neilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shindler v. Lamb
green
2 sentences1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c 1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c | 3 | 1994–2020 |
Shindler v. Lamb
green
2 sentences1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c 1994However, the trial court improperly applied the third-party exception to the long-standing American rule described in Shindler v Lamb ( 25 Misc 2d 810 , affd 10 AD2d 826 , affd 9 NY2d 621 ) concerning counterclaim plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees inasmuch as, unlike Japcap Establishment v Trust for Cultural Resources ( 115 AD2d 382 ), which involved a corporation and one of its principals who was also being sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff Hunt, who sued defendants as president of the Condominium’s board of managers, and the additional counterclaim defendants, who collectively c | 3 | 1994–2020 |
Bridges v. California
green
2 sentences1967That it is not palatable to a segment of society which conceives it as an encroachment of their special rights hardly justifies banning the book. “ [I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions ” (Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 270 ). 1966Pro., § 418) direct that the jury in a criminal libel action shall have the right to determine “ the law and the fact. ” I read these provisions literally, for they affect the fundamental privilege of free speech, and should not be curbed or diminished, for, as has been said rightly in another context, bnt with relevance to the conduct of the defendants here,££ it is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions ” (Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 270 ). | 3 | 1965–1967 |
Doyle v. . Lord
green
2 sentences1940Again, in Doyle v. Lord ( 64 N. Y. 432 ) the court, although sustaining an implied easement of light and air under the special circumstances of that case, stated the general rule as follows (p. 439): “ This conclusion is reached without any departure from what may be called the American doctrine as to light and air, as distinguished from the English common law doctrine, and the law as laid down in the following authorities is fully recognized: Parker v. Foote ( 19 Wend. 315 ); Palmer v. Wetmore (2 Sandf. 1940Again, in Doyle v. Lord ( 64 N. Y. 432 ) the court, although sustaining an implied easement of light and air under the special circumstances of that case, stated the general rule as follows (p. 439): “ This conclusion is reached without any departure from what may be called the American doctrine as to light and air, as distinguished from the English common law doctrine, and the law as laid down in the following authorities is fully recognized: Parker v. Foote ( 19 Wend. 315 ); Palmer v. Wetmore (2 Sandf. | 2 | 1920–1940 |
In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Acres
neutral
2 sentences1937Cazan were ineffective for that purpose and cannot be allowed in any way to influence the disposition of the estate.” (See Matter of Angle, 147 Misc. 445 .) In Matter of Acres ( 128 Misc. 254, 257 ) we find: “ In Schouler on Wills (6th ed. § 400) it is stated that the modern English and American rule is that extraneous, unattested docu ments may be incorporated into a will provided such documents were in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and are identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the papers referred to therein. 1931That an extraneous paper produced as and for a paper so referred to in a will, and shown to have been in existence when such will was executed, may be adjudged to form part of such will and be admitted to probate as such, under these circumstances, and no other, to wit, when by satisfactory and conclusive evidence it has been proved to be the same paper which the testator by his words of reference designed to indicate.” In Matter of Acres ( 128 Misc. 254, 257 ) Surrogate Harrington states in his opinion as follows: “In Schouler on Wills ([6th ed.] § 400) it is stated that the modern English an | 2 | 1931–1937 |
Collumb v. . Read
green
2 sentences1902Ch. 165 -200), reviewing all the American authorities; and was approved and adopted by this court in Collumb v. Read ( 24 N. Y. 505 ). * * * But the American rule, that the remainder descends to the heir, does not affect the character of the property as partnership effects, except that the incidents and qualities of real estate are revived. 1902Ch. 165 -200), reviewing all the American authorities; and was approved and adopted by this court in Collumb v. Read ( 24 N. Y. 505 ). * * * But the American rule, that the remainder descends to the heir, does not affect the character of the property as partnership effects, except that the incidents and qualities of real estate are revived. | 2 | 1896–1902 |
Prichep v. Prichep
green
2 sentences2024The reasoning in Frankel makes clear that the domestic relations law's "dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses" ( Frankel , supra at 607 ) is premised on the concept that absent an award of fees in the context of matrimonial litigation the non-monied spouse will be forced to litigate on unequal footing. ( Prichep , supra at 65 ). 2024The reasoning in Frankel makes clear that the domestic relations law's "dramatic departure from the American rule that usually requires litigants to pay their own legal expenses" ( Frankel , supra at 607 ) is premised on the concept that absent an award of fees in the context of matrimonial litigation the non-monied spouse will be forced to litigate on unequal footing. ( Prichep , supra at 65 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re the Estate of Greatsinger
green
2 sentences2023Here, the defendants failed to establish the existence of an agreement between the parties, statute, or court rule authorizing an award of attorneys' fees in this case ( cf. SCPA 2302; Matter of Greatsinger , 67 NY2d 177, 181 ). 2023Here, the defendants failed to establish the existence of an agreement between the parties, statute, or court rule authorizing an award of attorneys' fees in this case ( cf. SCPA 2302; Matter of Greatsinger , 67 NY2d 177, 181 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Schwartz v. Sayah
green
1 sentence2022The evidence submitted by First American in support of its motion similarly failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not have legal ownership or an immediate superior right to the escrow funds, which were tendered to Expedient as an agent of First American, or that First American did not exercise unauthorized dominion over those funds in failing to use them to pay off the existing mortgages encumbering the subject property ( see Schwartz v Sayah , 72 AD3d 790, 791 ; cf. Smallwood v Lupoli , 107 AD3d 782, 785 ; National Ctr. for Crisis Mgt., Inc. v Lerner , 91 AD3d 920, 921 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
National Center for Crisis Management, Inc. v. Lerner
green
1 sentence2022The evidence submitted by First American in support of its motion similarly failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not have legal ownership or an immediate superior right to the escrow funds, which were tendered to Expedient as an agent of First American, or that First American did not exercise unauthorized dominion over those funds in failing to use them to pay off the existing mortgages encumbering the subject property ( see Schwartz v Sayah , 72 AD3d 790, 791 ; cf. Smallwood v Lupoli , 107 AD3d 782, 785 ; National Ctr. for Crisis Mgt., Inc. v Lerner , 91 AD3d 920, 921 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Flatbush Two, LLC v. Morales
neutral
1 sentence2022The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of First American's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for conversion insofar as asserted against it based on the application of the law of the case doctrine ( see Flatbush Two, LLC v Morales , 190 AD3d 826, 827 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Smallwood v. Lupoli
green
1 sentence2022The evidence submitted by First American in support of its motion similarly failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not have legal ownership or an immediate superior right to the escrow funds, which were tendered to Expedient as an agent of First American, or that First American did not exercise unauthorized dominion over those funds in failing to use them to pay off the existing mortgages encumbering the subject property ( see Schwartz v Sayah , 72 AD3d 790, 791 ; cf. Smallwood v Lupoli , 107 AD3d 782, 785 ; National Ctr. for Crisis Mgt., Inc. v Lerner , 91 AD3d 920, 921 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| 214 Wall Street Associates, LLC v. Medical Arts-Huntington Realty green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Levine v. Infidelity, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Loral Space & Communications Inc. v. Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Mayer v. Town of Brookhaven green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Scantlebury green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Passaretti v. Aurora Pump Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Chapel v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Japcap Establishment, Inc. v. Trust for Cultural Resources green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Martin v. Curran green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kadish v. Colombo neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mgrditchian v. Donato green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In re the Estate of Bosco neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Matter of City of Brooklyn green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Matter of Low green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ltown Ltd. Partnership v. Sire Plan, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Blake-Veeder Realty, Inc. v. Crayford green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lehoczky v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Doyle v. Allstate Insurance green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Hall v. Cole green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas District green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State Commission for Human Rights v. Harvey Properties, Inc. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Instituto Cubano De Estabilizacion Del Azucar v. the SS Theotokos green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| In re Jama green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. . Sherlock green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.