implied consent warning in Georgia

126 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (56)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Causeygreen gactapp · 1994 · cited in 7 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–2007 2 sentences 1996The trial court committed no reversible error by allowing evidence of the Intoximeter 3000 results, even though the implied consent warning given Ayers by the officer was defective because it did not inform the defendant of his right to an independent test “by personnel of his own choosing.” See State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 1996The trial court committed no reversible error by allowing evidence of the Intoximeter 3000 results, even though the implied consent warning given Ayers by the officer was defective because it did not inform the defendant of his right to an independent test “by personnel of his own choosing.” See State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994).	5	7
Perano v. Stategreen ga · 1983 · cited in 8 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1993–2005 2 sentences 2005OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) provides that a person who drives a vehicle in Georgia is deemed to have given consent to a blood test for the purpose of determining whether he is under the influence of alcohol, while OCGA§ 40-6-392 (a) (4) provides that “[t]he arresting officer at the time of arrest shall advise the person arrested of his rights to a chemical test or tests.” The Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the latter statute to mean that the implied consent warning must be read either “at the time of arrest, or at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of t 2005OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) provides that a person who drives a vehicle in Georgia is deemed to have given consent to a blood test for the purpose of determining whether he is under the influence of alcohol, while OCGA§ 40-6-392 (a) (4) provides that “[t]he arresting officer at the time of arrest shall advise the person arrested of his rights to a chemical test or tests.” The Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the latter statute to mean that the implied consent warning must be read either “at the time of arrest, or at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of t	4	8
Clapsaddle v. Stategreen gactapp · 1993 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1994–2016 2 sentences 2016See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993) (the accused was not given his implied consent rights until after he was transported to the jail, for no apparent reason). 2016See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993) (the accused was not given his implied consent rights until after he was transported to the jail, for no apparent reason).	4	5
Howard v. Stategreen gactapp · 1995 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1997 2 sentences 1997See State v. Golub, 220 Ga. App. 810 ( 470 SE2d 331 ) (1996) (OCGA § 40-5-67.1 requires “the reading of precise implied consent language at the time a chemical test or tests are requested”); Park v. State, 220 Ga. App. 215 ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996) (by amending OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), the legislature was requiring “that specific language be used as the implied consent warning”); State v. Boone, 221 Ga. App. 256 ( 471 SE2d 53 ) (1996) (OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) “mandates that specific language be read upon arrest”); Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228 ( 465 SE2d 281 ) (1995); State v. Hunter, 221 Ga. App. 1997See State v. Golub, 220 Ga. App. 810 ( 470 SE2d 331 ) (1996) (OCGA § 40-5-67.1 requires “the reading of precise implied consent language at the time a chemical test or tests are requested”); Park v. State, 220 Ga. App. 215 ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996) (by amending OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), the legislature was requiring “that specific language be used as the implied consent warning”); State v. Boone, 221 Ga. App. 256 ( 471 SE2d 53 ) (1996) (OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) “mandates that specific language be read upon arrest”); Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228 ( 465 SE2d 281 ) (1995); State v. Hunter, 221 Ga. App.	4	5
Vandiver v. Stategreen gactapp · 1993 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–2016 2 sentences 2006See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Vandiver v. State, 207 Ga. App. 836, 837-838 (1) ( 429 SE2d 318 ) (1993) (the department’s “standard practice” was to wait until the defendant was transported to the jail before delivering the notification, resulting in an inexcusable delay and the reversal of the conviction); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 ) 2006See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Vandiver v. State, 207 Ga. App. 836, 837-838 (1) ( 429 SE2d 318 ) (1993) (the department’s “standard practice” was to wait until the defendant was transported to the jail before delivering the notification, resulting in an inexcusable delay and the reversal of the conviction); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 )	4	4
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen scotus · 2016 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025 2 sentences 2025Compare Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 450-451 (II) (A) & 477 (VI) ( 136 SCt 2160 , 195 LE2d 560) (2016) (where a statute made it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a blood test, and drivers in DUI investigations were told of the criminal consequence if they refused to submit, the drivers 3 The implied-consent warning was amended after Olevik, and the ver- sion that was read to La Anyane was slightly different than the one we consid- ered in that case. 2025Compare Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 450-451 (II) (A) & 477 (VI) ( 136 SCt 2160 , 195 LE2d 560) (2016) (where a statute made it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a blood test, and drivers in DUI investigations were told of the criminal consequence if they refused to submit, the drivers 3 The implied-consent warning was amended after Olevik, and the ver- sion that was read to La Anyane was slightly different than the one we consid- ered in that case.	3	5
Olevik v. Stategreen ga · 2017 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2025 2 sentences 2025Where the implied-consent warning in Olevik warned that “[y]our refusal to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial,” see Olevik, 302 Ga. at 249 (3) (a) (emphasis added), the version read to La Anyane said that “[y]our refusal to submit to blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial,” OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (emphasis added). 2025Where the implied-consent warning in Olevik warned that “[y]our refusal to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial,” see Olevik, 302 Ga. at 249 (3) (a) (emphasis added), the version read to La Anyane said that “[y]our refusal to submit to blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial,” OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (2) (b) (emphasis added).	3	4
State v. Lambgreen gactapp · 1995 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2016 2 sentences 2016See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993) (the accused was not given his implied consent rights until after he was transported to the jail, for no apparent reason). 2016See State v. Lamb, 217 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 ( 456 SE2d 769 ) (1995) (the officer “preferred” to read the implied consent warning in the presence of a witness, resulting in the defendant’s transport to the police station and an unlawful 30-minute delay); Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 (1) ( 432 SE2d 262 ) (1993) (the accused was not given his implied consent rights until after he was transported to the jail, for no apparent reason).	3	3
State v. Sneddongreen gactapp · 1998 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2006 2 sentences 2006See, e.g., State v. Sneddon, 235 Ga. App. 739, 740 ( 510 SE2d 566 ) (1998) (legislature amended implied consent law after we held that the statute as written required an arresting officer to read the implied consent warnings verbatim). 2006See, e.g., State v. Sneddon, 235 Ga. App. 739, 740 ( 510 SE2d 566 ) (1998) (legislature amended implied consent law after we held that the statute as written required an arresting officer to read the implied consent warnings verbatim).	3	3
Richards v. Stategreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1999 2 sentences 1999In cases such as Richards v. State, 225 Ga. App. 777 , 779-780 346 (2) ( 484 SE2d 683 ) (1997), this Court held that the implied consent warning read by an arresting officer must exactly match the language of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b). 1999In cases such as Richards v. State, 225 Ga. App. 777 , 779-780 346 (2) ( 484 SE2d 683 ) (1997), this Court held that the implied consent warning read by an arresting officer must exactly match the language of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b).	2	4
Klink v. Statered ga · 2000 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2002 2 sentences 2002Second, our Supreme Court determined in Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 606-607 (1) ( 533 SE2d 92 ) (2000), that the implied consent warnings do not violate due process by failing to tell the suspect that the test results can be used at trial. 2. 2002Second, our Supreme Court determined in Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 606-607 (1) ( 533 SE2d 92 ) (2000), that the implied consent warnings do not violate due process by failing to tell the suspect that the test results can be used at trial. 2.	2	3
State v. Geracegreen gactapp · 1993 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1998 2 sentences 1998As Radcliffe notes, we have held that “[t]he scope of the consent granted by a defendant to a test to determine alcohol or drug content of blood . . . may be derived from the wording of the implied consent warning read to a defendant.” State v. Jewell, 228 Ga. App. 825, 826 ( 492 SE2d 706 ) (1997) (State could not use blood test to support prosecution for possession of cocaine); see also State v. Burton, 230 Ga. App. 753 ( 489 SE2d 121 ) (1998) (same); State v. Frazier, 229 Ga. App. 344 ( 494 SE2d 36 ) (1997) (same); State v. Gerace, 210 Ga. App. 874, 875-876 ( 437 SE2d 862 ) (1993) (State cou 1998As Radcliffe notes, we have held that “[t]he scope of the consent granted by a defendant to a test to determine alcohol or drug content of blood . . . may be derived from the wording of the implied consent warning read to a defendant.” State v. Jewell, 228 Ga. App. 825, 826 ( 492 SE2d 706 ) (1997) (State could not use blood test to support prosecution for possession of cocaine); see also State v. Burton, 230 Ga. App. 753 ( 489 SE2d 121 ) (1998) (same); State v. Frazier, 229 Ga. App. 344 ( 494 SE2d 36 ) (1997) (same); State v. Gerace, 210 Ga. App. 874, 875-876 ( 437 SE2d 862 ) (1993) (State cou	2	3
State v. Levinergreen gactapp · 1994 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1998 2 sentences 1998See State v. Hassett, 216 Ga. App. 114 ( 453 SE2d 508 ) (1995); State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99 ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994). 1998See State v. Hassett, 216 Ga. App. 114 ( 453 SE2d 508 ) (1995); State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99 ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994).	2	3
State v. Holcombgreen gactapp · 1995 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1997 2 sentences 1996The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion in limine to suppress the results of his State-administered breath test, relying on the parties’ stipulation that defendant was not advised of the implied consent warnings prescribed in an April 21, 1995, amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), Ga. L. 1995, p. 1160 (“the April amendment”), “which mandates that specific language be read upon arrest.” State v. Holcomb, 219 Ga. App. 231 ( 464 SE2d 651 ). 1996The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion in limine to suppress the results of his State-administered breath test, relying on the parties’ stipulation that defendant was not advised of the implied consent warnings prescribed in an April 21, 1995, amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), Ga. L. 1995, p. 1160 (“the April amendment”), “which mandates that specific language be read upon arrest.” State v. Holcomb, 219 Ga. App. 231 ( 464 SE2d 651 ).	2	3
Howard v. Cofergreen gactapp · 1979 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 2 sentences 1996See Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228, 229 (2) ( 465 SE2d 281 ) (1995), and Howard v. Cofer, 150 Ga. App. 579 (2) ( 258 SE2d 195 ) (1979). 1996See Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228, 229 (2) ( 465 SE2d 281 ) (1995), and Howard v. Cofer, 150 Ga. App. 579 (2) ( 258 SE2d 195 ) (1979).	2	3
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen scotus · 1973 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2025 2 sentences 2025See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (II); Brooks, 285 Ga. at 425 . 2008See footnote 1, supra. 8 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973). 9 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. State, 272 Ga. App. 557,558 ( 612 SE2d 865 ) (2005) .	2	2
Plemmons v. Stategreen gactapp · 2014 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018Plemmons v. State , 326 Ga. App. at 768 (1), 755 S.E.2d 205 (The trial court was authorized to find that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not think that he was free to leave at the time an officer read the implied consent warnings where the officer, in the suspect's hospital room after an accident, wrote a ticket for DUI, told the suspect that he was under custodial arrest, gave him the ticket, and then read him the implied consent notice.) 10 4. 2018Plemmons v. State , 326 Ga. App. at 768 (1), 755 S.E.2d 205 (The trial court was authorized to find that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not think that he was free to leave at the time an officer read the implied consent warnings where the officer, in the suspect's hospital room after an accident, wrote a ticket for DUI, told the suspect that he was under custodial arrest, gave him the ticket, and then read him the implied consent notice.) 10 4.	2	2
The State v. Depolgreen gactapp · 2016 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016See State v. Depol, 336 Ga. App. 191 ( 784 SE2d 51 ) (2016) (conducting de novo review of defendant’s actual consent to breath test because “controlling facts are undisputed because they are plainly discernable from the patrol car-mounted video recording”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on August 29, 2014, some time between 11:00 p.m and midnight, Domenge-Delhoyo sideswiped the passenger side of a car traveling in the same direction as she passed in the right lane. 2016See State v. Depol, 336 Ga. App. 191 ( 784 SE2d 51 ) (2016) (conducting de novo review of defendant’s actual consent to breath test because “controlling facts are undisputed because they are plainly discernable from the patrol car-mounted video recording”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on August 29, 2014, some time between 11:00 p.m and midnight, Domenge-Delhoyo sideswiped the passenger side of a car traveling in the same direction as she passed in the right lane.	2	2
Crawford v. Stategreen gactapp · 2000 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2014	2	2
Doyle v. Stategreen gactapp · 2006 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013	2	2
Hough v. Stategreen ga · 2005 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007	2	2
Leiske v. Stategreen gactapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007	2	2
Rogers v. Stategreen gactapp · 1982 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1983–2003	2	2
Morrissette v. Stategreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2003	2	2
Keenan v. Stategreen ga · 1993 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–2000	2	2
Fantasia v. Stategreen ga · 1997 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1999	2	2
Nelson v. Stategreen gactapp · 1975 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1994–1995	2	2
Miranda v. Arizonagreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1983–2013 2 sentences 2013Corporal Greene then read the implied consent warning to Hughes, and Hughes submitted to a State-administered blood test. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 3 Hughes did not challenge the authority of the search incident to arrest. 4 Hughes filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was driving under the influence of drugs. 2013Corporal Greene then read the implied consent warning to Hughes, and Hughes submitted to a State-administered blood test. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 3 Hughes did not challenge the authority of the search incident to arrest. 4 Hughes filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was driving under the influence of drugs.	1	6
State v. Jewellgreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1999 2 sentences 1999Relying upon this Court’s holdings in State v. Burton, 230 Ga. App. 753 ( 498 SE2d 121 ) (1998), and State v. Jewell, 228 Ga. App. 825 ( 492 SE2d 706 ) (1997), Cronan contends that, under the language of the implied consent warnings, he consented to give a urine sample only for the purpose of determining whether he was “under the influence” of drugs or alcohol. 1999Relying upon this Court’s holdings in State v. Burton, 230 Ga. App. 753 ( 498 SE2d 121 ) (1998), and State v. Jewell, 228 Ga. App. 825 ( 492 SE2d 706 ) (1997), Cronan contends that, under the language of the implied consent warnings, he consented to give a urine sample only for the purpose of determining whether he was “under the influence” of drugs or alcohol.	1	3
Deckard v. Stategreen gactapp · 1993 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1998 2 sentences 1995After defendant performed poorly on these tests, Officer Saunders arrested him and read him the implied consent warning, including the following sentence: "Under OCGA § 40-5-55 and 40-5-153, you will lose your privilege to operate a motor vehicle from six to twelve months should you refuse to submit to the designated State administered chemical test." This case is controlled by Deckard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 421 ( 436 SE2d 536 ) (1993), in which we reversed the trial court's denial of a motion in limine under similar circumstances. 1995After defendant performed poorly on these tests, Officer Saunders arrested him and read him the implied consent warning, including the following sentence: "Under OCGA § 40-5-55 and 40-5-153, you will lose your privilege to operate a motor vehicle from six to twelve months should you refuse to submit to the designated State administered chemical test." This case is controlled by Deckard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 421 ( 436 SE2d 536 ) (1993), in which we reversed the trial court's denial of a motion in limine under similar circumstances.	1	3
McGinn v. Stategreen gactapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2016 2 sentences 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). 4 State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 613 ( 591 SE2d 479 ) (2003). 5 Id. 6 Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) ( 602 SE2d 563 ) (2004). 7 Id. 8 270 Ga. App. 111 ( 605 SE2d 835 ) (2004). 9 256 Ga. App. 726 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 10 Id. at 728 . 11 Gillaspy, supra at 112 . 12 Ladow, supra at 728 . 13 SeeAnderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s request of a blood test in response to officer’s request was not a request for an independent tes 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). 4 State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 613 ( 591 SE2d 479 ) (2003). 5 Id. 6 Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) ( 602 SE2d 563 ) (2004). 7 Id. 8 270 Ga. App. 111 ( 605 SE2d 835 ) (2004). 9 256 Ga. App. 726 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 10 Id. at 728 . 11 Gillaspy, supra at 112 . 12 Ladow, supra at 728 . 13 SeeAnderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s request of a blood test in response to officer’s request was not a request for an independent tes	1	2
Cooper v. Stategreen ga · 2003 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2008	1	2
State v. Tosargreen gactapp · 1986 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1994–2007	1	2
State v. Hopkinsgreen gactapp · 1998 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2002	1	2
State v. Fraziergreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1999	1	2
State v. Burtongreen gactapp · 1998 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1999	1	2
Beasley v. Stategreen gactapp · 1992 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1999	1	2
Richards v. Stategreen ga · 1998 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	2
State v. Martingreen ga · 1996 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	1	2
Smallwood v. Stategreen ga · 2020 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

Case	Cited	Years
Williams v. State green ga · 2015 2 sentences 2025Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 248 (3) (a) (i) ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017); Williams, 296 Ga. at 822-823 . 2017Kevin Mooney, for appellee. 1 The encounter was recorded by the trooper’s patrol car camera, and a digital copy of the audio and video recording was admitted into evidence without objection at the motion to suppress hearing. 2 The results of the blood test indicated Nicholson had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.136. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) and (5) and OCGA § 40-6-315. 4 In Williams , the Supreme Court clarified that, “[wjhether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation and pu	3	2016–2025
Martin v. State neutral gactapp · 1995 2 sentences 1998In Martin v. State, 217 Ga. App. 860 ( 460 SE2d 92 ) (1995), this Court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress breath test results due to the failure of the arresting officer to utilize the implied consent warning set forth in a recently enacted amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b). 1998In Martin v. State, 217 Ga. App. 860 ( 460 SE2d 92 ) (1995), this Court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress breath test results due to the failure of the arresting officer to utilize the implied consent warning set forth in a recently enacted amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b).	3	1995–1998
State v. Fielding green gactapp · 1997 2 sentences 1998Our decisions in Fielding, 229 Ga. App. at 675 , State v. Halstead, 706 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) and State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) are distinguishable because, in each of these cases, the changes to the specific words of the implied consent warning altered the meaning of the sentence in which the words appeared. 1998*Taylor, for appellee. 1 See State v. Fielding, 229 Ga. App. 675 ( 494 SE2d 561 ) (1997); State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) (1998); and State v. Halstead, 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) (1998), which require that the statutory language of the implied consent warnings be read exactly.	3	1998–1998
State v. Halstead green gactapp · 1998 2 sentences 1998Our decisions in Fielding, 229 Ga. App. at 675 , State v. Halstead, 706 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) and State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) are distinguishable because, in each of these cases, the changes to the specific words of the implied consent warning altered the meaning of the sentence in which the words appeared. 1998Our decisions in Fielding, 229 Ga. App. at 675 , State v. Halstead, 706 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) and State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) are distinguishable because, in each of these cases, the changes to the specific words of the implied consent warning altered the meaning of the sentence in which the words appeared.	3	1998–1998
Fazio v. State neutral ga · 2017 2 sentences 2019The State also argues that a holding that Paragraph XVI prohibits admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test would contravene Olevik 's holding that the implied consent warning is not per se coercive, as well as our subsequent decisions in Fazio v. State , 302 Ga. 295 , 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017), and Schmitz v. State , 302 Ga. 473 , 807 S.E.2d 361 (2017), relying on Olevik to reject challenges to the implied consent notice. 2019The State also argues that a holding that Paragraph XVI prohibits admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test would contravene Olevik 's holding that the implied consent warning is not per se coercive, as well as our subsequent decisions in Fazio v. State , 302 Ga. 295 , 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017), and Schmitz v. State , 302 Ga. 473 , 807 S.E.2d 361 (2017), relying on Olevik to reject challenges to the implied consent notice.	2	2019–2019
Schmitz v. State green ga · 2017 2 sentences 2019The State also argues that a holding that Paragraph XVI prohibits admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test would contravene Olevik 's holding that the implied consent warning is not per se coercive, as well as our subsequent decisions in Fazio v. State , 302 Ga. 295 , 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017), and Schmitz v. State , 302 Ga. 473 , 807 S.E.2d 361 (2017), relying on Olevik to reject challenges to the implied consent notice. 2019The State also argues that a holding that Paragraph XVI prohibits admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test would contravene Olevik 's holding that the implied consent warning is not per se coercive, as well as our subsequent decisions in Fazio v. State , 302 Ga. 295 , 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017), and Schmitz v. State , 302 Ga. 473 , 807 S.E.2d 361 (2017), relying on Olevik to reject challenges to the implied consent notice.	2	2019–2019
Ladow v. State green gactapp · 2002 2 sentences 2019Instead, the defendant interrupted the officer while he was reading the implied consent warning, stating that she was already aware of her rights and unequivocally stating, "I want a blood test." Id. 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). 4 State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 613 ( 591 SE2d 479 ) (2003). 5 Id. 6 Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) ( 602 SE2d 563 ) (2004). 7 Id. 8 270 Ga. App. 111 ( 605 SE2d 835 ) (2004). 9 256 Ga. App. 726 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 10 Id. at 728 . 11 Gillaspy, supra at 112 . 12 Ladow, supra at 728 . 13 SeeAnderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s request of a blood test in response to officer’s request was not a request for an independent tes	2	2007–2019
The State v. Bowman green gactapp · 2016 2 sentences 2016This sort of evidence of intoxication falls short of that shown in State v. Bowman, 337 Ga. App. 313 ( 787 SE2d 284 ) (2016), in which we upheld a finding that the defendant’s response to the implied consent warning was not voluntary based on evidence of severe intoxication: the defendant was so unsteady on his feet that an officer directed him to sit down, vomited to the extent that he seemed to be choking, and generally responded to officers’ inquiries to the effect that nothing mattered and he “was going to jail anyway.” Id. at 317-18 . 2016This sort of evidence of intoxication falls short of that shown in State v. Bowman, 337 Ga. App. 313 ( 787 SE2d 284 ) (2016), in which we upheld a finding that the defendant’s response to the implied consent warning was not voluntary based on evidence of severe intoxication: the defendant was so unsteady on his feet that an officer directed him to sit down, vomited to the extent that he seemed to be choking, and generally responded to officers’ inquiries to the effect that nothing mattered and he “was going to jail anyway.” Id. at 317-18 .	2	2016–2016
Lee v. State green gactapp · 1985	2	1996–2003
State v. Barfield green gactapp · 1998	2	1998–1998
Martin v. State green gactapp · 1993	2	1995–1997
Park v. State green gactapp · 1996	2	1996–1997
Steed v. City of Atlanta green gactapp · 1984	2	1986–1986
Elliott v. State green ga · 2019	1	2025–2025
State v. Turnquest green ga · 2019	1	2022–2022
Yeong Sik Oh v. State green · 2018	1	2018–2018
Kendrick v. the State green gactapp · 2016	1	2016–2016
Mathis v. State green gactapp · 2009	1	2016–2016
Missouri v. McNeely green scotus · 2013	1	2016–2016
Handschuh v. State green gactapp · 2004	1	2014–2014
Greer v. Protective Mortgage Co. green ga · 1939	1	2013–2013
Doggett v. United States green scotus · 1992	1	2013–2013
Barker v. Wingo green scotus · 1972	1	2013–2013
State v. Collier green ga · 2005	1	2008–2008

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 40-5-67.1 (64) GA § 40-6-391 (57) GA § 40-6-392 (53) GA § 40-5-55 (26) GA § 40-6-48 (7) GA § 5-7-1 (5) GA § 40-6-253 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

GA 126 (1979–2025) PA 95 (1990–2026) IL 74 (1974–2015) WA 54 (1974–2019) MO 50 (1992–2023) MN 46 (1984–2025) FL 21 (1970–2025) TX 20 (1970–2015) WI 14 (1995–2026) OR 13 (1989–2026) SC 12 (1995–2020) TN 11 (1996–2026) OH 10 (1973–2018) IA 10 (2005–2024) SD 9 (1978–2002) CA 9 (1955–2022) AZ 8 (1989–1998) AR 7 (1993–2021) ID 7 (2014–2020) VA 7 (1990–2017) HI 6 (1986–2021) ND 4 (2019–2023) KY 4 (1975–2025) OK 4 (2013–2016) WV 4 (1995–2022) WY 4 (1988–2007) MD 4 (1992–2021) AK 3 (1981–2001) NC 3 (1992–2010) IN 3 (1986–2009) KS 3 (2006–2020) CT 2 (1992–1996) ME 2 (2018–2018) NE 2 (1992–1998) MA 2 (1988–2004) VI 2 (2007–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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