implied consent doctrine in Virginia

2014See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 38 , 639 S.E.2d 217, 224 (2007) (“[W]e reject the [Defendants’] suggestion that we adopt a bright line rule holding that implied consent given by a resident of a dwelling is limited in all cases to entry onto the premises to ‘knock and talk’ to the resident and that any deviation from this purpose precludes application of the implied consent doctrine.”).

2014See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 38 , 639 S.E.2d 217, 224 (2007) (“[W]e reject the [Defendants’] suggestion that we adopt a bright line rule holding that implied consent given by a resident of a dwelling is limited in all cases to entry onto the premises to ‘knock and talk’ to the resident and that any deviation from this purpose precludes application of the implied consent doctrine.”).

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2017See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 20, 21 , 688 S.E.2d 283, 284 (2010) (holding that this Court erred by addressing the implied consent doctrine because the defendant had not raised that particular argument at trial); Redmond v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 254 , 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d 81 , 83 n.2 (2010) (holding that the argument that the officers exceeded the scope of any consent was procedurally barred).4 Additionally, at no point has the appellant asserted that the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 applies to permit this Court to address this challenge, and we do not consider that limited

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2017See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 20, 21 , 688 S.E.2d 283, 284 (2010) (holding that this Court erred by addressing the implied consent doctrine because the defendant had not raised that particular argument at trial); Redmond v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 254 , 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d 81 , 83 n.2 (2010) (holding that the argument that the officers exceeded the scope of any consent was procedurally barred).4 Additionally, at no point has the appellant asserted that the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 applies to permit this Court to address this challenge, and we do not consider that limited

2017See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 20, 21 , 688 S.E.2d 283, 284 (2010) (holding that this Court erred by addressing the implied consent doctrine because the defendant had not raised that particular argument at trial); Redmond v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 254 , 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d 81 , 83 n.2 (2010) (holding that the argument that the officers exceeded the scope of any consent was procedurally barred).4 Additionally, at no point has the appellant asserted that the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 applies to permit this Court to address this challenge, and we do not consider that limited

2017See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 20, 21 , 688 S.E.2d 283, 284 (2010) (holding that this Court erred by addressing the implied consent doctrine because the defendant had not raised that particular argument at trial); Redmond v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 254 , 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d 81 , 83 n.2 (2010) (holding that the argument that the officers exceeded the scope of any consent was procedurally barred).4 Additionally, at no point has the appellant asserted that the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 applies to permit this Court to address this challenge, and we do not consider that limited

2017See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761 , 589 S.E.2d at 448 ; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29 , 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705 , 710 n.5 (2017) (declining to apply 4 Vaughn, 279 Va. at 21 , 688 S.E.2d at 284 , and Redmond, 57 Va. App. at 259 n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 84 n.2, involved a previous version of Rule 5A:18.

2016“Courts are not permitted to interpret any statute, such as Virginia’s implied consent statute, in a way that ‘ “would render the statute strained, ambiguous, illogical, and in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent.” ’ ” Patterson v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 488, 498 , 749 S.E.2d 538, 543 (2013) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 139, 145 , 692 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2010)).

2016“Courts are not permitted to interpret any statute, such as Virginia’s implied consent statute, in a way that ‘ “would render the statute strained, ambiguous, illogical, and in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent.” ’ ” Patterson v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 488, 498 , 749 S.E.2d 538, 543 (2013) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 139, 145 , 692 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2010)).

2016“Courts are not permitted to interpret any statute, such as Virginia’s implied consent statute, in a way that ‘ “would render the statute strained, ambiguous, illogical, and in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent.” ’ ” Patterson v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 488, 498 , 749 S.E.2d 538, 543 (2013) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 139, 145 , 692 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2010)).

2016“Courts are not permitted to interpret any statute, such as Virginia’s implied consent statute, in a way that ‘ “would render the statute strained, ambiguous, illogical, and in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent.” ’ ” Patterson v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 488, 498 , 749 S.E.2d 538, 543 (2013) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 139, 145 , 692 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2010)).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2001) (“[A police] officer may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants of a residence.”); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing “that law enforcement officers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact the occupants of a residence”); State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272 , 154 P.3d 455, 474 (2007) (‘We also acknowledge that if no one *651 answers the knock, as here, the officers can be justified in knocking on more doors.”).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2001) (“[A police] officer may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants of a residence.”); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing “that law enforcement officers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact the occupants of a residence”); State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272 , 154 P.3d 455, 474 (2007) (‘We also acknowledge that if no one *651 answers the knock, as here, the officers can be justified in knocking on more doors.”).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2001) (“[A police] officer may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants of a residence.”); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing “that law enforcement officers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact the occupants of a residence”); State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272 , 154 P.3d 455, 474 (2007) (‘We also acknowledge that if no one *651 answers the knock, as here, the officers can be justified in knocking on more doors.”).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2001) (“[A police] officer may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants of a residence.”); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing “that law enforcement officers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact the occupants of a residence”); State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272 , 154 P.3d 455, 474 (2007) (‘We also acknowledge that if no one *651 answers the knock, as here, the officers can be justified in knocking on more doors.”).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 655 (8th Cir.2008).

2007Our conclusion is not changed by other cases cited by the Robinsons involving the implied consent doctrine: Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.2001); Alvarez v. Montgomery Cty., 147 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.1974); and Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003).

2007As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in Alvarez when rejecting the same bright line rule advocated by the defendants in that case: The textual "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." When applying this basic principle, the Supreme Court has "consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." 147 F.3d at 358 (citations omitted).

1990See Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 289 , 170 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1969)(the same act of driving that gives rise to the offense gives rise to the independent implied consent violation).

1990See Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 289 , 170 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1969)(the same act of driving that gives rise to the offense gives rise to the independent implied consent violation).