implied consent warning in Iowa

2022This standard requires the officer “under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest, to utilize those methods which are reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings.” Id. at 221 (quoting State v. Piddington, 623 N.W.2d 528 , 534–35 (Wis. 2001)).

2022In Garcia, we quoted Piddington as follows, “That a law enforcement officer must use reasonable methods to convey the implied consent warnings does not mean the officer must take extraordinary, or even impracticable measures to convey 11 the implied consent warnings.” Id. (quoting Piddington, 623 N.W.2d at 542 ).

2022This standard requires the officer “under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest, to utilize those methods which are reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings.” Id. at 221 (quoting State v. Piddington, 623 N.W.2d 528 , 534–35 (Wis. 2001)).

2022In Garcia, we quoted Piddington as follows, “That a law enforcement officer must use reasonable methods to convey the implied consent warnings does not mean the officer must take extraordinary, or even impracticable measures to convey 11 the implied consent warnings.” Id. (quoting Piddington, 623 N.W.2d at 542 ).

2022As we said a few years later in State v. Lukins, summarizing the holding of Garcia, “A peace officer need only use reasonable methods, under the circumstances, to convey to a drunk-driving suspect the implied consent warnings.” 846 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 2014) (citing Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 222 ).6 6We think the district court applied a version of a subjective test here.

2020See State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 2014) 5 (stating Garcia held that “[a] peace officer need only use reasonable methods, under the circumstances, to convey to a drunk-driving suspect the implied consent warnings”); State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Iowa 2010) (noting the court “adopted a reasonableness standard for the methods to be used by law enforcement officers to convey the advisory”).

2008We have stated the purpose of Iowa’s implied consent statute “is to reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor.” Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1174 , 152 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).

2008We have stated the purpose of Iowa’s implied consent statute “is to reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor.” Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1174 , 152 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).

2024There is no indication in the statute that it is only concerned with the implied consent doctrine or the administration of breath tests.” State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Iowa 2005).

2020See State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 2014) 5 (stating Garcia held that “[a] peace officer need only use reasonable methods, under the circumstances, to convey to a drunk-driving suspect the implied consent warnings”); State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Iowa 2010) (noting the court “adopted a reasonableness standard for the methods to be used by law enforcement officers to convey the advisory”).

2005Cf. Saunders, 226 N.W.2d at 22 (“The question of whether plaintiff was in fact operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage ... is not an issue in this civil proceeding. ...”).