implied consent hearing in Minnesota

1987Carlson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).

1986Carlson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).

2018Through a statutory-interpretation analysis, the supreme court determined that because the necessity defense was not one of the delineated issues in the statute, the individual could not raise the defense. 6 Id. at 208, 212 .

2018Whether an argument not listed in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b), can be raised at an implied-consent hearing was addressed in Axelberg , where the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a petitioner who attempted to raise a necessity defense at an implied-consent hearing. 848 N.W.2d at 207 -08 .

1987Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn.1983).

1984The general purpose of the new statute was to “reduce the time lapse between an implied consent violation and the imposition of license revocation.” Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn.1983).

2007State v. Victor-sen, 627 N.W.2d 655 (Minn.App.2001).

2006This court, in State v. Victorsen, held that an issue litigated during an implied-consent hearing could not be re-litigated during a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, so long as the prosecuting attorney had notice of the implied-consent hearing and an opportunity to be heard. 627 N.W.2d 655, 660-64 (Minn.App.2001).

1986This case is controlled by Dufrane v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 353 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), in which this court held: The evidence produced at the implied consent hearing was sufficient to sustain the court’s conclusion that appellant was in physical control of a motor vehicle when he was found behind the wheel of a car, observed to be intoxicated, and when he told police officers that he had been driving the car earlier.

1986Id. at 708 ; see also Martin v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 358 N.W.2d 734 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).

2015Safety, this court rejected the appellant’s argument that the Commissioner had a duty to turn over favorable evidence that would “tend to exculpate the defendant or reduce the penalty,” and decided, “an implied consent hearing is not a de facto criminal proceeding and due process rights associated with criminal trials do not apply.” 584 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied 8 (Minn. Nov. 24, 1998).

2001As we have previously held, “[b]ecause an implied consent hearing is not a criminal proceed *739 ing, Brady is inapplicable.” Brooks, 584 N.W.2d at 20 .

2013Safety, 356 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.App.1984) (accepting police officer testimony at an implied consent hearing); see also State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38 , 202 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol).

2013Safety, 356 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.App.1984) (accepting police officer testimony at an implied consent hearing); see also State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38 , 202 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol).

2018See Davidson v. Farrell , 8 Minn. 258 , 263, 8 Gil. 225 , 229 (1863) (stating that while the legislature has broad power to regulate judicial proceedings, it may not conflict with constitutional rights).

2016State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275 , 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (“[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 , 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993))).

2016State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275 , 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (“[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 , 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993))).

2016Exam’rs, 435 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn.1989).

2015Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995) this court decided “because the supreme court and this court have indicated that the implied consent test request is not a custodial interrogation, and no Minnesota case has applied Scales to implied consent proceedings, we hold that Scales does not apply [to the implied consent test request].” Because the reading of the implied-consent advisory is not a custodial interrogation, Scales does not apply and the district court did not err by admitting appellant’s chemical-breath-test results.

2015Safety, 355 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. App. 1984) At the implied-consent hearing, appellant informed the district court that he waived all issues 11 but his challenge to the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute, reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop, and probable cause for the test.

2014See State v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431 , 181 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1970) (placing a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof on the Commissioner in an implied consent hearing).

2014See State v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431 , 181 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1970) (placing a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof on the Commissioner in an implied consent hearing).

2008Bendorf, 712 N.W.2d at 224 (holding that appellant’s rights to procedural due-process were not violated when he requested the remedy of a stay of revocation); see also Szczech, 343 N.W.2d at 308 (“Due process does not require a hearing within 60 days.”).

2008But “a district court has considerable discretion in scheduling matters.” Riehm, 745 N.W.2d at 874 (quotation omitted).

2008Bendorf, 712 N.W.2d at 224 (holding that appellant’s rights to procedural due-process were not violated when he requested the remedy of a stay of revocation); see also Szczech, 343 N.W.2d at 308 (“Due process does not require a hearing within 60 days.”).