12 South Carolina opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fore v. Griffco of Wampee, Inc.green2 sentences2020See Fore v. Griffco of Wampee, Inc., 409 S.C. 360, 373 , 762 S.E.2d 37, 44 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding an amendment to a Form 58 should be allowed if the amendment is made as promptly as possible even if the amendment is made within ten days of the contested-case hearing); Lizee v. S.C. 2020See Fore v. Griffco of Wampee, Inc., 409 S.C. 360, 373 , 762 S.E.2d 37, 44 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding an amendment to a Form 58 should be allowed if the amendment is made as promptly as possible even if the amendment is made within ten days of the contested-case hearing); Lizee v. S.C. | 2 | 2 |
Lapp v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2013Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 387 S.C. 500, 506 , 692 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding "an implied consent hearing is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge" and, thus, "[a] finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 505- 06, 692 S.E.2d at 568-69 (concluding the ALC did not err in affirming the OMVH hearing officer's determination that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for DUI where the arresting officer detected a strong odor of 2013Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 387 S.C. 500, 506 , 692 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding "an implied consent hearing is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge" and, thus, "[a] finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 505- 06, 692 S.E.2d at 568-69 (concluding the ALC did not err in affirming the OMVH hearing officer's determination that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for DUI where the arresting officer detected a strong odor of | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2010See Taylor II, 382 S.C. at 571 , 677 S.E.2d at 590 (“Given that it is undisputed Taylor was advised of the implied consent warning, the Court of Appeals properly found he suffered no prejudice from the officer’s lack of written notice.”). 2010See Taylor II, 382 S.C. at 571 , 677 S.E.2d at 590 (“Given that it is undisputed Taylor was advised of the implied consent warning, the Court of Appeals properly found he suffered no prejudice from the officer’s lack of written notice.”). | 2 | 2 |
S.C. Department of Motor Vehicles v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2015Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 526 , 613 S.E.2d 544, 550 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the scope of an implied consent hearing is limited to whether the arrestee "(1) was lawfully arrested, (2) was advised in writing of his section 56-5-2950 rights, and (3) refused to submit to a test"). 2015Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 526 , 613 S.E.2d 544, 550 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the scope of an implied consent hearing is limited to whether the arrestee "(1) was lawfully arrested, (2) was advised in writing of his section 56-5-2950 rights, and (3) refused to submit to a test"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Georgegreen2 sentences2013Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 387 S.C. 500, 506 , 692 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding "an implied consent hearing is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge" and, thus, "[a] finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 505- 06, 692 S.E.2d at 568-69 (concluding the ALC did not err in affirming the OMVH hearing officer's determination that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for DUI where the arresting officer detected a strong odor of 2013Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 387 S.C. 500, 506 , 692 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding "an implied consent hearing is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge" and, thus, "[a] finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 505- 06, 692 S.E.2d at 568-69 (concluding the ALC did not err in affirming the OMVH hearing officer's determination that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for DUI where the arresting officer detected a strong odor of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. SC DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY
neutral
2 sentences2011Safety , 388 S.C. 39 , 693 S.E.2d 430 (Ct. App. 2010), as each of those cases involved some evidence of an implied consent warning; here, the Department did not present any evidence that Onorato was given either a written or verbal warning. 2011Safety , 388 S.C. 39 , 693 S.E.2d 430 (Ct. App. 2010), as each of those cases involved some evidence of an implied consent warning; here, the Department did not present any evidence that Onorato was given either a written or verbal warning. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Summersell v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety
green
2 sentences2010Because Lapp was still sitting in her vehicle at the scene of the accident, it was reasonable for Officer Simmons to conclude that the accident had recently occurred and that Lapp had freshly committed the crime of DUI. *506 Although Lapp contends that the Department failed to prove that she was “materially and appreciably impaired,” an implied consent hearing “is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge.” 5 Summersell, 334 S.C. at 369 , 513 S.E.2d at 625 . 2010Because Lapp was still sitting in her vehicle at the scene of the accident, it was reasonable for Officer Simmons to conclude that the accident had recently occurred and that Lapp had freshly committed the crime of DUI. *506 Although Lapp contends that the Department failed to prove that she was “materially and appreciably impaired,” an implied consent hearing “is not a trial in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on a DUI charge.” 5 Summersell, 334 S.C. at 369 , 513 S.E.2d at 625 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Percy v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public Transportation
green
2 sentences2004Our Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Percy’s suspension, stating “[t]he statute requires only that an accused be advised that his privilege to drive will be suspended for 90 days if he refuses the breathalyzer.” Id. at 385 , 434 S.E.2d at 265 . 2004Our Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Percy’s suspension, stating “[t]he statute requires only that an accused be advised that his privilege to drive will be suspended for 90 days if he refuses the breathalyzer.” Id. at 385 , 434 S.E.2d at 265 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
SC DEPT. HWYS. & PUB. TRANS. v. Dickinson
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 191, 341 S.E.2d at 135 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence1995McDonnell v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 45 Cal. App. (3d) 653, 119 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975); Carroll v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.