9 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peterson v. Stategreen2 sentences1985As we pointed out in Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D.1977), "a chemical test, properly conducted, is the best available method of determining the blood alcohol content of the driver, which, in turn, is accepted as the most reliable method of determining whether the driver is or is not under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Because of this high degree of reliability and the general public acceptance of such result, the legislature in 1980 enacted SDCL 32-23-10.1 which authorized admission into evidence at trial the refusal to take the implied consent test as an explanation why 1985As we pointed out in Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D.1977), “a chemical test, properly conducted, is the best available method of determining the blood alcohol content of the driver, which, in turn, is accepted as the most reliable method of determining whether the driver is or is not under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Because of this high degree of reliability and the general public acceptance of such result, the legislature in 1980 enacted SDCL 32-23-10.1 which authorized admission into evidence at trial the refusal to take the implied consent test as an explanation why | 1 | 2 |
State v. Tho Ngoc Nguyengreen2 sentences2002In prior felony cases, we have determined the penalties of 1) prohibiting the State from revoking the license of the driver, and 2) refusing to permit the use of the statutory presumptions at trial, sufficiently deter police from seizing blood evidence without the implied consent warning. 6 Nguyen, 1997 SD 47 at ¶ 16 , 563 N.W.2d at 124 (footnote added). 2002In prior felony cases, we have determined the penalties of 1) prohibiting the State from revoking the license of the driver, and 2) refusing to permit the use of the statutory presumptions at trial, sufficiently deter police from seizing blood evidence without the implied consent warning. 6 Nguyen, 1997 SD 47 at ¶ 16 , 563 N.W.2d at 124 (footnote added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGarrettgreen2 sentences1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). 1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D. 1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Almondgreen2 sentences1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). 1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D. 1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). 1997State v. McGarrett, 535 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D.1995); State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D. 1994); State v. Johnson, 509 N.W.2d 681, 683 (S.D.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacobson
green
2 sentences2002Thus, in State v. Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d 455 (S.D.1992), where it appeared that the arresting officer may have acted in bad faith in failing to investigate whether a DUI suspect had sufficient prior convictions to require forfeiture of his statutory right to refuse the blood test, we held that the remedy would only extend to the loss of the State’s right to revoke the suspect’s license for refusing the blood test and the State’s forfeiture of the statutory “under the influence presumptions.” Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d at 459 . [¶ 19.] A blood test is arguably the best evidence for a jury to consider w 2002Thus, in State v. Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d 455 (S.D.1992), where it appeared that the arresting officer may have acted in bad faith in failing to investigate whether a DUI suspect had sufficient prior convictions to require forfeiture of his statutory right to refuse the blood test, we held that the remedy would only extend to the loss of the State’s right to revoke the suspect’s license for refusing the blood test and the State’s forfeiture of the statutory “under the influence presumptions.” Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d at 459 . [¶ 19.] A blood test is arguably the best evidence for a jury to consider w | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1997Tucker, 533 N.W.2d at 155-56 . 1997Tucker, 533 N.W.2d at 155-56 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. MacDonald
green
1 sentence1992This court held in State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D.1977) that a municipal police chief fit the statutory definition of a “law enforcement officer”, for purposes of qualification, to give the implied consent warnings despite the fact the DWI arrest occurred outside the municipal jurisdiction of the police chief. 4 Based upon the foregoing analysis, both prongs for admission of Davidson’s blood test results were met in this case. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Chmelka v. Smith
green
2 sentences1986Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40 , 130 N.W.2d 423 (1964). 1986Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40 , 130 N.W.2d 423 (1964). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Assman
green
1 sentence1986State v. Assman, 386 N.W.2d 492 (S.D.1986). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. James
green
1 sentence1982One of the conclusions of law entered by the magistrate stated that the State’s evidence “was insufficient for the Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had been validly arrested . . .. ” We agree with the State that the magistrate erred in applying such a stringent standard of proof, for we held in State v. James, 286 N.W.2d 534 (S.D.1979), that probable cause to make a war-rantless arrest under the statute authorizing such arrests does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In Re the Revocation of the Driver's License of Knust
green
1 sentence1981Matter of Knust, 288 N.W.2d 776 (S.D.1980). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.