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7 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Augustin Gonzalezred2 sentences2021Regarding the concept of implied consent, our supreme court has held that “whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’” Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397, 409 , 993 S.W.2d 918 , 925 (1999) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 830 (11th Cir. 1996)). 2001Our supreme court touched on the issue of implied consent in Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397, 409 , 993 S.W.2d 918 , 925-926 (1999), and quoted with favor United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 830 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted), which stated: We have previously noted our hesitancy to find implied consent (i.e., consent by silence) in the Fourth Amendment context and we agree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit that, whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to “sanction[ ] entry into the home based upon inferred consent.” As Judg | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Shaibu
green
2 sentences2002The Eleventh Circuit held that there was no consent to enter: We have previously noted our hesitancy to find implied consent (i.e. consent by silence) in the Fourth Amendment context, and we agree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit that whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is appropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’ Gonzalez then quoted from U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), to which it had referred above: The government may not show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the entr 2002The Eleventh Circuit held that there was no consent to enter: We have previously noted our hesitancy to find implied consent (i.e. consent by silence) in the Fourth Amendment context, and we agree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit that whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’ Gonzalez then quoted from U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), to which it had referred above: The government may not show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the en | 4 | 1999–2002 |
Norris v. State
green
2 sentences2021Regarding the concept of implied consent, our supreme court has held that “whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’” Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397, 409 , 993 S.W.2d 918 , 925 (1999) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 830 (11th Cir. 1996)). 2021Regarding the concept of implied consent, our supreme court has held that “whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’” Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397, 409 , 993 S.W.2d 918 , 925 (1999) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 830 (11th Cir. 1996)). | 2 | 2001–2021 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2002To do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry. `This will not do.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. [10] at 17 [ 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)]. 2002To do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry. `This will not do.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. [10] at 17 [ 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)]. | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2021Having applied the proper standard of review to a suppression challenge, Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406 , 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003), we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and positive testimony that Johnson “consented” to Rucker’s entry as the State contends. 2021Having applied the proper standard of review to a suppression challenge, Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406 , 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003), we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and positive testimony that Johnson “consented” to Rucker’s entry as the State contends. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Graves v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1993In Graves v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. Cmwlth. 390, 535 A.2d 707 (1988), the commonwealth court found the arresting officer's implied consent warning insufficient to convey the mandatory nature of the suspension entailed by refusal to submit to a chemical test. 1993In Graves v. Commonwealth, 535 A.2d 707 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), the commonwealth court found the arresting officer’s implied consent warning insufficient to convey the mandatory nature of the suspension entailed by refusal to submit to a chemical test. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.