20 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watts v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2001"The doctrine of implied consent applies only where it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried, although not pleaded." Wendell , 677 S.W.2d at 618 (quoting Watts v. Watts , 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. 1997“The doctrine of implied consent applies only where it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried, although not pleaded.” Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 4 | 4 |
Johnston v. McKinney American, Inc.green2 sentences2008Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). 2002On this record, we find no evidence that the issue of attorney’s fees was actually tried at the June 7, 2000 hearing. [5] See Johnston v. McKinney Am. , 9 S.W.3d 271, 281 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (stating that doctrine of implied consent should be applied only if clearly warranted and only when it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Neesleygreen2 sentences2008See generally State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. 2008See generally State v. Neesley , 239 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Cheek v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (holding every person is presumed to know the law). 2015Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (holding every person is presumed to know the law). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In Brown v. State, 856 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals examined the doctrine of implied consent for the first time. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lee Skipwith, IIIgreen1 sentence1996McMorris, 567 F.2d at 899-900 ; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir.1973); Collier v. Miller, 414 F.Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.Tex.1976). | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. Millergreen1 sentence1996McMorris, 567 F.2d at 899-900 ; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir.1973); Collier v. Miller, 414 F.Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.Tex.1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunaway v. New York
green
2 sentences2015By providing a limited number of instances mandating compelled blood draws, the implied-consent framework provides a standard "essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 213–14 analysis. 2015By providing a limited number of instances mandating compelled blood draws, the implied-consent framework provides a standard "essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 213–14 (1979) (applying the Fourth Amendment to facts unrelated to the instant scenario). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Beeman v. State
green
1 sentence2014We add, too, that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed a limitation associated with the implied-consent framework of the Texas Transportation Code: "[It] does not give officers the ability to forcibly obtain blood samples from anyone arrested for DWI." Beeman, 86 S.W.3d at 616 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wendell v. Central Power and Light Co.
green
1 sentence2001"The doctrine of implied consent applies only where it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried, although not pleaded." Wendell , 677 S.W.2d at 618 (quoting Watts v. Watts , 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Libhart v. Copeland
green
1 sentence2000“The doctrine of implied consent applies only where it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried, although not pleaded.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mcmorris v. Alioto
green
1 sentence1996McMorris, 567 F.2d at 899-900 ; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir.1973); Collier v. Miller, 414 F.Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.Tex.1976). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman
green
1 sentence1975Rules 45, 46 and 67, Tex.R.Civ.P. (1967); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 348 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1961, no writ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1970Further, such interpretation would be unconstitutional under the coercion doctrine of U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 , (1967), for it would place a premium on guilty pleas by saying that no operator's license can be suspended under the implied consent law if the defendant pleads guilty to the criminal offense of driving while intoxicated, whether or not he re- ceives probation. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.