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7 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Micah Abraham Wulffgreen2 sentences2020Regarding the first element of the implied consent test—that drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily—Charlson reiterated an assertion from Wulff that “[d]rivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.” Id. at 616, 377 P.3d at 1079 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423 , 337 P.3d at 582 ). 2020Regarding the first element of the implied consent test—that drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily—Charlson reiterated an assertion from Wulff that “[d]rivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.” Id. at 616, 377 P.3d at 1079 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423 , 337 P.3d at 582 ). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Diazred2 sentences2017At that time, “Idaho precedent [held] that forced blood draws based on the implied consent exception fall under the alternate consent exception to the warrant requirement.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 , 337 P.3d at 579 , overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 , 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007), and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). 2017At that time, “Idaho precedent [held] that forced blood draws based on the implied consent exception fall under the alternate consent exception to the warrant requirement.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 , 337 P.3d at 579 , overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 , 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007), and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Wooleryred2 sentences2017At that time, “Idaho precedent [held] that forced blood draws based on the implied consent exception fall under the alternate consent exception to the warrant requirement.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 , 337 P.3d at 579 , overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 , 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007), and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). 2017At that time, “Idaho precedent [held] that forced blood draws based on the implied consent exception fall under the alternate consent exception to the warrant requirement.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 , 337 P.3d at 579 , overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 , 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007), and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2016“Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418 , 337 P.3d at 577 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 , 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)). “ ‘Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. 2016“Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418 , 337 P.3d at 577 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 , 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)). “ ‘Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kirk Murray Charlson
green
2 sentences2020Regarding the first element of the implied consent test—that drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily—Charlson reiterated an assertion from Wulff that “[d]rivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.” Id. at 616, 377 P.3d at 1079 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423 , 337 P.3d at 582 ). 2020The Charlson opinion went on to analyze the second element of the implied consent test, which requires that “drivers must continue to give voluntary consent.” 160 Idaho at 617, 377 P.3d at 1080 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423 , 337 P.3d at 582 ). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Kyle Nicholas Rios
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 266 , 371 P.3d at 320 , In denying Lutton’s suppression motion, the district court found that Lutton impliedly consented to the warrantless blood draw. 2017Id. at 266 , 371 P.3d at 320 , In denying Lutton’s suppression motion, the district court found that Lutton impliedly consented to the warrantless blood draw. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Newbold v. United States
green
1 sentence2014After granting certiorari in Aviles, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the ease “for further consideration in light of Missouri v. McNeely.” - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 902 , 187 L.Ed.2d 767 (2014). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lassiter v. City of Phila.
green
1 sentence2014After granting certiorari in Aviles, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the ease “for further consideration in light of Missouri v. McNeely.” - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 902 , 187 L.Ed.2d 767 (2014). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.