implied consent hearing in Illinois

74 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Malloygreen ill · 1979 · cited in 8 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1981–2000 2 sentences 2000See People v. Malloy, 76 Ill. 2d 513, 518-19 (1979) (holding that a trial court’s entry of findings in an implied-consent hearing is a final and appealable judgment). 2000See People v. Malloy , 76 Ill. 2d 513, 518-19 (1979) (holding that a trial court's entry of findings in an implied-consent hearing is a final and appealable judgment).	2	8
Curtis v. Jaskeygreen illappct · 2001 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2011 2 sentences 2006Based on the doctrine of implied consent (Curtis v. Jaskey, 326 Ill. 2006Based on the doctrine of implied consent ( Curtis v. Jaskey, 326 Ill.	2	4
People v. Cejagreen ill · 2003 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 347 (2003). 2009See People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 347 (2003).	2	2
Pratt v. Davisgreen illappct · 1905 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006App. 3d 90, 94-96 (2001)), the emergency exception was first referenced in Illinois law in Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. 2006App.3d 90, 94-96 , 259 Ill.Dec. 901 , 759 N.E.2d 962 (2001)), the emergency exception was first referenced in Illinois law in Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill.App. 161, 165-66 (1905), aff'd, 224 Ill. 300 , 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (also referring to the exception).	2	2
The PEOPLE v. Ardellagreen ill · 1971 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003If this were the sole issue presented, our review of this question would be de novo, and our answer would be “yes.” See People v. Ardella, 49 Ill. 2d 517, 522 (1971). 2003If this were the sole issue presented, our review of this question would be de novo , and our answer would be “yes.” See People v. Ardella , 49 Ill. 2d 517, 522 (1971).	2	2
People v. Horberggreen illappct · 1984 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1984–1987 2 sentences 1987App. 3d 456 , 462 N.E.2d 831 , the court held that a valid traffic ticket was not necessary to establish that defendant had been arrested for purposes of an implied consent hearing and that the trial court erred in directing a finding for defendant where the underlying ticket had been dismissed for a technical deficiency. 123 Ill. 1987App. 3d 456 , 462 N.E.2d 831 , the court held that a valid traffic ticket was not necessary to establish that defendant had been arrested for purposes of an implied consent hearing and that the trial court erred in directing a finding for defendant where the underlying ticket had been dismissed for a technical deficiency. 123 Ill.	1	5
Koss v. Slatergreen ill · 1987 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1988–1995 2 sentences 1995(Koss v. Slater (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 389, 394, 397 .) The statutory summary suspension of a driver’s license, which a court may refuse to rescind at an implied-consent hearing, is an administrative function of the Secretary of State designed to protect persons who travel the highways; it is not punishment. 1990(Koss v. Slater (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 389, 395 , 507 N.E.2d 826, 829 .) In Slater, the court determined that the issues involved in an implied-consent hearing were not so similar to the underlying charge of DUI that they became a part of the criminal process and that it is the decision on the merits of the DUI criminal proceeding that determines whether the defendant’s license should be suspended or revoked.	1	4
People v. Adamsgreen illappct · 1984 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1985–1987 2 sentences 1987App. 3d 456, 459 , 462 N.E.2d 831 ; see also People v. Adams (1984), 128 Ill. 1986(People v. Adams (1984), 128 Ill.	1	3
People v. Bafiagreen illappct · 1983 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1984 2 sentences 1984See, e.g., People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. 1983App. 3d 710 , 445 N.E.2d 878 .) Moreover, a dismissal or reduction of the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol does not preclude the suspension of the defendant’s driver’s license under section 11 — 501.1 or obviate the necessity for an implied consent hearing if the defendant has requested such a hearing. (1974 Ill.	1	2
People v. Shorkeygreen illappct · 1974 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1975–1982	1	2
Powell v. Alabamagreen scotus · 1932 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983	1	1
Coleman v. Alabamagreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983	1	1
Tedder v. Fairmangreen ill · 1982 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (67)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. Finley green illappct · 1974 2 sentences 1986App.3d 335 , 687 340, 315 N.E.2d 229, 232 .) It being well settled that the implied-consent hearing is not a "critical stage" in the underlying prosecution for driving under the influence, we must conclude that the decision whether to complete the test is also not a "critical stage," as its relationship to the criminal prosecution is even more attenuated. 1986*App. 3d 335, 340 , 315 N.E.2d 229, 232 .) It being well settled that the implied-consent hearing is not a “critical stage” in the underlying prosecution for driving under the influence, we must conclude that the decision whether to complete the test is also not a “critical stage,” as its relationship to the criminal prosecution is even more attenuated.	6	1977–1991
People v. Golden neutral illappct · 1983 2 sentences 1987(People v. Golden (1983), 117 Ill. 1986In People v. Golden (1983), 117 Ill.	6	1984–1987
People v. Cassidy neutral illappct · 1978 2 sentences 1989App. 3d 43 , 384 N.E.2d 599 : “It is the arrested person, not the arresting officer, who requests an implied consent hearing, as did the defendant here, and the arresting officer does not set an appearance date for such a hearing. 1989These considerations, in addition to the fact that an implied consent hearing is civil rather than criminal in nature [citation], lead to the logical conclusion that the implied consent hearing is outside the intended purview of [Supreme Court] Rule 504 and can not be dismissed merely because the hearing occurs beyond the 10- to 45-day time limitation for hearing traffic citations.” 67 Ill.	3	1982–1989
State v. Brooks green wis · 1983 2 sentences 1985Upon dismissing the implied consent hearing, the trial court in the instant matter relied upon State v. Brooks (1983), 113 Wis. 2d 347 , 335 N.W.2d 354 , which has somewhat similar facts. 1985However, the trial court’s power to dismiss as noted in Brooks was not a sua sponte obligation, but rather a discretionary grant of authority, “dependent upon the ambience [sic] of the particular case.” (113 Wis. 2d.347, 359, 335 N.W.2d 354, 360 .) In the present case, defendant did not move for dismissal of the implied consent hearing on this or any other ground and, as a result, has waived any claim that particular facts existed in this case which warranted dismissal of the implied consent proceeding: Accordingly, defendant has waived this • issue.	3	1985–1987
People v. Jacquith green illappct · 1984 2 sentences 1987(People v. Jacquith (1984), 129 Ill. 1986App. 3d 107 , 472 N.E.2d 107 .) However, the scope of an implied-consent hearing is limited by statute.	3	1985–1987
People v. Schuberth green illappct · 1983 2 sentences 1986(People v. Schuberth (1983), 115 Ill. 1985App. 3d 302, 304 , 450 N.E.2d 459 .) A decision of the trial court in an implied-consent hearing will not be overturned on appeal unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.	3	1983–1986
People v. Powell green illappct · 1982 2 sentences 1986(See People v. Powell (1982), 107 Ill. 1985(People v. Powell (1982), 107 Ill.	3	1983–1986
People v. Farr green ill · 1976 2 sentences 1986App. 3d 500 , 454 N.E.2d 1166 ) and the role of the court in an implied-consent proceeding (People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209 , 347 N.E.2d 146 ), we do not believe this allowance or concession to hardship may be expanded to permit a trial court to ignore the fact that defendant was driving under the influence, and through an exercise of judicial leniency alter the inevitable result of a finding of probable cause in an implied-consent hearing. 1986App. 3d 500 , 454 N.E.2d 1166 ) and the role of the court in an implied-consent proceeding (People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209 , 347 N.E.2d 146 ), we do not believe this allowance or concession to hardship may be expanded to permit a trial court to ignore the fact that defendant was driving under the influence, and through an exercise of judicial leniency alter the inevitable result of a finding of probable cause in an implied-consent hearing.	3	1981–1986
State v. Brooks green minn · 2013 2 sentences 2015At the hospital, the officer read him the implied-consent warning, which “informs drivers that Minnesota law requires them to take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol, that refusing to take a test is a crime, and that drivers have the right to - 10 - talk to a lawyer before deciding whether to take a test.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 565 . 2015At the hospital, the officer read him the implied-consent warning, which "informs drivers that Minnesota law requires them to take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol, that refusing to take a test is a crime, and that drivers have the right to talk to a lawyer before deciding whether to take a test." Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 565 .	2	2015–2015
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro green ohioctapp · 1984 2 sentences 2001Thus, that court concluded that an individual’s refusal “may not be overcome by the doctrine of implied consent.” Leach, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 397 , 469 N.E.2d at 1053 . 2001Thus, that court concluded that an individual’s refusal “may not be overcome by the doctrine of implied consent.” Leach, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 397 , 469 N.E.2d at 1053 .	2	2001–2001
People v. Badoud green ill · 1988 2 sentences 1989(See People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50 , 521 N.E.2d 884 .) Moreover, we bear in mind that the implied-consent hearing is a civil proceeding (People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ), and that the liberal amendment policy in effect in such proceedings should be available in the implied-consent setting. 1989(See People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50 , 521 N.E.2d 884 .) Moreover, we bear in mind that the implied-consent hearing is a civil proceeding (People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ), and that the liberal amendment policy in effect in such proceedings should be available in the implied-consent setting.	2	1989–1989
In Re Summary Suspension of Driver's License of Trainor green illappct · 1987 2 sentences 1989App.3d 918 , 510 N.E.2d 614 .) The question remains whether section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code conflicts with section 2-1203(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and violates the separation of powers doctrine thereby. 9 Section 2-118.1(b) provides that the original implied consent hearing will not stay the statutory summary suspension. 1987We held that in such cases, the 30 days within which the implied consent hearing must be held begins to run when the new judge is furnished with a copy of the hearing request. ( 156 Ill.	2	1987–1989
People Ex Rel. Ross v. Ragen green ill · 1945 2 sentences 1987Ross v. Ragen (1945), 391 Ill. 419 .) He argues that an implied-consent hearing is independent of the criminal proceeding and that representation of a defendant at such hearing does not involve an attorney’s continuing representation of his client on the underlying DUI charge. 1983Ross v. Ragen (1945), 391 Ill. 419 , 63 N.E.2d 874 ; see also Tedder v. Fairman (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 216 , 441 N.E.2d 311 ), it follows that an indigent defendant in an implied consent hearing has no right to appointed counsel.	2	1983–1987
People v. Greenspon green illappct · 1984 2 sentences 1987App. 3d 849 , 473 N.E.2d 331 .) The findings of the trial court in an implied-consent hearing should not be overturned unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1985(People v. Greenspon (1984), 129 Ill.	2	1985–1987
Village of Park Forest v. Angel green illappct · 1976 2 sentences 1987Since it is a proceeding in which plaintiff seeks suspension of the driving privileges of the defendant, we hold that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to resolve all of the issues prescribed by a preponderance of the evidence to warrant the requested suspension.” 37 Ill. 1983App. 3d 746 , 347 N.E.2d 278 .) Because of these differences in issues and proof, the court’s ruling in an implied consent hearing is neither binding nor determinative of the outcome in a subsequently held criminal trial.	2	1983–1987
People v. Barry neutral illappct · 1985 2 sentences 1986(People v. Barry (1985), 134 Ill. 1985(People v. Barry (1985), 134 Ill.	2	1985–1986
Schmerber v. California green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1986Ed. 2d 908 , 86 S. Ct. 1826 .) Our legislature has also provided that a driver arrested for driving under the influence be read the implied consent law and has specifically stated that this warning is not an issue in an implied consent hearing. 1984Ed. 2d 908 , 86 S. Ct. 1826 .) Our legislature has also provided that a driver arrested for driving under the influence be read the implied consent law and has specifically stated that this warning is not an issue in an implied consent hearing.	2	1984–1986
People v. Matulis green illappct · 1983 2 sentences 1985(See People v. Matulis (1983), 117 Ill. 1984People v. Matulis (1983), 117 Ill.	2	1984–1985
People v. LaFrank green illappct · 1982 2 sentences 1985(People v. LaFrank (1982), 104 Ill. 1984App. 3d 650 , 432 N.E.2d 1282 .) The implied consent hearing under section 11 — 501.1(c) is a separate and distinct proceeding and progresses independently of the related municipal prosecution for DWI.	2	1984–1985
People v. Malloy green illappct · 1980 2 sentences 1984(People v. Malloy (1980), 83 Ill. 1982This same argument was considered in depth and rejected in People v. Malloy (1980), 83 Ill.	2	1982–1984
People v. Fancher green illappct · 1978 2 sentences 1984App. 3d 632 , 371 N.E.2d 1291 .) The scope of an implied consent hearing is limited by statute to the issues provided in section 11—501.1(d) (Ill. 1978These considerations, in addition to the fact that an implied consent hearing is civil rather than criminal in nature (People v. Fancher (3d Dist. 1978), 56 Ill.	2	1978–1984
Bell v. Burson green scotus · 1971	2	1974–1983
Glos v. Sanitary District of Chicago green ill · 1906	1	2006–2006
Pratt v. Davis green ill · 1906	1	2006–2006
People v. Dvorak green illappct · 1995	1	1996–1996
People v. Gafford green illappct · 1991	1	1993–1993
People v. Griffith neutral illappct · 1986	1	1992–1992
People v. Furness green illappct · 1988	1	1992–1992
People v. Giere green illappct · 1989	1	1990–1990
People v. Gerke green ill · 1988	1	1989–1989
People v. Gerke green illappct · 1987	1	1989–1989
People v. Kirby green illappct · 1986	1	1989–1989
People v. Orth green ill · 1988	1	1989–1989
People v. Gaddi green illappct · 1986	1	1989–1989
People v. Doherty green illappct · 1986	1	1989–1989
People v. Frye green illappct · 1983	1	1989–1989
People v. Wingren green illappct · 1988	1	1988–1988
People v. Kissel green illappct · 1986	1	1988–1988
Blair v. Bartelmay green illappct · 1986	1	1988–1988
People v. Foster green illappct · 1988	1	1988–1988

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 755 ILCS 40/5 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

GA 126 (1979–2025) PA 95 (1990–2026) IL 74 (1974–2015) WA 54 (1974–2019) MO 50 (1992–2023) MN 46 (1984–2025) FL 21 (1970–2025) TX 20 (1970–2015) WI 14 (1995–2026) OR 13 (1989–2026) SC 12 (1995–2020) TN 11 (1996–2026) OH 10 (1973–2018) IA 10 (2005–2024) SD 9 (1978–2002) CA 9 (1955–2022) AZ 8 (1989–1998) AR 7 (1993–2021) ID 7 (2014–2020) VA 7 (1990–2017) HI 6 (1986–2021) ND 4 (2019–2023) KY 4 (1975–2025) OK 4 (2013–2016) WV 4 (1995–2022) WY 4 (1988–2007) MD 4 (1992–2021) AK 3 (1981–2001) NC 3 (1992–2010) IN 3 (1986–2009) KS 3 (2006–2020) CT 2 (1992–1996) ME 2 (2018–2018) NE 2 (1992–1998) MA 2 (1988–2004) VI 2 (2007–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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