privity rule in Maryland

2024Recognizing that the strict privity rule barred the buyers’ claims against the lender’s attorney, this Court noted that other jurisdictions had adopted other approaches, including a “balancing of 11 factors theory.” Id.

2000In addition to the analysis set out above, the Court used language indicating that the holding was limited to the legal malpractice context: "Based on our review of the above cases, we think it clear that Maryland, as a general rule, adheres to the strict privity rule in attorney malpractice cases." Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. at 130 , 492 A.2d at 625 (emphasis added).

2024ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE – STRICT PRIVITY RULE The Supreme Court held that the strict privity rule set out in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730 (1998), is still good law.

2024In two thorough and well-reasoned opinions (one for the first stage and one for the second), the circuit court held that in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730 (1998), this Court affirmed the continuing vitality of the strict privity rule in legal malpractice cases and “closed the door altogether to non-client third-party beneficiary claims of legal malpractice in the estate planning context[.]” The court further held that even if Noble left open the possibility for such third-party beneficiary claims, the 8 undisputed facts showed that Pauline engaged Mr. Gentile to draft the 2019 Instrument to serve

1997In Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md.App. 23 , 420 A.2d 1285 (1980), we examined the Court’s analysis in Prescott and explained that [although the case has a most unusual factual setting, it does seem to suggest a modest relaxation of the strict privity requirement to the extent of allowing a true third party beneficiary to sue an attorney as he could sue any other defaulting or tortious party to a contract made for his benefit.

1997In Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md.App. 23 , 420 A.2d 1285 (1980), we examined the Court’s analysis in Prescott and explained that [although the case has a most unusual factual setting, it does seem to suggest a modest relaxation of the strict privity requirement to the extent of allowing a true third party beneficiary to sue an attorney as he could sue any other defaulting or tortious party to a contract made for his benefit.

2009Ferguson v. Cramer, 349 Md. 760 , 709 A.2d 1279 (1998), similarly considered “whether a beneficiary under a will may maintain a cause of action for professional malpractice against an attorney retained by the personal representative of the testator’s estate.” Citing the same public policy considerations listed in Noble , the Court once again held that the strict privity rule applied and the suit by the beneficiary was barred as a matter of law.

2009Ferguson v. Cramer, 349 Md. 760 , 709 A.2d 1279 (1998), similarly considered “whether a beneficiary under a will may maintain a cause of action for professional malpractice against an attorney retained by the personal representative of the testator’s estate.” Citing the same public policy considerations listed in Noble , the Court once again held that the strict privity rule applied and the suit by the beneficiary was barred as a matter of law.

2013In applying the privity standard enunciated in Jacques and Ultramares, the Court looked for an intimate nexus between the parties. 11 Focusing on the accountant’s knowledge of the third party’s reliance on the accountant’s report, we concluded that the accountant’s knowledge could suffice as the legal equivalent of privity necessary to establish a negligence claim between the parties. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 684-88, 692-94 , 762 A.2d at 603-05, 607-09 .

2013In applying the privity standard enunciated in Jacques and Ultramares, the Court looked for an intimate nexus between the parties. 11 Focusing on the accountant’s knowledge of the third party’s reliance on the accountant’s report, we concluded that the accountant’s knowledge could suffice as the legal equivalent of privity necessary to establish a negligence claim between the parties. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 684-88, 692-94 , 762 A.2d at 603-05, 607-09 .

2017Instead, in such cases we have refrained from finding a tort duty absent privity or its equivalent—i.e., an “intimate nexus.” 11 Jacques , 307 Md. at *615 537, 515 A.2d 756 ; Walpert, 361 Md. at 681 , 762 A.2d 582 ; see also 100 Inv.

2000The petitioner relies on Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756, 759-60 (1986) and Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 130-31, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (1985).

1998The Balancing of Factors Theory Forty years ago, the Supreme Court of California began the trend of alternative approaches to the strict privity rule when it first formulated its policy-based balancing of factors theory in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647 , 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).

1998The Balancing of Factors Theory Forty years ago, the Supreme Court of California began the trend of alternative approaches to the strict privity rule when it first formulated its policy-based balancing of factors theory in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647 , 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.

2024Although we perceive no reason not to apply Noble in this context, this opinion should not be interpreted as holding that the laws governing wills and trusts are the same in any other respect. 16 Wadsworth v. Sharma, 479 Md. 606, 630 (2022) (internal citations omitted).

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.

2024This Court may abandon the doctrine of stare decisis when the decision is “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles” or where there is “a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” 704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985) (citing Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wash. 1976)). 14 Mississippi is the lone state that has legislatively abolished the privity requirement.

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.

2024This Court may abandon the doctrine of stare decisis when the decision is “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles” or where there is “a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” 704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985) (citing Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wash. 1976)). 14 Mississippi is the lone state that has legislatively abolished the privity requirement.

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.

2024I A A trust is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person[.]” Klein v. Bryer, 227 Md. 473, 477 (1962).

2024CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (West 2024); Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 373-74 (Miss. 1992) (recognizing the legislative abrogation of the privity requirement and “extending liability to foreseeable third parties who detrimentally rely” on an attorney’s services). 15 Neither party has argued that Noble does not apply in the estate planning context where, as here, the estate is distributed under the terms of a trust instead of a will.

2024See Robinson v. Benton, 842 So.2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002); Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, Pro.

2024(Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 15 privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md.