privity requirement in New York

1995We had long since abandoned the privity requirement in many personal injury claims based on implied warranty and incrementally extended the duty of manufacturers and suppliers not only to purchasers and users, but to users’ family members (see, Greenberg v Lorenz, 9 NY2d 195 ), to remote purchasers (Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co., 11 NY2d 5 ), to an airline passenger suing the manufacturer of a defective component part of an airplane (Goldberg v Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 NY2d 432 , supra), and to rescuers suing the manufacturer of a defective oxygen mask (Guarino v Mine Safety Appl

1995We had long since abandoned the privity requirement in many personal injury claims based on implied warranty and incrementally extended the duty of manufacturers and suppliers not only to purchasers and users, but to users' family members ( see , Greenberg v Lorenz , 9 N.Y.2d 195 ), to remote purchasers ( Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co. , 11 N.Y.2d 5 ), to an airline passenger suing the manufacturer of a defective component part of an airplane ( Goldberg v Kollsman Instrument Corp. , 12 N.Y.2d 432 , supra ), and to rescuers suing the manufacturer of a defective oxygen mask ( Guarino v M

1992By holding that plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing to survive defendant's motion for summary judgment, the majority reimposes the stringent privity rule of Glanzer v Shepard ( 233 N.Y. 236 ) and Ultramares Corp. v Touche ( 255 N.Y. 170 ).

1992By holding that plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the majority reimposes the stringent privity rule of Glanzer v Shepard ( 233 NY 236 ) and Ultramares Corp. v Touche ( 255 NY 170 ).

1989Since Codling v Paglia ( 32 NY2d 330 ) eliminated the privity requirement in strict products liability actions brought against manufacturers, the pool of potential defendants has been judicially expanded to include distributors, retailers, processors of materials and makers of component parts, or essentially to any one responsible for placing the defective product in the marketplace (see, Kirby v Rouselle Corp., 108 Misc 2d 291, 295 ; see also, PJI 2:141 [1989 Supp]).

1985The court’s decision in Codling v Paglia (supra) only removed the privity requirement and allowed the injured user to sue directly those who created the defect and marketed it.

2024Co. of Am. , 164 AD2d 73, 81 [1st Dept 1990], affd 79 NY2d 623 [1992]).

2024Co. of Am. , 164 AD2d 73, 81 [1st Dept 1990], affd 79 NY2d 623 [1992]).

1995Some courts (including ours) recognized certain narrow exceptions to the privity requirement in an effort to avoid the doctrine’s harsher effects (e.g., Greenberg v Lorenz, 9 NY2d 195 ; see, Heller v U. S. Suzuki Motor Corp., supra, at 410; Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 96, at 682 [5th ed]).

1995We had long since abandoned the privity requirement in many personal injury claims based on implied warranty and incrementally extended the duty of manufacturers and suppliers not only to purchasers and users, but to users’ family members (see, Greenberg v Lorenz, 9 NY2d 195 ), to remote purchasers (Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co., 11 NY2d 5 ), to an airline passenger suing the manufacturer of a defective component part of an airplane (Goldberg v Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 NY2d 432 , supra), and to rescuers suing the manufacturer of a defective oxygen mask (Guarino v Mine Safety Appl

1995We had long since abandoned the privity requirement in many personal injury claims based on implied warranty and incrementally extended the duty of manufacturers and suppliers not only to purchasers and users, but to users’ family members (see, Greenberg v Lorenz, 9 NY2d 195 ), to remote purchasers (Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co., 11 NY2d 5 ), to an airline passenger suing the manufacturer of a defective component part of an airplane (Goldberg v Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 NY2d 432 , supra), and to rescuers suing the manufacturer of a defective oxygen mask (Guarino v Mine Safety Appl

1995We had long since abandoned the privity requirement in many personal injury claims based on implied warranty and incrementally extended the duty of manufacturers and suppliers not only to purchasers and users, but to users' family members ( see , Greenberg v Lorenz , 9 N.Y.2d 195 ), to remote purchasers ( Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co. , 11 N.Y.2d 5 ), to an airline passenger suing the manufacturer of a defective component part of an airplane ( Goldberg v Kollsman Instrument Corp. , 12 N.Y.2d 432 , supra ), and to rescuers suing the manufacturer of a defective oxygen mask ( Guarino v M

1992In our 1977 White decision, we loosened the privity requirement of Ultramares without rejecting it outright ( White v Guarente , 43 NY2d, at 362 ).

1992In our 1977 White decision, we loosened the privity requirement of Ultramares without rejecting it outright (White v Guarente, 43 NY2d, at 362 ).

1981The court wrote ( 74 Misc 2d 685, 685-686 , supra): “The more difficult question involves the attorney’s liability to third parties.

1977(Victor v Goldman, 74 Misc 2d 685 , supra, p 686.) (Emphasis added.) In so stating, the court recognized the obsolescence of the strict privity doctrine.

2012In particular, we note that the agreement was not signed by Barkin, the physician whom the Supreme Court found had a “sufficiently close” relationship with the HIFU defendants so as to permit them to enforce the agreement (Bernstein v Wysoki, 77 AD3d at 251 ).

2012In particular, we note that the agreement was not signed by Barkin, the physician whom the Supreme Court found had a “sufficiently close” relationship with the HIFU defendants so as to permit them to enforce the agreement (Bernstein v Wysoki, 77 AD3d at 251 ).

1992By holding that plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing to survive defendant's motion for summary judgment, the majority reimposes the stringent privity rule of Glanzer v Shepard ( 233 N.Y. 236 ) and Ultramares Corp. v Touche ( 255 N.Y. 170 ).

1992By holding that plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the majority reimposes the stringent privity rule of Glanzer v Shepard ( 233 NY 236 ) and Ultramares Corp. v Touche ( 255 NY 170 ).

1991Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the courts of this State have not departed from the privity requirement in will-drafting cases (see, Viscardi v Lerner, supra, at 664), whether brought by intended beneficiaries (see, Mali v De Forest & Duer, 160 AD2d 297, 297-298 , lv denied 76 NY2d 710 ; Rossi v Boehner, supra) or the estate itself (see, Estate of Spivey v Pulley, supra; cf., Kramer v Belfi, supra).

1986While we recognize that the privity requirement has been relaxed in certain areas of professional negligence (see, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 ; White v Guarente, 43 NY2d 356 ), the courts of this State have not departed from this requirement in legal malpractice cases (Rossi v Boehner, supra, citing Calamari v Grace, supra).

1989But just as rapidly, exceptions to the privity requirement developed (see, e.g., Devlin v Smith, 89 NY 470 ; Loop v Litchfield, 42 NY 351 ; Thomas v Winchester, 6 NY 397 ; Huset v Case Threshing Mach.

1973The pattern in New York has been to eliminate the privity requirement (1) with respect to food and beverages (Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N Y 2d 195); (2) when dealing with inherently and imminently dangerous products (Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 ; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382 ); (3) in an action against a manufacturer for breach of express warranty (Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N Y 2d 5); (4) in the case of implied warranty where the breach was not only considered a violation of the sales contract but also as a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party wh

1985In Ryan v Kanne ( 170 NW2d 395 [Iowa]), the court rejected the accountants’ contention that a strict privity doctrine governed accountants’ liability for negligence.

1984(For example, see Ryan v Kanne, 170 NW2d 395 [Iowa Supreme Ct]; Shatterproof Glass Corp. v James, 466 SW2d 873 [Tex Ct Civ App]; H.

1958Actually, the decision was based on the reasoning in the By an case ( 255 N. Y. 388 [1931], supra) where Chief Judge Cardozo was the first to skirt the strict privity requirement by holding that the husband might sue since the wife acted ás his ‘ ‘ agent ’ ’ in making the purchase.

1957Here our courts have permitted a husband to recover for the breach of implied warranty where his wife had purchased the food based upon a presumption of agency (Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388 ; Visusil v. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736 ) and in Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp. ( 265 App. Div. 278, 285 ) ordered a new trial so that plaintiff father could “ show that the son acted simply as his agent in making the purchase and that the cause of action in contract accrued to the father. ’ ’ Recently, in Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ( 308 N. Y. 780 ), the Court of App

1958In Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ( 284 App. Div. 663 [1954], supra, afifd. without opinion 308 N. Y. 780 [1955]), the Appellate Division (3d Dept.) held that the plaintiff, who was not the purchaser, was entitled to recover although her sister made the purchase.

1957Here our courts have permitted a husband to recover for the breach of implied warranty where his wife had purchased the food based upon a presumption of agency (Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388 ; Visusil v. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736 ) and in Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp. ( 265 App. Div. 278, 285 ) ordered a new trial so that plaintiff father could “ show that the son acted simply as his agent in making the purchase and that the cause of action in contract accrued to the father. ’ ’ Recently, in Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ( 308 N. Y. 780 ), the Court of App

2019As for Conners and Cestone, the "special circumstances" exception to the privity rule applies ( see Deep Woods Holdings LLC v Pryor Cashman LLP , 145 AD3d 447 , 449-450 [1st Dept 2016]).

2018This Court should, likewise, refuse to impose this additional requirement in the face of the ambiguous policy language here. 3 If defendant sought that requirement, it could have so provided by using clear and unambiguous language ( compare AB Green Gansevoort, LLC v. Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. , 102 A.D.3d 425 , 426, 961 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept. 2013] [holding a privity requirement exists where the policy unambiguously stated that an organization is added as an additional insured "when you and such ... organization have agreed in writing or in a contract or agreement that such ... organizati

2018This Court should, likewise, refuse to impose this additional requirement in the face of the ambiguous policy language here. 3 If defendant sought that requirement, it could have so provided by using clear and unambiguous language ( compare AB Green Gansevoort, LLC v. Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. , 102 A.D.3d 425 , 426, 961 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept. 2013] [holding a privity requirement exists where the policy unambiguously stated that an organization is added as an additional insured "when you and such ... organization have agreed in writing or in a contract or agreement that such ... organizati

2018This Court should, likewise, refuse to impose this additional requirement in the face of the ambiguous policy language here. 3 If defendant sought that requirement, it could have so provided by using clear and unambiguous language ( compare AB Green Gansevoort, LLC v. Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. , 102 A.D.3d 425 , 426, 961 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept. 2013] [holding a privity requirement exists where the policy unambiguously stated that an organization is added as an additional insured "when you and such ... organization have agreed in writing or in a contract or agreement that such ... organizati

2018This Court should, likewise, refuse to impose this additional requirement in the face of the ambiguous policy language here. 3 If defendant sought that requirement, it could have so provided by using clear and unambiguous language ( compare AB Green Gansevoort, LLC v. Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. , 102 A.D.3d 425 , 426, 961 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept. 2013] [holding a privity requirement exists where the policy unambiguously stated that an organization is added as an additional insured "when you and such ... organization have agreed in writing or in a contract or agreement that such ... organizati

2016Under these circumstances, where defendants drafted the assignment at a time when it represented both Lichtenstein and plaintiff, and that interpreting the assignment to exclude tort claims would mean that *450 neither the assignor nor plaintiff, the assignee, would be able to sue defendants for malpractice for failing to exercise the call option in a timely manner, we find that the “special circumstances” exception to the privity requirement applies (see generally Estate of Schneider v Finmann, 15 NY3d 306, 308-309 [2010]; Good Old Days Tavern v Zwirn, 259 AD2d 300 [1st Dept 1999]).