privity requirement in Illinois

1982In discussing the tort of misrepresentation the court stated: “This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement has proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of tort liability to third persons. *** To eliminate any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction.

1981In Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62 , 250 N.E.2d 656, 660 , the supreme court said: “This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement has proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of tort liability to third persons. * * * To eliminate any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction.

1981In Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62 , 250 N.E.2d 656, 660 , the supreme court said: “This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement has proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of tort liability to third persons. * * * To eliminate any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction.

1981In Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62 , 250 N.E.2d 656, 660 , the supreme court said: “This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement has proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of tort liability to third persons. * * * To eliminate any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction.

2011Indeed, defendants acknowledged that the privity requirement had been abolished by Pelham, 92 Ill.2d at 21 , 64 Ill.Dec. 544 , 440 N.E.2d 96 .

2011Indeed, defendants acknowledged that the privity requirement had been abolished by Pelham, 92 Ill.2d at 21 , 64 Ill.Dec. 544 , 440 N.E.2d 96 .

2006Mekertichian, 347 Ill.

2006Mekertichian, 347 Ill.

2004Rothe, 119 Ill. 2d at 294 , 518 N.E.2d at 1030 ; Szajna, 115 Ill. 2d at 315-16 , 503 N.E.2d at 769 .

2004Rothe, 119 Ill. 2d at 294 , 518 N.E.2d at 1030 ; Szajna, 115 Ill. 2d at 315-16 , 503 N.E.2d at 769 .

2007Although a plaintiff may be excepted from the privity requirement by suing for personal injury (Perona, 292 Ill.

2007Although a plaintiff may be excepted from the privity requirement by suing for personal injury (Perona, 292 Ill.

2004In Voelker , the court explicitly stated: "The Magnuson-Moss Act allows a suit for breach of 'an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title).' [Citation.] Because §§2308 and 2304(a) do not modify, or discuss in any way, a state's ability to establish a privity requirement, whether privity is a prerequisite to a claim for breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act therefore hinges entirely on the applicable state law. [Citations.] Under the law of Illinois, privity of contract is a prerequisite to recover economic damages for bre

2004In Voelker, the court explicitly stated: “The Magnuson-Moss Act allows a suit for breach of ‘an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title).’ [Citation.] Because §§ 2308 and 2304(a) do not modify, or discuss in any way, a state’s ability to establish a privity requirement, whether privity is a prerequisite to a claim for breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act therefore hinges entirely on the applicable state law. [Citations.] Under the law of Illinois, privity of contract is a prerequisite to recover economic damages for bre

2001As with nearly all of Meyer’s legal maneuvers in both this litigation and the federal litigation, the attempt was ineffectual, for in a privity analysis, “[i]t is the identity of interest that controls ***, not the nominal identity of the parties.” Burris, 151 Ill. 2d at 296 .

2001As with nearly all of Meyer's legal maneuvers in both this litigation and the federal litigation, the attempt was ineffectual, for in a privity analysis, "[i]t is the identity of interest that controls ***, not the nominal identity of the parties." Burris , 151 Ill. 2d at 296 .

1986We stated: “[Application of the rules of warranty prevents a manufacturer from being held liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope.” (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 79 .) We further stated: “We believe it is preferable to relegate the consumer to the comprehensive scheme of remedies fashioned by the UCC, rather than requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products so that the manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers.” ( 91 Ill. 2d 69, 79-80 .)

1986We stated: “[Application of the rules of warranty prevents a manufacturer from being held liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope.” (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 79 .) We further stated: “We believe it is preferable to relegate the consumer to the comprehensive scheme of remedies fashioned by the UCC, rather than requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products so that the manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers.” ( 91 Ill. 2d 69, 79-80 .)

1986App. 2d 362 , 219 N.E.2d 726 (defectively manufactured aerosol cans), in other cases of economic loss based upon breach of implied warranty, however, our appellate courts have maintained the privity requirement (Bagel v. American Honda Motor Co. (1985), 132 Ill.

1982App. 2d 362 , 219 N.E.2d 726 , that abrogated the privity requirement on a third-party beneficiary theory.

1980Karagheusian, Inc. (1965), 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 , the court which had led the way in attacking the privity requirement in a breach of warranty action (Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960), 32 N.J. 358 , 161 A.2d 69 ) again broke new ground.

1980Karagheusian, Inc. (1965), 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 , the court which had led the way in attacking the privity requirement in a breach of warranty action (Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960), 32 N.J. 358 , 161 A.2d 69 ) again broke new ground.

1978Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460 , 241 N.Y.S. 2d 128 ) which evidence the increasing disregard for the privity requirement through continued expansion of the class of permissible plaintiffs under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and realize that in factual situations similar to the instant case recovery has been granted under this theory, (e.g., Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677 , 186 N.Y.S. 2d 103 ) we believe the fundamental reasoning underlying the tortious misrepresentation theory more nearly accommodates this case than the expanded third-party beneficiary doctrine.” For

1978Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460 , 241 N.Y.S. 2d 128 ) which evidence the increasing disregard for the privity requirement through continued expansion of the class of permissible plaintiffs under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and realize that in factual situations similar to the instant case recovery has been granted under this theory, (e.g., Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677 , 186 N.Y.S. 2d 103 ) we believe the fundamental reasoning underlying the tortious misrepresentation theory more nearly accommodates this case than the expanded third-party beneficiary doctrine.” For

1978Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460 , 241 N.Y.S. 2d 128 ) which evidence the increasing disregard for the privity requirement through continued expansion of the class of permissible plaintiffs under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and realize that in factual situations similar to the instant case recovery has been granted under this theory, (e.g., Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677 , 186 N.Y.S. 2d 103 ) we believe the fundamental reasoning underlying the tortious misrepresentation theory more nearly accommodates this case than the expanded third-party beneficiary doctrine.” For

1978Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460 , 241 N.Y.S. 2d 128 ) which evidence the increasing disregard for the privity requirement through continued expansion of the class of permissible plaintiffs under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and realize that in factual situations similar to the instant case recovery has been granted under this theory, (e.g., Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677 , 186 N.Y.S. 2d 103 ) we believe the fundamental reasoning underlying the tortious misrepresentation theory more nearly accommodates this case than the expanded third-party beneficiary doctrine.” For

1974“Where * # ” plaintiff can establish representations to the public, justifiable reliance on these representations, and the other matters necessary to bring his case under the rules developed in 2 Restatement (Second) Torts, §402B and a parallel rule concerning pecuniary loss we consider that recovery is justified, both for physical and pecuniary loss, on grounds of misrepresentation, even though there is no direct contract relationship between the parties.’ 398 S.W.2d at 248 .

1969“Where * * * the plaintiff can establish representations to the public, justifiable reliance on these representations, and the other matters necessary to bring his case under the rules developed in 2 Restatement (Second) Torts, § 402B and a parallel rule concerning pecuniary loss we consider that recovery is justified, both for physical and pecuniary loss, on grounds of misrepresentation, even though there is no direct contract relationship between the parties.” 398 S.W.2d at 248 .

1969(Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 , 377 P.2d 897, 907 .) The principles developed in those cases, wherein recovery was based upon “direct warranty to the consumer” or “misrepresentation”, have been adopted by the American Law Institute in Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), § 402B.

1969(Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 , 377 P.2d 897, 907 .) The principles developed in those cases, wherein recovery was based upon “direct warranty to the consumer” or “misrepresentation”, have been adopted by the American Law Institute in Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), § 402B.

1995In Kassab v. Central Soya (1968), 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848 , overruled on other grounds AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1990), 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 , the supreme court of Pennsylvania eliminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

1995In Kassab v. Central Soya (1968), 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848 , overruled on other grounds AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1990), 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 , the supreme court of Pennsylvania eliminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

1995In Kassab v. Central Soya (1968), 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848 , overruled on other grounds AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1990), 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 , the supreme court of Pennsylvania eliminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

1995In Kassab v. Central Soya (1968), 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848 , overruled on other grounds AM/PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1990), 526 Pa. 110 , 584 A.2d 915 , the supreme court of Pennsylvania eliminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

1993App. 3d 716, 718 , 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1265 .) The doctrine of privity, by itself, no longer shields tortfeasors from the consequences of negligent conduct.

1993However, “[w]hat does remain as a factor is the concern behind the privity requirement, that the duty imposed not constitute an unduly severe burden upon a defendant.” (Alm, 134 Ill.

1992See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 , 94 S.Ct. at 2094 , 40 L.Ed.2d at 471 ; Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 512 , 41 S.Ct. 189, 191 , 65 L.Ed. 376, 379 ; United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile (1926), 272 U.S. 321, 333 , 47 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 71 L.Ed. 279, 286 .

1992See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 , 94 S.Ct. at 2094 , 40 L.Ed.2d at 471 ; Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 512 , 41 S.Ct. 189, 191 , 65 L.Ed. 376, 379 ; United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile (1926), 272 U.S. 321, 333 , 47 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 71 L.Ed. 279, 286 .

1992See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 , 94 S.Ct. at 2094 , 40 L.Ed.2d at 471 ; Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 512 , 41 S.Ct. 189, 191 , 65 L.Ed. 376, 379 ; United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile (1926), 272 U.S. 321, 333 , 47 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 71 L.Ed. 279, 286 .

1992See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 , 94 S.Ct. at 2094 , 40 L.Ed.2d at 471 ; Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 512 , 41 S.Ct. 189, 191 , 65 L.Ed. 376, 379 ; United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile (1926), 272 U.S. 321, 333 , 47 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 71 L.Ed. 279, 286 .

1992(See, e.g., United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft (5th Cir.1985), 750 F.2d 1280, 1288 ; United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air (4th Cir.1985), 777 F.2d 947 , 951; United States v. Twenty Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents (8th Cir.1985), 769 F.2d 479, 482 ; United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars (1st Cir.1980), 615 F.2d 1, 3 ; United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans (1st Cir.1980), 621 F.2d 444, 448 ; United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, Etc. (2d Cir. 1982), 691 F.2d 603 , 607; United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV (W.

1992(See, e.g., United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft (5th Cir.1985), 750 F.2d 1280, 1288 ; United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air (4th Cir.1985), 777 F.2d 947 , 951; United States v. Twenty Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents (8th Cir.1985), 769 F.2d 479, 482 ; United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars (1st Cir.1980), 615 F.2d 1, 3 ; United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans (1st Cir.1980), 621 F.2d 444, 448 ; United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, Etc. (2d Cir. 1982), 691 F.2d 603 , 607; United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV (W.

1992(See, e.g., United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft (5th Cir.1985), 750 F.2d 1280, 1288 ; United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air (4th Cir.1985), 777 F.2d 947 , 951; United States v. Twenty Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents (8th Cir.1985), 769 F.2d 479, 482 ; United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars (1st Cir.1980), 615 F.2d 1, 3 ; United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans (1st Cir.1980), 621 F.2d 444, 448 ; United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, Etc. (2d Cir. 1982), 691 F.2d 603 , 607; United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV (W.