7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1964–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2010Therefore, the privity requirement is not waived in this case."); Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enters., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) ("[T]he rule has evolved that in situations involving solely economic loss based upon breach of express warranty, privity of contract between the parties is required. 2010See TD Props., LLC v. VP Bldgs., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 351 , 360 n. 5 (D.Conn.2009) (“In the Court’s view, this is a form of economic loss because the Plaintiff seeks recovery for the value and costs of repair for the allegedly defective goods____ There is no indication that the Plaintiffs ‘other property’ [was] damaged---- Therefore, the privity requirement is not waived in this case.”); Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enters., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (“[T]he rule has evolved that in situations involving solely economic loss based upon breach of express warranty, pri | 1 | 1 |
TD Properties, LLC v. VP Buildings, Inc.green1 sentence2010See TD Props., LLC v. VP Bldgs., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 351 , 360 n. 5 (D.Conn.2009) (“In the Court’s view, this is a form of economic loss because the Plaintiff seeks recovery for the value and costs of repair for the allegedly defective goods____ There is no indication that the Plaintiffs ‘other property’ [was] damaged---- Therefore, the privity requirement is not waived in this case.”); Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enters., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (“[T]he rule has evolved that in situations involving solely economic loss based upon breach of express warranty, pri | 1 | 1 |
Blair v. Inggreen2 sentences2005Smith, Legal Malpractice § 32.4, at 735 (5th ed. 2000) (“Although the rationale varies, the prevailing rule is that an attorney can be liable for negligence to the intended beneficiary or heirs.”) (footnote collecting cases omitted). 7 See also Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai'i *691 at 253, 21 P.3d at 458 (“Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice, the trend in estate planning is to allow a legal malpractice cause of action brought by non-clients.” (citation omitted)); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d at 681 (“The trend in recent year 2005Smith, Legal Malpractice § 32.4, at 735 (5th ed. 2000) (“Although the rationale varies, the prevailing rule is that an attorney can be liable for negligence to the intended beneficiary or heirs.”) (footnote collecting cases omitted). 7 See also Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai'i *691 at 253, 21 P.3d at 458 (“Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice, the trend in estate planning is to allow a legal malpractice cause of action brought by non-clients.” (citation omitted)); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d at 681 (“The trend in recent year | 1 | 1 |
Schreiner v. Scovillegreen2 sentences2005Smith, Legal Malpractice § 32.4, at 735 (5th ed. 2000) (“Although the rationale varies, the prevailing rule is that an attorney can be liable for negligence to the intended beneficiary or heirs.”) (footnote collecting cases omitted). 7 See also Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai'i *691 at 253, 21 P.3d at 458 (“Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice, the trend in estate planning is to allow a legal malpractice cause of action brought by non-clients.” (citation omitted)); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d at 681 (“The trend in recent year 2005Smith, Legal Malpractice § 32.4, at 735 (5th ed. 2000) (“Although the rationale varies, the prevailing rule is that an attorney can be liable for negligence to the intended beneficiary or heirs.”) (footnote collecting cases omitted). 7 See also Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai'i *691 at 253, 21 P.3d at 458 (“Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice, the trend in estate planning is to allow a legal malpractice cause of action brought by non-clients.” (citation omitted)); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d at 681 (“The trend in recent year | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co.
green
2 sentences2007This Court appears to have first adopted product liability law principlesabsent the privity requirementinto West Virginia's common law in 1902 in Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W.Va. 644 , 41 S.E. 190 (1902). 2007This Court appears to have first adopted product liability law principlesabsent the privity requirementinto West Virginia's common law in 1902 in Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W.Va. 644 , 41 S.E. 190 (1902). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Conley v. Spillers
green
2 sentences1991In Conley, 171 W.Va. at 594-595 , 301 S.E.2d at 226 , we held that the mere fact that the plaintiffs had appeared in the prior litigation as representatives of the interests of the minor child did not preclude them from proceeding upon their own claims against the same defendants: “Cases as well as the Restatement demonstrate that the privity doctrine does not apply when a person sues in a representative capacity, and then brings his own individual cause of action even though it arises from the same transaction. 1991In Conley, 171 W.Va. at 594-595 , 301 S.E.2d at 226 , we held that the mere fact that the plaintiffs had appeared in the prior litigation as representatives of the interests of the minor child did not preclude them from proceeding upon their own claims against the same defendants: “Cases as well as the Restatement demonstrate that the privity doctrine does not apply when a person sues in a representative capacity, and then brings his own individual cause of action even though it arises from the same transaction. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Farley v. Farley
green
2 sentences1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rudow v. Fogel
green
2 sentences1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
George H. Humphreys, Administrator of the Estate of John S. Humphreys, Deceased, and George H. Humphreys, Individually v. Herman Tann
green
1 sentence1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
James S. Gerrard v. William G. Larsen, Special Administrator of the Estate of Jack K. Gibbens, Deceased
green
1 sentence1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hossler Ex Rel. Dows v. Barry
green
1 sentence1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Molino v. County of Putnam
green
2 sentences1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 1983This is summarized in Paragraph 2 of Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982): *595 “A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.” 16 See Humphrey v. Tann, supra; Gerrard v. Larsen, supra; Hossler v. Barry, supra; Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587 , 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978); In re Sullivan’s Estate, 289 N.Y.2d 44 , 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 , 272 N.E.2d 323 (1971); Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 , 431 P.2d 133 (19 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
MacPherson v. . Buick Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1979In this country, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 , 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), is generally credited with making the major breach in the privity rule by holding *876 that the user of a chattel could recover for injuries if it were negligently manufactured and inherently or imminently dangerous, even though the user had no contractual relationship with the manufacturer. 1979In this country, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 , 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), is generally credited with making the major breach in the privity rule by holding *876 that the user of a chattel could recover for injuries if it were negligently manufactured and inherently or imminently dangerous, even though the user had no contractual relationship with the manufacturer. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
General Motors Corporation v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1964Quoting from 27 Am, Jur., Independent Contractors, § 56, the opinion states: “. . . ‘Furthermore, a contractor may be liable where he turns over work which is inherently or intrinsically dangerous, or, in other words, where the work is turned over in a manner so negligently defective as to be imminently dangerous to third persons, or where he knows of defective conditions of the work, which may not in itself be inherently dangerous; ....’” It is interesting to note that the Wright case, establishing the privity rule, involved the liability of a contractor and not of a manufacturer or seller. * | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.