privity rule in Vermont

2017See, e.g., Hedges , 2003 VT 63 , ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 588 , 834 A.2d 1 ("Many courts have held lawyers liable to nonclient plaintiffs for negligence where the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship-in estate-planning and will-drafting cases for example."); Bovee , 174 Vt. at 488 , 811 A.2d at 140 ("[A] number of courts have relaxed the privity rule in limited circumstances-most often in the estate-planning context-where it can be shown that the client's purpose in retaining the attorney was to directly benefit a third party.").

2017See, e.g., Hedges , 2003 VT 63 , ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 588 , 834 A.2d 1 ("Many courts have held lawyers liable to nonclient plaintiffs for negligence where the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship-in estate-planning and will-drafting cases for example."); Bovee , 174 Vt. at 488 , 811 A.2d at 140 ("[A] number of courts have relaxed the privity rule in limited circumstances-most often in the estate-planning context-where it can be shown that the client's purpose in retaining the attorney was to directly benefit a third party.").

2017See, e.g., Hedges , 2003 VT 63 , ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 588 , 834 A.2d 1 ("Many courts have held lawyers liable to nonclient plaintiffs for negligence where the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship-in estate-planning and will-drafting cases for example."); Bovee , 174 Vt. at 488 , 811 A.2d at 140 ("[A] number of courts have relaxed the privity rule in limited circumstances-most often in the estate-planning context-where it can be shown that the client's purpose in retaining the attorney was to directly benefit a third party.").

2017See, e.g., Hedges , 2003 VT 63 , ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 588 , 834 A.2d 1 ("Many courts have held lawyers liable to nonclient plaintiffs for negligence where the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship-in estate-planning and will-drafting cases for example."); Bovee , 174 Vt. at 488 , 811 A.2d at 140 ("[A] number of courts have relaxed the privity rule in limited circumstances-most often in the estate-planning context-where it can be shown that the client's purpose in retaining the attorney was to directly benefit a third party.").

2024Neighbor does not argue that landowners failed to comply with this provision. 8 291 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1961); but see Kem, 817 F.2d at 1517 (“It is not clear that the privity exception does any more than restate in different language the rule that persons tantamount to a party may be allowed standing.”).

2003This privity rule ensures that “ ‘attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation.’ ” Id. at 488 , 811 A.2d at 140 (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Tex. 1996)).

2003See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 , 583 A.2d at 587 .

2003See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 , 583 A.2d at 587 .

2002App. Ct. 1988) (“Public policy mandates that when an attorney acts in his professional capacity, he must be free to advise his client without fear of personal liability to third persons and nonclients if the advice later proves to be incorrect.”); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978) (“abandonment of the privity requirement would place a potentially unlimited burden on lawyers”); see generally Comment, Limits on the Privity and As signment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. Chi.

2002See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (intended beneficiaries of will who lost testamentary rights because of attorney negligence may recover against attorney as third-party beneficiaries); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1976) (law firm may be liable to third-party lender for negligent misrepresentation where firm knew that misrepresentations would be used to obtain loan); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (non-client plaintiff had standing to sue attorney who contravened testator’s instructions to leave plain

2002See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (intended beneficiaries of will who lost testamentary rights because of attorney negligence may recover against attorney as third-party beneficiaries); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1976) (law firm may be liable to third-party lender for negligent misrepresentation where firm knew that misrepresentations would be used to obtain loan); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (non-client plaintiff had standing to sue attorney who contravened testator’s instructions to leave plain

2002See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (intended beneficiaries of will who lost testamentary rights because of attorney negligence may recover against attorney as third-party beneficiaries); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1976) (law firm may be liable to third-party lender for negligent misrepresentation where firm knew that misrepresentations would be used to obtain loan); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (non-client plaintiff had standing to sue attorney who contravened testator’s instructions to leave plain

2002See Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 156 Vt. at 549-50 , 594 A.2d at 429 (in the *332 absence of express language limiting Attorney General’s enforcement power to personal consumer victims, plain meaning supports actions against defendants who engage in unfair and deceptive practices with respect to business consumers); Custom Pools, 150 Vt. at 536 , 556 A.2d at 74 (if Legislature intended that Attorney General cannot sue a finance company that benefitted from the consumer fraud of a seller, “it could have done so with clear language to that effect”).

2002See Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 156 Vt. at 549-50 , 594 A.2d at 429 (in the *332 absence of express language limiting Attorney General’s enforcement power to personal consumer victims, plain meaning supports actions against defendants who engage in unfair and deceptive practices with respect to business consumers); Custom Pools, 150 Vt. at 536 , 556 A.2d at 74 (if Legislature intended that Attorney General cannot sue a finance company that benefitted from the consumer fraud of a seller, “it could have done so with clear language to that effect”).

2002See Gamboa v. Shaw, 956 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. App. 1997) (“deviation [from privity requirement] would result in attorneys owing a duty to each shareholder of any corporation they represent,” leading to “almost unlimited liability”).

2002See Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 156 Vt. at 549-50 , 594 A.2d at 429 (in the *332 absence of express language limiting Attorney General’s enforcement power to personal consumer victims, plain meaning supports actions against defendants who engage in unfair and deceptive practices with respect to business consumers); Custom Pools, 150 Vt. at 536 , 556 A.2d at 74 (if Legislature intended that Attorney General cannot sue a finance company that benefitted from the consumer fraud of a seller, “it could have done so with clear language to that effect”).

2002See Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 156 Vt. at 549-50 , 594 A.2d at 429 (in the *332 absence of express language limiting Attorney General’s enforcement power to personal consumer victims, plain meaning supports actions against defendants who engage in unfair and deceptive practices with respect to business consumers); Custom Pools, 150 Vt. at 536 , 556 A.2d at 74 (if Legislature intended that Attorney General cannot sue a finance company that benefitted from the consumer fraud of a seller, “it could have done so with clear language to that effect”).

2002See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (intended beneficiaries of will who lost testamentary rights because of attorney negligence may recover against attorney as third-party beneficiaries); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1976) (law firm may be liable to third-party lender for negligent misrepresentation where firm knew that misrepresentations would be used to obtain loan); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (non-client plaintiff had standing to sue attorney who contravened testator’s instructions to leave plain

2002See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (intended beneficiaries of will who lost testamentary rights because of attorney negligence may recover against attorney as third-party beneficiaries); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1976) (law firm may be liable to third-party lender for negligent misrepresentation where firm knew that misrepresentations would be used to obtain loan); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (non-client plaintiff had standing to sue attorney who contravened testator’s instructions to leave plain

2002See McLachlan v. Simon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741 (N.D.

1984Because the privity requirement in negligence actions has been eliminated, O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 160 , 212 A.2d 69, 70 (1965), the holding of Menard, supra, should not be limited to- “purchasers” but extended to employees of purchasers as well. *309 Nevertheless, plaintiff here has a further hurdle to clear before establishing a prima facie case in negligence.

1984Because the privity requirement in negligence actions has been eliminated, O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 160 , 212 A.2d 69, 70 (1965), the holding of Menard, supra, should not be limited to- “purchasers” but extended to employees of purchasers as well. *309 Nevertheless, plaintiff here has a further hurdle to clear before establishing a prima facie case in negligence.