14 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Ridgewaygreen2 sentences2013See Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378 , 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996); Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85 , 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). 2013See Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378 , 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996); Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85 , 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). | 3 | 6 |
Giles v. HARRINGTON, MILLER, NEIHOUSEgreen2 sentences2021Privity of contract is defined as “that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties,” and our supreme court has “narrowly construed the privity requirement to require direct privity between the plaintiff and the attorney or entity to be held liable for legal malpractice.” Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neilhouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 347 , 208 S.W.3d 197, 203 (2005). 2021Privity of contract is defined as “that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties,” and our supreme court has “narrowly construed the privity requirement to require direct privity between the plaintiff and the attorney or entity to be held liable for legal malpractice.” Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neilhouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 347 , 208 S.W.3d 197, 203 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Almand v. Benton County, Ark.green1 sentence2021Additionally, while a federal bankruptcy court has held that language to include intentional torts other than fraud and misrepresentation, see Almand v. Benton Cnty., 145 B.R. 608, 617 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
Barcelo v. Elliottgreen1 sentence2005This privity rule ensures that “attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation.” Hedges v. Durrance, 175 Vt. 588, 589 , 834 A.2d 1 (2003) (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Tex. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jayel Corp. v. Cochran
green
2 sentences2011Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175 , 234 S.W.3d 278 (2006) (holding that an attorney-client relationship was sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement). 2011Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175 , 234 S.W.3d 278 (2006) (holding that an attorney-client relationship was sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement). | 3 | 2010–2017 |
Wiseman v. Batchelor
green
2 sentences2013See Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378 , 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996); Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85 , 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). 2013See Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378 , 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996); Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85 , 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). | 3 | 1999–2013 |
McDonald v. Pettus
green
2 sentences2013Our conclusion with respect to privity does not end our analysis, “because the lawyer-immunity statute contains two exceptions to the privity requirement,” and [n]o privity is required for “ ‘[a]cts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations.’ ” McDonald, 337 Ark. at 274 , 988 S.W.2d at 14 . 2013Our conclusion with respect to privity does not end our analysis, “because the lawyer-immunity statute contains two exceptions to the privity requirement,” and [n]o privity is required for “ ‘[a]cts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations.’ ” McDonald, 337 Ark. at 274 , 988 S.W.2d at 14 . | 2 | 2003–2013 |
Jackson v. Ivory
green
2 sentences2009Jackson, 353 Ark. 847 , 120 S.W.3d 587 . 2009Jackson, 353 Ark. 847 , 120 S.W.3d 587 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Russell v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006In Russell v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc., 261 Ark. 79 -B, 547 S.W.2d 409 (1977), two men were killed in a car accident involving two employees of Nekoosa Papers, Inc. The administrators for the deceaseds brought a negligence action against the employees, resulting in a settlement agreement between the parties. 2006In Russell v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc., 261 Ark. 79 -B, 547 S.W.2d 409 (1977), two men were killed in a car accident involving two employees of Nekoosa Papers, Inc. The administrators for the deceaseds brought a negligence action against the employees, resulting in a settlement agreement between the parties. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Barnett v. Isabell
green
2 sentences2006Similarly, in Barnett v. Isabell, 282 Ark. 88 , 666 S.W.2d 393 (1984), the plaintiff, Barnett, brought an action against Isabell, a motorist who had negligently caused an accident. 2006Similarly, in Barnett v. Isabell, 282 Ark. 88 , 666 S.W.2d 393 (1984), the plaintiff, Barnett, brought an action against Isabell, a motorist who had negligently caused an accident. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hedges v. Durrance
green
2 sentences2005This privity rule ensures that “attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation.” Hedges v. Durrance, 175 Vt. 588, 589 , 834 A.2d 1 (2003) (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Tex. 1996). 2005This privity rule ensures that “attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation.” Hedges v. Durrance, 175 Vt. 588, 589 , 834 A.2d 1 (2003) (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Tex. 1996). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Swink v. Ernst & Young
green
2 sentences2003The appellees state that “there is nothing ‘subjective’ in the requirements of § 16-22-310 - the statute requires a writing identifying the third-party, not just by name, but also as ‘a person who was intended to rely on the [attorney’s] services.’ Swink, 322 Ark. at 422 .” In Swink, the court interpreted the accountant-immunity statute, which is analogous to the attorney-immunity statute. 2003Nor did Swink, Jr., allege in his complaint that Ernst & Young sent him a copy of a statement announcing such intent.” Swink, 322 Ark. at 422 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lawhon Farm Services v. Brown
green
2 sentences1999Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272 , 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998); Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. 1999Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272 , 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998); Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lawhon Farm Services v. Brown
green
2 sentences1999Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272 , 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998); Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. 1999Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272 , 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998); Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1994In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630 , 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), we unequivocally repudiated the privity doctrine in tort cases. 1994In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630 , 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), we unequivocally repudiated the privity doctrine in tort cases. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.