privity requirement in Arizona

12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc.green ariz · 1984 · cited in 5 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2006–2013 2 sentences 2013The court thus held that contractual privity was not required for a subsequent homeowner to sue a builder-vendor for breach of implied warranty and that “any reasoning which would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to someone equally deserving of recovery is incomprehensible.” Id. ¶ 9 Our supreme court further expanded the exception to the privity requirement, albeit narrowly, in Lofts at Fillmore Condominium Association. 2012However, in Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 245 , 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984), our supreme court recognized an exception to the privity requirement, allowing subsequent purchasers of a house to bring a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against the builder.	2	5
Hayden Business Center Condominiums Ass'n v. Pegasus Development Corp.green arizctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008Supra ¶ 13; see also Hayden, 209 Ariz. at 515, ¶ 24 , 105 P.3d at 161 (rejecting the argument that “privity must be eliminated in order to protect real estate purchasers against insolvent sellers or developers who structure ‘shell companies’ to avoid liability for defective construction” as there was “no evidence that the problem is persuasive enough to require a blanket exception to the privity requirement.”). 2008Supra ¶ 13; see also Hayden, 209 Ariz. at 515, ¶ 24 , 105 P.3d at 161 (rejecting the argument that “privity must be eliminated in order to protect real estate purchasers against insolvent sellers or developers who structure ‘shell companies’ to avoid liability for defective construction” as there was “no evidence that the problem is persuasive enough to require a blanket exception to the privity requirement.”).	1	2
Lofts at Fillmore Condominium Association v. Reliance Commercial Construction, Inc.green ariz · 2008 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013In Lofts , the court addressed two issues — whether a non-vendor homebuilder gave an implied warranty of workmanship and habitability in a condominium conversion project, and whether residential homebuyers, who had no direct contractual relationship with the builder, could properly bring suit for breach of the implied warranty. 218 Ariz. 574, ¶¶ 7, 14 , 190 P.3d at 735, 736 . 2013In Lofts , the court addressed two issues — whether a non-vendor homebuilder gave an implied warranty of workmanship and habitability in a condominium conversion project, and whether residential homebuyers, who had no direct contractual relationship with the builder, could properly bring suit for breach of the implied warranty. 218 Ariz. 574, ¶¶ 7, 14 , 190 P.3d at 735, 736 .	1	1
Chaurasia v. General Motors Corp.green arizctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Motors Corp., 212 Ariz. 18, ¶ 19 , 126 P.3d 165, 172 (App.2006) (“[W]e leave any further expansion of Richards to the Arizona Supreme Court.”). 7 369 ¶ 14 Yanni also argues that definitions in certain Arizona statutes indicate that “Arizona’s public policy ... recognizes implied warranty claims against subcontractors.” Yanni maintains that the Purchaser Dwelling Act (“PDA”), A.R.S. §§ 12-1361 through 12-1366, and Arizona’s construction defect statute of repose, AR.S. § 12-552, require us to conclude Subcontractors are “seller[s]” of a “dwelling” and, thus, properly can be sued for breach of i 2013Motors Corp., 212 Ariz. 18, ¶ 19 , 126 P.3d 165, 172 (App.2006) (“[W]e leave any further expansion of Richards to the Arizona Supreme Court.”). 7 369 ¶ 14 Yanni also argues that definitions in certain Arizona statutes indicate that “Arizona’s public policy ... recognizes implied warranty claims against subcontractors.” Yanni maintains that the Purchaser Dwelling Act (“PDA”), A.R.S. §§ 12-1361 through 12-1366, and Arizona’s construction defect statute of repose, AR.S. § 12-552, require us to conclude Subcontractors are “seller[s]” of a “dwelling” and, thus, properly can be sued for breach of i	1	1
Stuart v. Norvielgreen ariz · 1924 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008See Stuart, 26 Ariz. at 501 , 226 P. at 910 ; see also Ariz. Const, art. 3 (“The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.”). 2 ¶ 14 Here, Lofts’ policy argument to do away with the privity requirement is based on the assertions, without significant support in the record, that “no single entity builds 2008See Stuart, 26 Ariz. at 501 , 226 P. at 910 ; see also Ariz. Const, art. 3 (“The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.”). 2 ¶ 14 Here, Lofts’ policy argument to do away with the privity requirement is based on the assertions, without significant support in the record, that “no single entity builds	1	1
Woodward v. Chirco Const. Co., Inc.green ariz · 1984 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 516 , 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1984) (emphasis added). 1 ¶ 6 Lofts first argues, as it did below, that our Supreme Court “abolished the privity requirement” for an implied warranty claim in Richards, 139 Ariz. at 242 , 678 P.2d at 427 . 2008Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 516 , 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1984) (emphasis added). 1 ¶ 6 Lofts first argues, as it did below, that our Supreme Court “abolished the privity requirement” for an implied warranty claim in Richards, 139 Ariz. at 242 , 678 P.2d at 427 .	1	1
Plagens v. National RV Holdings, Inc.green azd · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 1 sentence 2006See Plagens v. Nat’l RV Holdings, Inc., 328 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1074 (D.Ariz.2004) (citations omitted) (granting summary judgment on a MMWA implied warranty claim due to lack of privity). ¶ 17 Notwithstanding this requirement, Chaurasia argues that the Arizona Supreme Court eroded the privity requirement in Flory .	1	1
Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc.green vt · 1990 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law). 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law).	1	1
Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc.green ariz · 1981 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006See Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 600 , 638 P.2d 210, 214 (1981). 2006See Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 600 , 638 P.2d 210, 214 (1981).	1	1
Colberg v. Rellingergreen arizctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005See Colberg v. Rellinger, 160 Ariz. 42, 47 , 770 P.2d 346, 351 (App.1988) (“Don-nelly did not involve a claim of negligent construction nor a claim of implied warranty of workmanlike performance and habitability.”). 2 ¶ 23 Equally unavailing is the Association’s argument that Arizona product liability cases eliminate the privity requirement for all eon-tract claims that can be pigeon-holed as a “breach of warranty.” Those cases hold only that a manufacturer’s warranty runs to those who purchase its product, even if purchased from a retailer. 2005See Colberg v. Rellinger, 160 Ariz. 42, 47 , 770 P.2d 346, 351 (App.1988) (“Don-nelly did not involve a claim of negligent construction nor a claim of implied warranty of workmanlike performance and habitability.”). 2 ¶ 23 Equally unavailing is the Association’s argument that Arizona product liability cases eliminate the privity requirement for all eon-tract claims that can be pigeon-holed as a “breach of warranty.” Those cases hold only that a manufacturer’s warranty runs to those who purchase its product, even if purchased from a retailer.	1	1
Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturergreen arizctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 258 , 589 P.2d 896, 901 (App.1978), disapproved in part on other grounds, Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242 , 709 P.2d 876 (1985). 1991Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 258 , 589 P.2d 896, 901 (App.1978), disapproved in part on other grounds, Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242 , 709 P.2d 876 (1985).	1	1
Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gillelandgreen ariz · 1984 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988Thereafter, our supreme court definitively rejected the privity requirement for malpractice liability in Donnelly Construction Co., 139 Ariz. 184 , 677 P.2d 1292 . 1988Thereafter, our supreme court definitively rejected the privity requirement for malpractice liability in Donnelly Construction Co., 139 Ariz. 184 , 677 P.2d 1292 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Lacer v. Navajo County green arizctapp · 1984 2 sentences 2017(In contrast, the parties must be in privity to enforce a contractual fee provision.) Cf. Lacer v. Navajo Cty., 141 Ariz. 392, 394 , 687 P.2d 400 (App. 1984) (determining a party was entitled to fees "if judgment in its favor is based upon the absence of the contract sued upon”). 2017(In contrast, the parties must be in privity to enforce a contractual fee provision.) Cf. Lacer v. Navajo Cty., 141 Ariz. 392, 394 , 687 P.2d 400 (App. 1984) (determining a party was entitled to fees "if judgment in its favor is based upon the absence of the contract sued upon”).	1	2017–2017
Flory v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. green ariz · 1981 2 sentences 2006The court acknowledged that the privity requirement extends to both implied and express warranties. 129 Ariz. at 578 , 633 P.2d at 387 . 2006The court acknowledged that the privity requirement extends to both implied and express warranties. 129 Ariz. at 578 , 633 P.2d at 387 .	1	2006–2006
Beal v. General Motors Corporation green ded · 1973 1 sentence 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law).	1	2006–2006
Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp. green njsuperctappdiv · 1981 2 sentences 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law). 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law).	1	2006–2006
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc. green minn · 1977 1 sentence 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law).	1	2006–2006
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Novak green miss · 1982 1 sentence 2006See Gochey, 153 Vt. 607 , 572 A.2d 921 (permitting revocation under the MMWA based upon an interpretation of Vermont's UCC); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.2d 801 (Miss.1982) (Mississippi Legislature abolished the privity requirement under the UCC); Ventura, 180 N.J.Super. 45 , 433 A.2d 801 ; Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (allowing revocation based upon an interpretation of Minnesota law); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.Supp. 423 (D.Del.1973) (allows remedies based upon an interpretation of Delaware law).	1	2006–2006
Boston Investment Property 1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc. green ri · 1995 1 sentence 2005“In the case of sophisticated commercial entities in the commercial real estate market,” it noted, “contract law is the proper device to allocate economic risk.” Id. at 518 . ¶ 17 Four years later, the same court abolished the privity requirement for subsequent purchasers of residential property, yet left Boston Investment intact.	1	2005–2005
Blecick v. School District No. 18 of Cochise County green arizctapp · 1965 2 sentences 1997In the course of its opinion, the supreme court expressly overruled Blecick v. School District No. 18, 2 Ariz.App. 115 , 406 P.2d 750 (1965), which had imposed a privity requirement for contractors’ suits against architects. 1997In the course of its opinion, the supreme court expressly overruled Blecick v. School District No. 18, 2 Ariz.App. 115 , 406 P.2d 750 (1965), which had imposed a privity requirement for contractors’ suits against architects.	1	1997–1997
Chalpin v. Brennan green arizctapp · 1976 2 sentences 1997The court then expanded its ruling as follows: Our decision herein necessitates a review of Arizona cases other than Blecick which have denied negligence actions against certain professionals because of a lack of privity. [describing Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219 , 29 P.2d 1065 (1934) (negligence liability of title abstractor required privity of contract) and Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124 , 559 P.2d 680 (App.1976) (legal malpractice liability required privity) ]. 1997The court then expanded its ruling as follows: Our decision herein necessitates a review of Arizona cases other than Blecick which have denied negligence actions against certain professionals because of a lack of privity. [describing Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219 , 29 P.2d 1065 (1934) (negligence liability of title abstractor required privity of contract) and Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124 , 559 P.2d 680 (App.1976) (legal malpractice liability required privity) ].	1	1997–1997
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co. green ariz · 1934 2 sentences 1997The court then expanded its ruling as follows: Our decision herein necessitates a review of Arizona cases other than Blecick which have denied negligence actions against certain professionals because of a lack of privity. [describing Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219 , 29 P.2d 1065 (1934) (negligence liability of title abstractor required privity of contract) and Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124 , 559 P.2d 680 (App.1976) (legal malpractice liability required privity) ]. 1997The court then expanded its ruling as follows: Our decision herein necessitates a review of Arizona cases other than Blecick which have denied negligence actions against certain professionals because of a lack of privity. [describing Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219 , 29 P.2d 1065 (1934) (negligence liability of title abstractor required privity of contract) and Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124 , 559 P.2d 680 (App.1976) (legal malpractice liability required privity) ].	1	1997–1997
Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc. green ariz · 1985 2 sentences 1991Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 258 , 589 P.2d 896, 901 (App.1978), disapproved in part on other grounds, Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242 , 709 P.2d 876 (1985). 1991Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 258 , 589 P.2d 896, 901 (App.1978), disapproved in part on other grounds, Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242 , 709 P.2d 876 (1985).	1	1991–1991
Travelers Insurance v. Breese green arizctapp · 1983 2 sentences 1988In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Breese, 138 Ariz. 508 , 675 P.2d 1327 (App. 1983), this court characterized Chalpin as having chosen to impose a privity requirement "under the facts in the case." Id. at 513, 675 P.2d at 1332 . 1988In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Breese, 138 Ariz. 508 , 675 P.2d 1327 (App. 1983), this court characterized Chalpin as having chosen to impose a privity requirement "under the facts in the case." Id. at 513, 675 P.2d at 1332 .	1	1988–1988
Eck v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. green arizctapp · 1969 2 sentences 1981Eck held that the theories of implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness were not available to the injured plaintiff in that case because “the privity requirement as to both theories applies in Arizona.” 9 Ariz.App. at 429 , 453 P.2d at 369 . 1981Eck held that the theories of implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness were not available to the injured plaintiff in that case because “the privity requirement as to both theories applies in Arizona.” 9 Ariz.App. at 429 , 453 P.2d at 369 .	1	1981–1981
Davidson v. Wee green ariz · 1963 2 sentences 1969Even though implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness are two different theories and in proper situations the court could instruct on both, Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191 , 379 P.2d 744 (1963), the privity requirement as to both theories applies in Arizona.' Judgment affirmed. 1969Even though implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness are two different theories and in proper situations the court could instruct on both, Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191 , 379 P.2d 744 (1963), the privity requirement as to both theories applies in Arizona.' Judgment affirmed.	1	1969–1969

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (7) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 60 (1926–2024) IL 53 (1962–2026) CA 52 (1958–2026) FL 38 (1958–2021) IN 33 (1980–2026) TX 32 (1965–2023) GA 28 (1939–2019) PA 26 (1960–2023) OH 24 (1988–2022) NC 23 (1916–2026) VA 23 (1979–2016) MI 22 (1969–2026) WA 21 (1955–2015) IA 20 (1973–2021) NJ 20 (1971–2025) MD 19 (1984–2024) CT 18 (1960–2025) RI 14 (1965–2010) AR 14 (1994–2021) MO 13 (1952–2024) AZ 12 (1969–2017) VT 12 (1984–2024) NH 10 (1982–2020) DE 9 (1970–2018) MN 9 (1991–2018) SC 9 (2000–2019) MS 9 (1987–2014) DC 8 (1989–2022) WV 7 (1964–2010) ME 7 (1928–2020) ID 7 (1985–2018) CO 7 (1972–2020) UT 6 (1989–2008) AK 6 (1970–2021) NV 6 (2009–2020) KS 6 (1967–2022) SD 6 (1936–2022) WI 5 (1973–2019) KY 5 (1962–2026) MA 5 (1977–2007) WY 5 (1980–2004) LA 5 (1958–1992) OR 4 (1976–1999) MT 4 (1984–2010) AL 4 (1924–2024) ND 4 (1965–2020) NM 3 (1972–2004) OK 3 (1974–2025) TN 2 (1969–2026) HI 2 (1997–2001)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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