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23 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1916–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Byrd v. Star Rubber Companygreen2 sentences1979App. 297, 300 , 181 S.E. 2d 227, 228 (1971): “It is true that there has been some slight erosion in this State of the privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. 1972Wyatt v. Equipment Co., 253 N.C. 355 , 117 S.E. 2d 21 . *108 A similar effort to have the privity requirement abandoned in breach of warranty cases was made in the case of Byrd v. Rubber Co., 11 N.C. | 2 | 4 |
Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc.green2 sentences1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- 1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- | 2 | 2 |
Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corporationgreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., Kinlaw, 298 N.C. 494 , 259 S.E.2d 552 ; Corprew v. Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485 , 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660 , 136 S.E.2d 56 ; Simpson v. Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542 , 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940). 1991See, e.g., Kinlaw, 298 N.C. 494 , 259 S.E.2d 552 ; Corprew v. Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485 , 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660 , 136 S.E.2d 56 ; Simpson v. Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542 , 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940). | 1 | 3 |
Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Raleigh, N. C., Inc.green2 sentences1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- 1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- | 1 | 2 |
Perfecting Service Co. v. Product Development & Sales Co.green2 sentences1979The oft-cited general principle of the privity requirement is given in Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 668 , 136 S.E. 2d 56, 62 (1964), as follows: “A warranty is an element in a contract of sale and, whether express or implied, is contractual in nature. 1979The oft-cited general principle of the privity requirement is given in Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 668 , 136 S.E. 2d 56, 62 (1964), as follows: “A warranty is an element in a contract of sale and, whether express or implied, is contractual in nature. | 1 | 2 |
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Newportgreen1 sentence2026Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918))). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas M. McInnis & Associates, Inc. v. Hallgreen1 sentence2025See id. (“[W]e see no good reason for continuing to require mutuality of estoppel in cases like this case.”); see also Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895 (“No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.”). | 1 | 1 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Associationgreen1 sentence2025See id. (“[W]e see no good reason for continuing to require mutuality of estoppel in cases like this case.”); see also Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895 (“No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Summersgreen1 sentence2025Id. (“Unlike issue identity, the rules for determining whether the parties in question are or were in privity with parties in the prior action are not as well defined.”). | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Holdengreen2 sentences2003See Reid v. Holden, 242 N.C. 408 , 88 S.E.2d 125 (1955). 2003See Reid v. Holden, 242 N.C. 408 , 88 S.E.2d 125 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
Crews v. W. A. Brown & Son, Inc.green1 sentence1996See Crews, 106 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Bernick v. Jurdengreen2 sentences1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- 1992Where the cause of action against the manufacturer is based on breach of implied warranty, the Products Liability Act (Act) eliminates the privity requirement where the claimant “is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of the product involved, or ... is a member or a guest of a member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b) (1989); Bernick, 306 N.C. at 448-49 , 293 S.E.2d at 414 (son of purchaser allowed to sue manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 304- | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Company
green
2 sentences2001Nonetheless, over the years our courts have “relaxed the privity rule in certain cases involving food and drink because of their importance to health.” Id. 1971In Terry v. Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1 , 138 S.E. 2d 753 (1964), Justice Sharp in a concurring opinion made an exhaustive survey of the privity requirement in this State and other jurisdictions and discussed many of the reasons advanced for its loss of vitality in other jurisdictions. | 3 | 1971–2001 |
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche
green
2 sentences1986Justice Cardozo's decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931) first established the privity requirement. 1986Justice Cardozo's decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931) first established the privity requirement. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Wyatt v. North Carolina Equipment Company
green
2 sentences1972Wyatt v. Equipment Co., 253 N.C. 355 , 117 S.E. 2d 21 . *108 A similar effort to have the privity requirement abandoned in breach of warranty cases was made in the case of Byrd v. Rubber Co., 11 N.C. 1972Wyatt v. Equipment Co., 253 N.C. 355 , 117 S.E. 2d 21 . *108 A similar effort to have the privity requirement abandoned in breach of warranty cases was made in the case of Byrd v. Rubber Co., 11 N.C. | 2 | 1972–1978 |
Cunningham v. City of Greensboro
green
1 sentence2026Cunningham v. City of Greensboro, 212 N.C. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Williams v. Peabody
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Atlantic Coast Mechanical, Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller of North Carolina, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller of North Carolina, Inc., 175 N.C. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. O'ROURKE
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 440 , 442 S.E.2d at 139 . *640 Following the O’Rourke decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified that it is the people of the State of North Carolina, rather than district attorneys, who are the real parties in interest in criminal prosecutions. 1999Id. at 440 , 442 S.E.2d at 139 . *640 Following the O’Rourke decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified that it is the people of the State of North Carolina, rather than district attorneys, who are the real parties in interest in criminal prosecutions. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Simpson v. American Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1991See, e.g., Kinlaw, 298 N.C. 494 , 259 S.E.2d 552 ; Corprew v. Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485 , 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660 , 136 S.E.2d 56 ; Simpson v. Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542 , 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940). 1991See, e.g., Kinlaw, 298 N.C. 494 , 259 S.E.2d 552 ; Corprew v. Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485 , 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Service Co. v. Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660 , 136 S.E.2d 56 ; Simpson v. Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542 , 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Herring v. Wallace Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1991However, vertical privity, which minimizes the privity requirement, appears consistent with North Carolina law, see Herring v. Wallace Lumber Co., 163 N.C. 481 , 79 S.E. 876 (1913) (covenantee entitled to enforce against successor of original covenantor, covenant in timber deed), and with sound public policy. 1991However, vertical privity, which minimizes the privity requirement, appears consistent with North Carolina law, see Herring v. Wallace Lumber Co., 163 N.C. 481 , 79 S.E. 876 (1913) (covenantee entitled to enforce against successor of original covenantor, covenant in timber deed), and with sound public policy. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler
green
1 sentence1986"While the Restatement position is easily applied, its arbitrary limitations create an undesirable inflexibility which denies injured third parties recovery simply because they do not fall within a specific class of persons." Id. at 445-46 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 552, comment h, illustrations 5-7 *69 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Shoffner Industries, Inc. v. W. B. Lloyd Construction Co.
green
1 sentence1980The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of another person.” Industries, Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Williams v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1978Williams v. General Motors Corp., 19 N.C. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
City of Durham v. REIDSVILLE ENGINEERING COMPANY
green
2 sentences1978Durham v. Engineering Co., 255 N.C. 98 , 120 S.E. 2d 564 (1961). 1978Durham v. Engineering Co., 255 N.C. 98 , 120 S.E. 2d 564 (1961). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Helms v. . Collins neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
neutral
2 sentences1971Enloe v. Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305 , 180 S.E. 582 , and cases cited; Caudle v. Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105 , 16 S.E. 2d 680 .” (Emphasis ours.) It is true that there has been some slight erosion in this State of the privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. 1971Enloe v. Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305 , 180 S.E. 582 , and cases cited; Caudle v. Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105 , 16 S.E. 2d 680 .” (Emphasis ours.) It is true that there has been some slight erosion in this State of the privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co.
green
2 sentences1971Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105 , 16 S.E.2d 680 ." (Emphasis ours.) It is true that there has been some slight erosion in this State of the privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. 1971Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105 , 16 S.E.2d 680 ." (Emphasis ours.) It is true that there has been some slight erosion in this State of the privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Miller v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co. neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Broom v. Monroe Coca Cola Bottling Co. neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Broadway v. . Grimes
neutral
2 sentences1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i.e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E. 2d 684 (1949) ; food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928) ; Broom v. Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). 1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i. e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949); food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928); Broom v. Monroe Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
neutral
2 sentences1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i. e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949); food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928); Broom v. Monroe Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). 1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i. e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949); food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928); Broom v. Monroe Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.
neutral
2 sentences1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i. e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949); food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928); Broom v. Monroe Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). 1971Prior to Corprew , exceptions to the privity rule in negligence had begun to appear; i. e., the dangerous instrumentalities exception, Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285 , 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949); food and drink cases, Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623 , 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175 , 145 S.E. 14 (1928); Broom v. Monroe Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55 , 156 S.E. 152 (1930). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Ricker v. Butler neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.