privity requirement in Pennsylvania

1979In Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A. 2d 848 (1968), the court, expressly stating the desire to create symmetry between tort and warranty actions, ehminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

1979In Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A. 2d 848 (1968), the court, expressly stating the desire to create symmetry between tort and warranty actions, ehminated the privity requirement in assumpsit suits by purchasers against remote manufacturers for breach of implied warranty.

2023However, our Court repudiated this privity requirement following Judge Cardozo’s watershed opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).

1966In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 , 111 N.E. 1050 , Judge (later Justice) Cardozo eliminated the privity requirement in a tort action, stating: “We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.

1985Shortly thereafter, our Superior Court in Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa. Super. 418 , 476 A.2d 22 (1984), recognized that although strict applica tion of the privity rule contains a great potential for unrecompensable.injury to innocent third persons, “to abandon the concept completely [would entail] too vast a range of the lawyer’s potential liability to third parties.” Id. at 426 , 476 A.2d at 26 .

1985Shortly thereafter, our Superior Court in Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa. Super. 418 , 476 A.2d 22 (1984), recognized that although strict applica tion of the privity rule contains a great potential for unrecompensable.injury to innocent third persons, “to abandon the concept completely [would entail] too vast a range of the lawyer’s potential liability to third parties.” Id. at 426 , 476 A.2d at 26 .

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1980This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the *549 plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1980This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the *549 plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1981This test, enunciated in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685 , cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1961), involves the weighing of several factors, to wit: the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certaintly that the plaintiff suffered injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.” Id. at 548 , 421 A. 2d 335 (emphasis supplied).

1988Spencer v. Leo S. Firanski & Son Inc., 55 Wash. Rep. 7, 67 D.&C. 2d 235 (1974) and Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92 , 484 A.2d 675 (1984), which abolished the privity requirement in actions based on a breach of implied warranty for defects in construction of residential property.

1988Spencer v. Leo S. Firanski & Son Inc., 55 Wash. Rep. 7, 67 D.&C. 2d 235 (1974) and Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92 , 484 A.2d 675 (1984), which abolished the privity requirement in actions based on a breach of implied warranty for defects in construction of residential property.

1988In Grodstein v. McGiven, 303 Pa. 555 , 154 A. 794 (1931), the Court recognized a general exception to the strict privity rule for those whom the contractor should expect, that in the natural course of things, would also be brought into contact with or use the defective article or structure.

1988In Grodstein v. McGiven, 303 Pa. 555 , 154 A. 794 (1931), the Court recognized a general exception to the strict privity rule for those whom the contractor should expect, that in the natural course of things, would also be brought into contact with or use the defective article or structure.

1987Id. [6] Appellant, while rendering a correct statement of the law as to the potential liability of an attorney to a third party upon the commission of an intentional tort, fails to explain how this exception to the privity requirement permits him to sustain a negligence action against the attorney-appellees.

1987Id. 6 Appellant, while rendering a correct statement of the law as to the potential liability of an attorney to a third party upon the commission of an intentional tort, fails to explain how this exception to the privity requirement permits him to sustain a negligence action against the attorney-appellees.

1983Indeed this Court in the seminal case of Lawall v. Croman, 180 Pa. 532 , 37 A. 98 (1897) refused to apply the privity doctrine where to do so would immunize an attorney from a clear breach of duty to a known third party.

1983Indeed this Court in the seminal case of Lawall v. Croman, 180 Pa. 532 , 37 A. 98 (1897) refused to apply the privity doctrine where to do so would immunize an attorney from a clear breach of duty to a known third party.

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781 , 562 P.2d 540 (1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Ct.App.1978).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1980See, e. g., Havens v. Hardesty, Colo.App., 600 P.2d 116 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.App. 429 , 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc.2d 158 , 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okl. 105 , 274 P. 471 (1929).

1979The privity defense has been chipped away at in Pennsylvania starting with Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A. 2d 853 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court specifically adopted Restatement, 2d, Torts, §402A and held that sellers were liable in tort without regard to privity.

1979The privity defense has been chipped away at in Pennsylvania starting with Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A. 2d 853 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court specifically adopted Restatement, 2d, Torts, §402A and held that sellers were liable in tort without regard to privity.

1979The rationale for retaining the privity requirement is probably best summed up by Richards v. Goerg Boat and Motors, Inc.,_Ind. App.__, 384 N.E. 2d 1084 (1979), wherein the court stated at 1092: “Generally, privity extends to the parties to the contract of sale.

1979Witness, for example, so-called "good Samaritan" legislation which immunizes physicians and certain others from liability to which they would be exposed were they at liberty to decline treatment of the patient. 35 P.S. § 6805; 12 P.S. § 1641 ( See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331(a)). [9] See, e.g., Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.

1979Witness, for example, so-called "good Samaritan" legislation which immunizes physicians and certain others from liability to which they would be exposed were they at liberty to decline treatment of the patient. 35 P.S. § 6805; 12 P.S. § 1641 ( See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331(a)). [9] See, e.g., Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.

1979Teer Co., 38 N.C.

1979Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72 , 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964). [7] The privity requirement is no longer the law in California, see Lucas v. Hamm, infra , but is illustrative of the contractual basis of the tort of legal malpractice. [8] The notion that persons with certain necessary skills may merit some special consideration when placed in circumstances where their skills are required and they are without option to exercise or refuse to exercise those skills, is not totally alien.

1979Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72 , 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964). [7] The privity requirement is no longer the law in California, see Lucas v. Hamm, infra , but is illustrative of the contractual basis of the tort of legal malpractice. [8] The notion that persons with certain necessary skills may merit some special consideration when placed in circumstances where their skills are required and they are without option to exercise or refuse to exercise those skills, is not totally alien.

1969In Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A. 2d 320 (1966), Justice Cohen, writing for the Court, recognized the kinship between warranty and strict tort liability, noting that abandonment of the privity requirement would produce the same result as adoption of §402A.

1969In Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A. 2d 320 (1966), Justice Cohen, writing for the Court, recognized the kinship between warranty and strict tort liability, noting that abandonment of the privity requirement would produce the same result as adoption of §402A.