privity requirement in Minnesota

2009Noting that it has never required strict privity in the application of res judicata and that in a res judicata principal-agent context it has "all but done away with the privity requirement," the Arkansas Supreme Court, noting the practical reasons behind its lenient approach to privity and the "combination of precedent, policy, and practicalities," concluded that the attorney-client relationship was sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement for purposes of res judicata, citing Geringer, 731 S.W.2d 859 ; Chaara, 132 N.M. 175 , 45 *417 P.3d 895; and Simpson, 693 N.W.2d 612 .

2009Noting that it has never required strict privity in the application of res judicata and that in a res judicata principal-agent context it has “all but done away with the privity requirement,” the Arkansas Supreme Court, noting the practical reasons behind its lenient approach to privity and the “combination of precedent, policy, and practicalities,” concluded that the attorney-client relationship was sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement for purposes of res judicata, citing Geringer, 731 S.W.2d 859 ; Chaara, 132 N.M. 175 , 45 P.3d 895 ; and Simpson, 693 N.W.2d 612 .

2018See Frederick , 907 N.W.2d at 173 (explaining the elements of a claim for legal malpractice); McIntosh , 745 N.W.2d at 545 (explaining the privity requirement in legal-malpractice actions).

2011See Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 492 (4th Cir.2007) (holding that "[t]he concept of privity requires an alignment of interests and not an exact identity of parties”); Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that law firm defendants appeared at previous proceeding by virtue of their activities as representatives of their client therefore creating privity); In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendants were co-perpetrators of the harming act and shared a significant relationship, thus satisfying the privity requ

2011See Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 492 (4th Cir.2007) (holding that "[t]he concept of privity requires an alignment of interests and not an exact identity of parties”); Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that law firm defendants appeared at previous proceeding by virtue of their activities as representatives of their client therefore creating privity); In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendants were co-perpetrators of the harming act and shared a significant relationship, thus satisfying the privity requ

2011See Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 492 (4th Cir.2007) (holding that "[t]he concept of privity requires an alignment of interests and not an exact identity of parties”); Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that law firm defendants appeared at previous proceeding by virtue of their activities as representatives of their client therefore creating privity); In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendants were co-perpetrators of the harming act and shared a significant relationship, thus satisfying the privity requ

2011Nov. 8, 2006) (concluding that a lawyer is in privity with his previous client); Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175 , 234 S.W.3d 278, 281-84 (2006) (holding that attorney-client relationship between lawyer and landowners satisfied the privity requirement of res judicata); Simpson v. Chi.

2011Nov. 8, 2006) (concluding that a lawyer is in privity with his previous client); Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175 , 234 S.W.3d 278, 281-84 (2006) (holding that attorney-client relationship between lawyer and landowners satisfied the privity requirement of res judicata); Simpson v. Chi.

2010The court of appeals' dissent asserted that the plain language of the statute does not include a privity requirement—specifically, that "[t]here is no language in the statute that requires that Ms. Krueger be an employee of or in a direct, personal contractual relationship with the general contractor." Id. at 892 (Minge, J., dissenting).

2010The court of appeals’ dissent asserted that the plain language of the statute does not include a privity requirement — specifically, that “[t]here is no language in the statute that requires that Ms. Krueger be an employee of or in a direct, personal contractual relationship with the general contractor.” Id. at 892 (Minge, J., dissenting).

2007Thirdr-Party-Beneficiary Theory Appellants argue that they had an attorney-client relationship with Dorsey — and thus have standing to sue Dorsey for legal malpractice — because they were third-party beneficiaries of Dorsey’s representation of Miller. 1 The district court concluded that there was no genuine issue regarding the fact that “[a]ny intended benefit to [appellants] of the attorney-client relationship between Miller & Schroeder and Dorsey was incidental; [appellants] were not the sole intended beneficiaries or the intended direct beneficiaries, as required by Marker.” Because the dis

2007Thirdr-Party-Beneficiary Theory Appellants argue that they had an attorney-client relationship with Dorsey — and thus have standing to sue Dorsey for legal malpractice — because they were third-party beneficiaries of Dorsey’s representation of Miller. 1 The district court concluded that there was no genuine issue regarding the fact that “[a]ny intended benefit to [appellants] of the attorney-client relationship between Miller & Schroeder and Dorsey was incidental; [appellants] were not the sole intended beneficiaries or the intended direct beneficiaries, as required by Marker.” Because the dis

2000See TCF Banking, 706 F.Supp. at 1417-18 .

1993See also Lloyd F. Smith Co., 491 N.W.2d at 15 (holding that the U.C.C. applies to a sub-purchaser’s cause of action based on the defective product itself and any consequential damage resulting therefrom).