19 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1860–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2022A key example is our requirement that a suspect in a criminal matter, even one not yet charged or arraigned, who requests representation may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney (Cunningham, 49 NY2d at 205, 207 ). 2022A key example is our requirement that a suspect in a criminal matter, even one not yet charged or arraigned, who requests representation may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney (Cunningham, 49 NY2d at 205, 207 ). | 2 | 2 |
Ambac Assurance Corporation v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.green1 sentence2024Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc ., 27 NY3d 616, 625 [2016].) The claimant argues that privilege was not waived when he shared the letter with his father because he had a reasonable expectation that, given their common interest in Mr. Perkins' exoneration and Mr. Mayo's assistance with his son's case outside the correctional facility, the letter would remain confidential, i.e., Mr. Perkins, when seeking his father's assistance, did not intend to waive privilege when he shared the document with his father. | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2016As that is not a claim that we make – and the issue is irrelevant considering the fact that petitioner did raise the issue of his youth before the Board – we see no need to further address the dissent's contention in this regard. 5 This format is consistent with Montgomery v Louisiana (supra), which clarifies that a state "may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them" (id. at 736). 6 We are not persuaded by the fact that our dissenting colleagues were able to find an example in a hearing transcript -7- 521 | 1 | 1 |
Upic & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning Centers, Inc.green1 sentence2012Co., 1998 WL 513054 , *4, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 12784 , *12-16, referring to Upic & Co. v Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 793 F Supp 448, 454-455 [SD NY 1992]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stonegreen1 sentence1981(People v Al-Kanani, 33 NY2d 260 ; see, also, People v Stone, 35 NY2d 69 .) As an example of this waiver of the doctor-patient privilege, the prosecution has been allowed to call at trial a psychiatrist who had previously examined a defendant, to rebut the testimony of another defense psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was mentally unfit at the time of the commission of the crime charged (People v Edney, 39 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Edneygreen1 sentence1981(People v Al-Kanani, 33 NY2d 260 ; see, also, People v Stone, 35 NY2d 69 .) As an example of this waiver of the doctor-patient privilege, the prosecution has been allowed to call at trial a psychiatrist who had previously examined a defendant, to rebut the testimony of another defense psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was mentally unfit at the time of the commission of the crime charged (People v Edney, 39 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Allen
green
2 sentences1979(See, also, Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337 ; People v Epps, 37 NY2d 343 ; People ex rel. 1977(People v Aiken, 54 AD2d 937 ; People v Vega, 80 Misc 2d 59 .) CPL 260.20 itself offers an example of a waiver when it states: "A defendant who conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.” This was adopted to codify the decision in Illinois v Allen ( 397 US 337 , supra), but was not intended to limit waiver to that single factual instance (see People v | 2 | 1977–1979 |
People v. Epps
green
2 sentences1979(See, also, Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337 ; People v Epps, 37 NY2d 343 ; People ex rel. 1977(People v Aiken, 54 AD2d 937 ; People v Vega, 80 Misc 2d 59 .) CPL 260.20 itself offers an example of a waiver when it states: "A defendant who conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.” This was adopted to codify the decision in Illinois v Allen ( 397 US 337 , supra), but was not intended to limit waiver to that single factual instance (see People v | 2 | 1977–1979 |
People v. Finch
neutral
2 sentences2025Alternatively, § 201 ("Misbranding of food") provides the purchaser with notice of the exact character of the article being purchased and, where the product is a mixture or compound represented by a label, brand, or tag containing a known food, informs the buyer of the constituent elements of such mixture or compound ( see People v Finch , 74 Misc 575 [Sup Ct, Orange County 1911]). 2025Alternatively, § 201 ("Misbranding of food") provides the purchaser with notice of the exact character of the article being purchased and, where the product is a mixture or compound represented by a label, brand, or tag containing a known food, informs the buyer of the constituent elements of such mixture or compound ( see People v Finch , 74 Misc 575 [Sup Ct, Orange County 1911]). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Park
neutral
2 sentences2025An example of such a violation was presented to the Court in People v Park (60 AD 255 [1st Dept 1901]), where a beverage marketed as lemonade contained no lemon juice and instead used a substitute, which was deemed an adulteration. 2025An example of such a violation was presented to the Court in People v Park (60 AD 255 [1st Dept 1901]), where a beverage marketed as lemonade contained no lemon juice and instead used a substitute, which was deemed an adulteration. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hague Corp. v. Empire Zone Designation Board
green
1 sentence2022Matter of Hague Corp. v Empire Zone Designation Bd. , 96 AD3d 1144 , 1146 [2012], affd sub nom. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Maldonado
green
1 sentence2007People v. Jennings , 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981); People v. Lent , 92 A.D.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1983). 4 "Reasonable cause" is synonymous with "probable cause." See People v. Maldonado , 86 N.Y.2d 631 , 635 (1995). 5 A crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, but not a violation. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Lent
green
1 sentence2007People v. Jennings , 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981); People v. Lent , 92 A.D.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1983). 4 "Reasonable cause" is synonymous with "probable cause." See People v. Maldonado , 86 N.Y.2d 631 , 635 (1995). 5 A crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, but not a violation. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Jennings
green
1 sentence2007People v. Jennings , 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981); People v. Lent , 92 A.D.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1983). 4 "Reasonable cause" is synonymous with "probable cause." See People v. Maldonado , 86 N.Y.2d 631 , 635 (1995). 5 A crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, but not a violation. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bank v. Allen
neutral
1 sentence1991In so doing, however, the court cautioned that "competitive injury, of itself, will not confer standing” (supra, at 11), citing as an example of this principle Matter of Bank v Allen ( 35 AD2d 245 ), where a committee representing pharmacy owners and operators was denied standing to challenge the administrative approval of a third-party’s application for a certificate of registration to operate a pharmacy. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Reid v. . Terwilliger
green
1 sentence1984Punitive damages, serve a number of purposes: they punish the defendant for his wrongful conduct; they protect the public against similar acts; they operate to deter the defendant from a repetition of the same conduct; and they serve as an example or warning to others (Reid v Terwilliger, 116 NY 530 ; 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 173). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Colligan v. Fera
green
1 sentence1984Such damages will not be denied merely because the defendant’s conduct is criminal, and the same act may be the subject of both a civil action for punitive damages and a criminal prosecution (Colligan v Fera, 76 Misc 2d 22 ; see, also, Giddings v Freedley, 128 F 355). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Mandelkern v. City of Buffalo
green
1 sentence1983Continuing residency requirements need only pass the rational basis test in order to be found constitutional. ( Wardwell v Board of Education of City School District, 529 F.2d 625 , 628 [1976].) City residency requirements for city employees bear a rational relationship to one or more legitimate State purposes, such as: "promotion of ethnic balance of the community, reduction of high unemployment rates * * * enhancement of employee performance, diminution of absenteeism and tardiness, ready availability of trained personnel and general economic benefits." ( Wright v City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 9 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
J. D. Wright v. The City of Jackson, Mississippi
green
1 sentence1983Continuing residency requirements need only pass the rational basis test in order to be found constitutional. ( Wardwell v Board of Education of City School District, 529 F.2d 625 , 628 [1976].) City residency requirements for city employees bear a rational relationship to one or more legitimate State purposes, such as: "promotion of ethnic balance of the community, reduction of high unemployment rates * * * enhancement of employee performance, diminution of absenteeism and tardiness, ready availability of trained personnel and general economic benefits." ( Wright v City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 9 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Terry S. Wardwell v. The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Cincinnati
green
1 sentence1983Continuing residency requirements need only pass the rational basis test in order to be found constitutional. ( Wardwell v Board of Education of City School District, 529 F.2d 625 , 628 [1976].) City residency requirements for city employees bear a rational relationship to one or more legitimate State purposes, such as: "promotion of ethnic balance of the community, reduction of high unemployment rates * * * enhancement of employee performance, diminution of absenteeism and tardiness, ready availability of trained personnel and general economic benefits." ( Wright v City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 9 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
B X Corp. v. Aetna Insurance
green
1 sentence1981Co., 187 Misc 806, 811 , affd 272 App Div 880 , mot for lv to app den 272 App Div 961 ; see Note, Fire Insurance Recovery Rights of the Foreclosing Mortgagee, 8 Fordham Urban LJ 857, 859, n 19, for an example of the standard clause). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Al-Kanani
green
1 sentence1981(People v Al-Kanani, 33 NY2d 260 ; see, also, People v Stone, 35 NY2d 69 .) As an example of this waiver of the doctor-patient privilege, the prosecution has been allowed to call at trial a psychiatrist who had previously examined a defendant, to rebut the testimony of another defense psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was mentally unfit at the time of the commission of the crime charged (People v Edney, 39 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Huggler
green
1 sentence1977A defendant may personally waive his appearance at a hearing (People v Huggler, 50 AD2d 471 ) and at least during a trial, a defendant may expressly permit testimony to be offered in his absence (Diaz v United States, 223 US 442 , supra). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Stanley Manor, Inc. v. Glass
green
1 sentence1977(People v Aiken, 54 AD2d 937 ; People v Vega, 80 Misc 2d 59 .) CPL 260.20 itself offers an example of a waiver when it states: "A defendant who conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.” This was adopted to codify the decision in Illinois v Allen ( 397 US 337 , supra), but was not intended to limit waiver to that single factual instance (see People v | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Diaz v. United States
green
1 sentence1977A defendant may personally waive his appearance at a hearing (People v Huggler, 50 AD2d 471 ) and at least during a trial, a defendant may expressly permit testimony to be offered in his absence (Diaz v United States, 223 US 442 , supra). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Vega
neutral
1 sentence1977(People v Aiken, 54 AD2d 937 ; People v Vega, 80 Misc 2d 59 .) CPL 260.20 itself offers an example of a waiver when it states: "A defendant who conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.” This was adopted to codify the decision in Illinois v Allen ( 397 US 337 , supra), but was not intended to limit waiver to that single factual instance (see People v | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Brede v. . Rosedale Terrace Co.
green
1 sentence1921While the case of Taylor v. Goelet, supra, has not been expressly limited, it is significant that in the subsequent case of Brede v. Rosedale Terrace Co., 216 N. Y. 246 , it is cited as an example of the rule that: “ Where a contract involving successive or continued acts is to be performed in a reasonable time, delay, though it will give rise to a cause of action for damages, will not always permit rescission.” It has been applied to executory contracts of sale where the goods were to be specially manufactured, and to executed contracts of sale where the price was paid and title passed before | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Taylor v. . Goelet
green
1 sentence1921While the case of Taylor v. Goelet, supra, has not been expressly limited, it is significant that in the subsequent case of Brede v. Rosedale Terrace Co., 216 N. Y. 246 , it is cited as an example of the rule that: “ Where a contract involving successive or continued acts is to be performed in a reasonable time, delay, though it will give rise to a cause of action for damages, will not always permit rescission.” It has been applied to executory contracts of sale where the goods were to be specially manufactured, and to executed contracts of sale where the price was paid and title passed before | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Kley v. . Healy
green
1 sentence1910The best example of this exception is to be found in the case of Kley v. Healy ( 127 N. Y. 555 ). | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Wyllie v. . Palmer
green
1 sentence1901As is said in Shearman Redfield on Negligence (§ 160): "He is to be deemed the master who has the supreme choice, control and direction of the servant and whose will the servant represents, not merely in the ultimate result of his work, but in all its details." An example of this rule is to be found in Wyllie v. Palmer ( 137 N.Y. 248 ). | 1 | 1901–1901 |
| Potter v. Luther neutral | 1 | 1860–1860 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.