7 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorggreen1 sentence1993See also Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So.2d 667 , 675 n. 10 (La.1984) (emphasizing that the proper place for the cross-collateralization clause is the pledge agreement, not the collateral mortgage). [5] A close analysis of the Chenault decision reveals that the court recognized that each collateral mortgage was distinct as it limited the liability of one of the mortgagors, Effie B. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trust for Schwegmann v. SCHWEGMANN FAMILY
green
1 sentence2026As an example of that exception, in The Trust for Schwegmann v. The Schwegmann Family Trust, 05-95 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05) , 905 So.2d 1143 , the fifth circuit found that the plaintiffs, a beneficiary and the trust, not represented by the trustee, had a right of action under La.R.S. 9:2222, to enforce a right of the trust against an obligor. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Ross
neutral
1 sentence2025App. 4 Cir. 12/21/16), 207 So.3d 511 was also cited by the Defense as an example of the factors considered by courts in granting a downward departure. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2025In response, the trial court noted that with the exception of Eugene, “[t]here is no sentencing range for second degree murder, therein lies the difference in the distinction.” 2 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 21 Following this exchange, the trial court allowed Dr. Wright to continue testifying along with the remainder of Appellant’s witnesses. 2025In response, the trial court noted that with the exception of Eugene, “[t]here is no sentencing range for second degree murder, therein lies the difference in the distinction.” 2 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 21 Following this exchange, the trial court allowed Dr. Wright to continue testifying along with the remainder of Appellant’s witnesses. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2025In response, the trial court noted that with the exception of Eugene, “[t]here is no sentencing range for second degree murder, therein lies the difference in the distinction.” 2 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 21 Following this exchange, the trial court allowed Dr. Wright to continue testifying along with the remainder of Appellant’s witnesses. 2025In response, the trial court noted that with the exception of Eugene, “[t]here is no sentencing range for second degree murder, therein lies the difference in the distinction.” 2 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 21 Following this exchange, the trial court allowed Dr. Wright to continue testifying along with the remainder of Appellant’s witnesses. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2025In response, the trial court noted that with the exception of Eugene, “[t]here is no sentencing range for second degree murder, therein lies the difference in the distinction.” 2 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 21 Following this exchange, the trial court allowed Dr. Wright to continue testifying along with the remainder of Appellant’s witnesses. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences2011The classic example of this exception is the landmark abortion case, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). 2011The classic example of this exception is the landmark abortion case, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Theriot v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev.
green
1 sentence2007App. 1 Cir. 09/25/01), 809 So.2d 279 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Theriot v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2003An example of this principle is found in Theriot v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 478 So.2d 741 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), in which the plaintiff sued his automobile insurer in contract and the seller of a defective engine in redhibition. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rosier v. HA Lott, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1993For an example of such a clause see Citizens National Bank v. Coates, 509 So.2d 103 , 104 n. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), appeal after remand, 563 So.2d 1265 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 568 So.2d 1058 (La.1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
CITIZENS NAT. BANK v. Coates
neutral
1 sentence1993For an example of such a clause see Citizens National Bank v. Coates, 509 So.2d 103 , 104 n. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), appeal after remand, 563 So.2d 1265 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 568 So.2d 1058 (La.1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Citizens Nat. Bank v. Coates
green
1 sentence1993For an example of such a clause see Citizens National Bank v. Coates, 509 So.2d 103 , 104 n. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), appeal after remand, 563 So.2d 1265 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 568 So.2d 1058 (La.1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Jackson v. Lajaunie
green
1 sentence1981An example of the exception's application was involved in Jackson v. Lajaunie, 270 So.2d 859 (La.1972), where the operator of a gas station accidentally shot a customer while playing a practical joke. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.