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12 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1904–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Becraftgreen2 sentences2019See Becraft II, 2017-Ohio-1464 , 89 N.E.3d 218, at ¶ 18-25 . 2019See Becraft II, 2017-Ohio-1464 , 89 N.E.3d 218, at ¶ 18-25 . | 1 | 1 |
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2015Palazzi, 32 Ohio St.3d 169 , 512 N.E.2d 971 , at syllabus; see also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544-545 , 34 S.Ct. 359 , 58 L.Ed. 713 (1914) (“one who would strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must show he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Federal Constitution”). {¶ 33} Palazzi provides an example of this principle that is directly applicable to the case at hand. 2015Palazzi, 32 Ohio St.3d 169 , 512 N.E.2d 971 , at syllabus; see also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544-545 , 34 S.Ct. 359 , 58 L.Ed. 713 (1914) (“one who would strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must show he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Federal Constitution”). {¶ 33} Palazzi provides an example of this principle that is directly applicable to the case at hand. | 1 | 1 |
Royal Indemnity Co. v. McFaddengreen1 sentence1963See Royal Indemnity Co. v. McFadden (1940), 65 Ohio App., 15 . | 1 | 1 |
Clason v. City of Milwaukeegreen1 sentence1904See, also, Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316 ; Stafford v. C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. California
green
2 sentences2020Ultimately, this individual in this example is in violation of Ohio law the moment he crosses the border not because he committed a voluntary, illegal act in our state but because he attained the status of drug addict through illegal acts in another state. {¶51} In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States found a California law that criminalized drug addiction to be unconstitutional.4 In this decision, the Supreme Court recognized the broad powers of states to “regulate the narcotic drugs traffic within [their] borders * * *.” Id. at 6 2020Ultimately, this individual in this example is in violation of Ohio law the moment he crosses the border not because he committed a voluntary, illegal act in our state but because he attained the status of drug addict through illegal acts in another state. {¶51} In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States found a California law that criminalized drug addiction to be unconstitutional.4 In this decision, the Supreme Court recognized the broad powers of states to “regulate the narcotic drugs traffic within [their] borders * * *.” Id. at 6 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 41 , 285 N.E.2d 324 . {¶ 26} An example of waiver occurred in Sanit. 2018Id. at 41 , 285 N.E.2d 324 . {¶ 26} An example of waiver occurred in Sanit. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sanitary Commercial Services, Inc. v. Shank
green
2 sentences2018Commercial Services, Inc. v. Shank , 57 Ohio St.3d 178 , 566 N.E.2d 1215 (1991), where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a right to appeal may validly be waived as part of a written settlement agreement between litigating parties. 2018Commercial Services, Inc. v. Shank , 57 Ohio St.3d 178 , 566 N.E.2d 1215 (1991), where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a right to appeal may validly be waived as part of a written settlement agreement between litigating parties. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner
green
2 sentences2015Palazzi, 32 Ohio St.3d 169 , 512 N.E.2d 971 , at syllabus; see also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544-545 , 34 S.Ct. 359 , 58 L.Ed. 713 (1914) (“one who would strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must show he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Federal Constitution”). {¶ 33} Palazzi provides an example of this principle that is directly applicable to the case at hand. 2015Palazzi, 32 Ohio St.3d 169 , 512 N.E.2d 971 , at syllabus; see also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544-545 , 34 S.Ct. 359 , 58 L.Ed. 713 (1914) (“one who would strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must show he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Federal Constitution”). {¶ 33} Palazzi provides an example of this principle that is directly applicable to the case at hand. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich
green
2 sentences1997An example of such a violation is found in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 225 , 631 N.E.2d 582 . 1997An example of such a violation is found in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 225 , 631 N.E.2d 582 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wever v. Hicks
green
1 sentence1981As stated in Wever v. Hicks (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 230, 234 , “[t]he gist of the defense of assumption of the risk is (1) consent or acquiescence in (2) an appreciated or known (3) risk* * *. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Manning v. Village of Lakewood
neutral
1 sentence1975Arnoff v. Williams (1916), 94 Ohio St. 145 , 113 N. E. 661 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Arnoff v. Williams
neutral
1 sentence1975Arnoff v. Williams (1916), 94 Ohio St. 145 , 113 N. E. 661 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Newman v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History
green
1 sentence1960It is true, and perhaps unfortunately so, that the decision in the Avellone case did not specifically overrule the Waddell ( 133 Ohio St., 601 ), Cullen ( 139 Ohio St., 194 ) and Newman ( 143 Ohio St., 369 ) cases. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Waddell v. Y. W. C. A.
green
1 sentence1960It is true, and perhaps unfortunately so, that the decision in the Avellone case did not specifically overrule the Waddell ( 133 Ohio St., 601 ), Cullen ( 139 Ohio St., 194 ) and Newman ( 143 Ohio St., 369 ) cases. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Cullen v. Schmit
green
1 sentence1960It is true, and perhaps unfortunately so, that the decision in the Avellone case did not specifically overrule the Waddell ( 133 Ohio St., 601 ), Cullen ( 139 Ohio St., 194 ) and Newman ( 143 Ohio St., 369 ) cases. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
green
1 sentence1953Eq. 24, above quoted and affirmed the Barttella and Perincola cases also quoted above, (see p. 347.) The classic example of the violation of a person’s right of privacy is found in McDaniel v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice
green
1 sentence1922S., supra, appears the following: “Adopting the view that exemplary damages are awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the wrongdoer, and as an example or warning to others, and that they can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense, a principal, although he is liable to make compensation for injuries done or inflicted by his agent within the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent upon the part of the agent, but in order that the | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Le Feber v. Village of West Allis
neutral
2 sentences1904An example of this principle is-found in Le Feber v. West Allis, 119 Wis. 608 , 97 N. W. 203 , where an ordinance granting lighting franchises, which was also a contract, was held void for unreasonableness, and it was said that legislative power was delegated to subordinate political divisions of the state for public purposes only,, and that if an act be so remote from every public purpose that no relation thereto can within human reason be discovered, siich an act must be deemed to be beyond the power of" a subordinate legislative body, and will be set aside by the-courts. 1904An example of this principle is-found in Le Feber v. West Allis, 119 Wis. 608 , 97 N. W. 203 , where an ordinance granting lighting franchises, which was also a contract, was held void for unreasonableness, and it was said that legislative power was delegated to subordinate political divisions of the state for public purposes only,, and that if an act be so remote from every public purpose that no relation thereto can within human reason be discovered, siich an act must be deemed to be beyond the power of" a subordinate legislative body, and will be set aside by the-courts. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.