example principle in Kentucky

1992Saul Real Estate Investment Trust, Ky., 601 S.W.2d 287 (1980), authored by Chief Justice Palmore, (who of course, also authored the example instruction criticized by the Court of Appeals): “The reason for publication of this opinion is to dispel a misconception with respect to whether a possessor’s exposure to liability rests upon knowledge of a particular condition or upon his further knowledge or realization that the condition is dangerous.

1992Saul Real Estate Investment Trust, Ky., 601 S.W.2d 287 (1980), authored by Chief Justice Palmore, (who of course, also authored the example instruction criticized by the Court of Appeals): "The reason for publication of this opinion is to dispel a misconception with respect to whether a possessor's exposure to liability rests upon knowledge of a particular condition or upon his further knowledge or realization that the condition is dangerous. . . . .

1969An example of this principle is found in Mendel v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29 , 258 S.W. 936 (1924), in which this court held that a Louisville ordinance making a rate of speed over eight miles an hour in going around a curve or corner prima facie evidence of negligence conflicted with a state statute, and was invalid.

1969An example of this principle is found in Mendel v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29 , 258 S.W. 936 (1924), in which this court held that a Louisville ordinance making a rate of speed over eight miles an hour in going around a curve or corner prima facie evidence of negligence conflicted with a state statute, and was invalid.

1964Thus one who goes into a shop which occupies part of a building, *207 the rest of which is used as the possessor’s residence, is a trespasser if he goes into the residential part of the premises without the shopkeeper’s consent; but he is a licensee if the shopkeeper permits him to go to the bathroom, or invites him to pay a social call.” Lerman Brothers v. Lewis, 277 Ky. 334 , 126 S.W.2d 461 , is an example of the principle stated as applied to similar facts.

1964Thus one who goes into a shop which occupies part of a building, *207 the rest of which is used as the possessor’s residence, is a trespasser if he goes into the residential part of the premises without the shopkeeper’s consent; but he is a licensee if the shopkeeper permits him to go to the bathroom, or invites him to pay a social call.” Lerman Brothers v. Lewis, 277 Ky. 334 , 126 S.W.2d 461 , is an example of the principle stated as applied to similar facts.

1924Co. v. Spurling, 160 Ky. 819 , 170 S. W. 192 , and many like cases there cited, and in stating the circumstances in which such duty will or will not arise, the court said: “Taking the Spurling caso as an example of the principle announced in these cases, the essential difference between the Spxuiing case and the case we have is that in the Spurling case there was no element of tort; the passenger was put off in a depot, in a large city, where she could be and was safe, comfortable and well taken care of, and where, as said, she had the alternatives presented to her of waiting until the road wa

1924Co. v. Spurling, 160 Ky. 819 , 170 S. W. 192 , and many like cases there cited, and in stating the circumstances in which such duty will or will not arise, the court said: “Taking the Spurling caso as an example of the principle announced in these cases, the essential difference between the Spxuiing case and the case we have is that in the Spurling case there was no element of tort; the passenger was put off in a depot, in a large city, where she could be and was safe, comfortable and well taken care of, and where, as said, she had the alternatives presented to her of waiting until the road wa