example principle in California

2022That court recognized that an APA exemption may also exist in “unusual circumstances.” (State Water Resources, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) As an example of this principle, it cites Alta Bates Hospital v. Lackner (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 614 (Alta Bates).

2022That court recognized that an APA exemption may also exist in “unusual circumstances.” (State Water Resources, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) As an example of this principle, it cites Alta Bates Hospital v. Lackner (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 614 (Alta Bates).

2022That court recognized that an APA exemption may also exist in “unusual circumstances.” (State Water Resources, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) As an example of this principle, it cites Alta Bates Hospital v. Lackner (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 614 (Alta Bates).

2022That court recognized that an APA exemption may also exist in “unusual circumstances.” (State Water Resources, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) As an example of this principle, it cites Alta Bates Hospital v. Lackner (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 614 (Alta Bates).

2019People v. Castaneda (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 197 is an additional example of this principle.

2019People v. Castaneda (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 197 is an additional example of this principle.

2019A similar argument was rejected in In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542 , 546, 114 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 522 P.2d 657 , in which our Supreme Court stated that statutes lessening the punishment for specific offenses could be limited to prospective *90 application in order "to assure that penal laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as written." Senate Bill No. 620 is an example of this principle.

2019A similar argument was rejected in In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542 , 546, 114 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 522 P.2d 657 , in which our Supreme Court stated that statutes lessening the punishment for specific offenses could be limited to prospective *90 application in order "to assure that penal laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as written." Senate Bill No. 620 is an example of this principle.

1979In that case of an aggravated consumer fraud committed by an insurance company, the court noted the necessity for a large punitive award in order to adequately ‘serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct’ ( 18 Cal.App.3d at p. 270 ), and to make ‘the punishment fit the offense’ (id.), in light of the great net worth and high profits of the defendant.

1976In that case of an aggravated consumer fraud committed by an insurance company, the court noted the necessity for a large punitive award in order to adequately “serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct” ( 18 Cal.App.3d at p. 270 ), and to make “the punishment fit the offense” (id), in light of the great net worth and high profits of the defendant.

2024(Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 58 ; see Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970 [under doctrine of implied findings, appellate court presumes trial court made all necessary findings supported by substantial evidence].) An example of the doctrine being applied to a claim for attorney fees under section 800 is provided by Halaco, supra, 42 10.

2022(Id. at pp. 464–465.) 16 The Reno court reached a similar conclusion in addressing the “Clark/Horowitz” bar against the piecemeal presentation of claims by successive proceedings. ( Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 501–502.) In that analysis, the court discussed “claim No. 85” as an example of such a claim and noted the petitioner merely addressed the Clark/Horowitz bar in his subsequent habeas petition with a global assertion that all known claims were included so that the court could assess the cumulative effect of all the errors in the case.

2022(Id. at p. 340.) An example of where such error was not held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23 .

2019It is a classic example of a claim that was not "factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court," and that we will not consider for the first time on appeal. ( Peart v. Ferro (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 60 , 70, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 [" 'unless they were factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court, potential theories which could theoretically create "triable issues of material fact" may not be raised or considered on appeal' "].) Defendant protests that it briefed the issue in its motion for a new trial, and that in any event it is "strictly a question of law

2019It is a classic example of a claim that was not "factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court," and that we will not consider for the first time on appeal. ( Peart v. Ferro (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 60 , 70, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 [" 'unless they were factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court, potential theories which could theoretically create "triable issues of material fact" may not be raised or considered on appeal' "].) Defendant protests that it briefed the issue in its motion for a new trial, and that in any event it is "strictly a question of law

2017Defendant contends, however, that the court also had a duty sua sponte to tell the jury the elements of the specific violation of the Controlled Substances Act from which the prosecution claimed the money found in his car trunk was derived, i.e., unlawful sale of marijuana. 34 In his opening brief, defendant presents the barest of arguments on this point, citing two cases for the general propositions that “a jury must be properly instructed on the relevant law” (McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 833, 836 , overruled in part on other grounds by Weeks v. Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 225

2017Defendant contends, however, that the court also had a duty sua sponte to tell the jury the elements of the specific violation of the Controlled Substances Act from which the prosecution claimed the money found in his car trunk was derived, i.e., unlawful sale of marijuana. 34 In his opening brief, defendant presents the barest of arguments on this point, citing two cases for the general propositions that “a jury must be properly instructed on the relevant law” (McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 833, 836 , overruled in part on other grounds by Weeks v. Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 225

2017Defendant contends, however, that the court also had a duty sua sponte to tell the jury the elements of the specific violation of the Controlled Substances Act from which the prosecution claimed the money found in his car trunk was derived, i.e., unlawful sale of marijuana. 34 In his opening brief, defendant presents the barest of arguments on this point, citing two cases for the general propositions that “a jury must be properly instructed on the relevant law” (McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 833, 836 , overruled in part on other grounds by Weeks v. Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 225

2013(See § 12926.1, subds. (a), (d) [“Although the [ADA] provides a floor of protection, this state’s law has always . . . afforded additional protections.”].) “[B]ecause FEHA ‘provides protections independent from those in the [ADA]’ and ‘afford[s] additional protections[ than the ADA]’ [citation], state law will part ways with federal law in order to advance the legislative goal of providing greater protection to employees than the ADA. [Citation.]” (Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 57 .) Accordingly, we reject Auto-Chlor’s assertion that the narrow example of a claim of “expense” association

2013Easter cites People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169 , as an example where a defense attorney’s failure to challenge the identification procedure was prejudicial.

2008Our decision in Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., supra, 25 Cal.3d 707 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 835 , 602 P.2d 755 , provides an example of the defense that section 835.4 defines.

2008Our decision in Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., supra, 25 Cal.3d 707 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 835 , 602 P.2d 755 , provides an example of the defense that section 835.4 defines.

2007The cases turn upon the circumstances in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause to seek access." ( Id. at p. 1249, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 .) "The plaintiffs inability to discover the libel when it first was `published' and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the writing was placed in the file." ( Ibid. ) Shively cites Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979

2007The cases turn upon the circumstances in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause to seek access." ( Id. at p. 1249, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 .) "The plaintiffs inability to discover the libel when it first was `published' and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the writing was placed in the file." ( Ibid. ) Shively cites Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979

2007The cases turn upon the circumstances in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause to seek access." ( Id. at p. 1249, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 .) "The plaintiffs inability to discover the libel when it first was `published' and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the writing was placed in the file." ( Ibid. ) Shively cites Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979

2007The cases turn upon the circumstances in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause to seek access." ( Id. at p. 1249, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 .) "The plaintiffs inability to discover the libel when it first was `published' and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the writing was placed in the file." ( Ibid. ) Shively cites Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979

2007As we pointed out, "A murder victim's fear of the alleged killer may be in issue when the victim's state of mind is directly relevant to an element of the offense." ( Ibid. ) An example of this principle is found in People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 , in which we held that evidence that the murder victim was afraid the defendant would kill her was admissible under the state of mind exception because it went to whether "she willingly had intercourse with defendant, *606 which was very much in issue given the prosecution theory of murder during the commissi

2007As we pointed out, "A murder victim's fear of the alleged killer may be in issue when the victim's state of mind is directly relevant to an element of the offense." ( Ibid. ) An example of this principle is found in People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 , in which we held that evidence that the murder victim was afraid the defendant would kill her was admissible under the state of mind exception because it went to whether "she willingly had intercourse with defendant, *606 which was very much in issue given the prosecution theory of murder during the commissi

2007As we pointed out, "A murder victim's fear of the alleged killer may be in issue when the victim's state of mind is directly relevant to an element of the offense." ( Ibid. ) An example of this principle is found in People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 , in which we held that evidence that the murder victim was afraid the defendant would kill her was admissible under the state of mind exception because it went to whether "she willingly had intercourse with defendant, *606 which was very much in issue given the prosecution theory of murder during the commissi

2005Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 655 P.2d 317 ] provides an example of the exception an agency’s lack of jurisdiction creates.

2005Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 655 P.2d 317 ] provides an example of the exception an agency’s lack of jurisdiction creates.

2004Nothing in the Governor’s decision indicates that he failed to afford petitioner individualized consideration of all relevant factors . . . .” (Ibid.) *360 In the next paragraph of the Rosenkrantz opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledges that “[i]n some circumstances, a denial of parole based upon the nature of the offense alone might rise to the level of a due process violation . . . .” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683 .) The Supreme Court gives an example of such a violation in the same sentence: “where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or