example principle in Connecticut

2003As an example of such a principle, this court cited a Montana court’s conclusion that a Daubert analysis is not necessary for ordinary fingerprint identification evidence to be admissible. [State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 85 n.30 ], citing State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171 (1996).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 546 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000).

2003As an example of such a principle, this court cited a Montana court’s conclusion that a Daubert analysis is not necessary for ordinary fingerprint identification evidence to be admissible. [State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 85 n.30 ], citing State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171 (1996).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 546 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000).

2003As an example of such a principle, this court cited a Montana court’s conclusion that a Daubert analysis is not necessary for ordinary fingerprint identification evidence to be admissible. [State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 85 n.30 ], citing State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171 (1996).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 546 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000).

2003As an example of such a principle, this court cited a Montana court’s conclusion that a Daubert analysis is not necessary for ordinary fingerprint identification evidence to be admissible. [State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 85 n.30 ], citing State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171 (1996).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 546 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000).

2001The plaintiff has criticized the defendants for not discovering a large gathering of 100 to 200 persons, yet he CT Page 17105 alternately argues that he was among a small class of foreseeable victims "as one of the few people in the area of the illegal fireworks display." The plaintiff cites Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 (1994) to advance his argument that this incident is an example of the exception to municipal immunity.

1996Murray v. Supreme Lodge, 74 Conn. 715, 718 , 52 Atl. 722 [1902], furnishes an example of an exception to the hearsay rule, based upon necessity.

1996Murray v. Supreme Lodge, 74 Conn. 715, 718 , 52 Atl. 722 [1902], furnishes an example of an exception to the hearsay rule, based upon necessity.

1990However, the amount must be fixed with calm discretion and sound reason, and not because of sympathy, bias, or prejudice against any party.” (Emphasis added.) The verdict form submitted to the jury contained interrogatories for identification of the amount of compensatory or nominal damages and the amount of punitive damages. 3 Since the jurors awarded punitive damages against both defendant police officers in the civil rights suit, they clearly found, in accordance with the trial court’s instructions, that the police officers acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless and callous disr

1990However, the amount must be fixed with calm discretion and sound reason, and not because of sympathy, bias, or prejudice against any party.” (Emphasis added.) The verdict form submitted to the jury contained interrogatories for identification of the amount of compensatory or nominal damages and the amount of punitive damages. 3 Since the jurors awarded punitive damages against both defendant police officers in the civil rights suit, they clearly found, in accordance with the trial court’s instructions, that the police officers acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless and callous disr

1978For an example of factors calling into play the doctrine of estoppel in avoidance of the statute of limitations, see Kilburn v. Keenan, 27 Conn. Sup. 394, 397 .