text rule in Oregon

2023That means that we “ ‘seek to divine the intent of the rule’s drafters’ by consid- ering ‘the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Id. at 400-01 (quoting Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014)).

2023That means that we “ ‘seek to divine the intent of the rule’s drafters’ by consid- ering ‘the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Id. at 400-01 (quoting Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014)).

2025We interpret administrative rules to “ ‘divine the intent of the rule’s drafters’ by considering ‘the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Landwatch II, 330 Or App at 739-40 (quoting Shaefer v. Marion County, 318 Or App 617, 620 , 509 P3d 718 (2022)).

2025We interpret administrative rules to “ ‘divine the intent of the rule’s drafters’ by considering ‘the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Landwatch II, 330 Or App at 739-40 (quoting Shaefer v. Marion County, 318 Or App 617, 620 , 509 P3d 718 (2022)).

2024Under that framework, “we seek to divine the intent of the rule’s drafters by considering the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024Under that framework, “we seek to divine the intent of the rule’s drafters by considering the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014That is, we consider the text of the rule and its context, including other portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule’s adoption history, State v. Teixeira, 259 Or App 184, 190 , 313 P3d 351 (2013), including the history of OSHA’s adoption of the federal rule, cf. State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168 , 874 P2d 822 (1994) (considering federal legislative history of a federal evidence rule that was the model for Oregon’s rule, where the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted the federal rule).

2014That is, we consider the text of the rule and its context, including other portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule’s adoption history, State v. Teixeira, 259 Or App 184, 190 , 313 P3d 351 (2013), including the history of OSHA’s adoption of the federal rule, cf. State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168 , 874 P2d 822 (1994) (considering federal legislative history of a federal evidence rule that was the model for Oregon’s rule, where the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted the federal rule).

2025Tualatin Riverkeepers v. DEQ, 235 Or App 132, 144 , 230 P3d 559 , rev den, 349 Or 173 (2010) (explaining that we apply the same analytical framework that we apply to the con- struction of statutes).

2025Tualatin Riverkeepers v. DEQ, 235 Or App 132, 144 , 230 P3d 559 , rev den, 349 Or 173 (2010) (explaining that we apply the same analytical framework that we apply to the con- struction of statutes).

2025Tualatin Riverkeepers v. DEQ, 235 Or App 132, 144 , 230 P3d 559 , rev den, 349 Or 173 (2010) (explaining that we apply the same analytical framework that we apply to the con- struction of statutes).

2025Tualatin Riverkeepers v. DEQ, 235 Or App 132, 144 , 230 P3d 559 , rev den, 349 Or 173 (2010) (explaining that we apply the same analytical framework that we apply to the con- struction of statutes).

2021Under that analytical framework, we con- sider the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory con- text.” Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (citing State v. Hogevoll, 348 Or 104, 109 , 228 P3d 569 (2010)).

2021Under that analytical framework, we con- sider the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory con- text.” Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (citing State v. Hogevoll, 348 Or 104, 109 , 228 P3d 569 (2010)).

2018App. 210 , 214, 323 P.3d 356 (2014). "[W]e begin by examining the text of the rule itself, together with its context" to "discern the meaning of the words used, giving effect to the intent of the body that promulgated the rule." Tye v. McFetridge , 342 Or. 61 , 69, 149 P.3d 1111 (2006).

2018App. 210 , 214, 323 P.3d 356 (2014). "[W]e begin by examining the text of the rule itself, together with its context" to "discern the meaning of the words used, giving effect to the intent of the body that promulgated the rule." Tye v. McFetridge , 342 Or. 61 , 69, 149 P.3d 1111 (2006).

2025Accordingly, “we con- sider the text of the rule and its context, including other portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule’s adoption history.” County of Klamath v. Ricard, 317 Or App 608, 612 , 507 P3d 333 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 4 When interpreting agency rules, “[w]e defer to [an] agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule, including an interpretation made in the course of applying the rule, if that interpretation is not inconsistent with the wording of the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” Harris v. Dept. of Public Safety Standards, 287 O

2025Accordingly, “we con- sider the text of the rule and its context, including other portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule’s adoption history.” County of Klamath v. Ricard, 317 Or App 608, 612 , 507 P3d 333 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 4 When interpreting agency rules, “[w]e defer to [an] agency’s plausible interpretation of its own rule, including an interpretation made in the course of applying the rule, if that interpretation is not inconsistent with the wording of the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” Harris v. Dept. of Public Safety Standards, 287 O

2024Finally, ORS 147.600(2) expressly precludes disclosure “without the written, informed consent of the vic- tim.”7 OEC 507-1(2) does not expressly preclude disclosure without the victim’s consent, but that follows from the text of the rule that gives a victim “a privilege to refuse to dis- close and to prevent any other person from disclosing” confi- dential communications and records protected by the rule. 7 ORS 147.600(3) provides an exception—identical to the exception in OEC 507-1(3)—that allows disclosure to the extent necessary for the defense of any action brought against the certified ad

2024Finally, ORS 147.600(2) expressly precludes disclosure “without the written, informed consent of the vic- tim.”7 OEC 507-1(2) does not expressly preclude disclosure without the victim’s consent, but that follows from the text of the rule that gives a victim “a privilege to refuse to dis- close and to prevent any other person from disclosing” confi- dential communications and records protected by the rule. 7 ORS 147.600(3) provides an exception—identical to the exception in OEC 507-1(3)—that allows disclosure to the extent necessary for the defense of any action brought against the certified ad

2023When interpreting the board’s administrative rules, “[w]e will defer to the board’s plausible interpretation of its own rule, including an interpretation made in the course of applying the rule, if it is not inconsistent with the text of the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” McGuire v. SAIF, 317 Or App 629, 634-35 , 507 P3d 317 , rev den, 370 Or 197 (2022).

2023When interpreting the board’s administrative rules, “[w]e will defer to the board’s plausible interpretation of its own rule, including an interpretation made in the course of applying the rule, if it is not inconsistent with the text of the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” McGuire v. SAIF, 317 Or App 629, 634-35 , 507 P3d 317 , rev den, 370 Or 197 (2022).

2018On appeal, BP assigns error to that ruling, renewing its argument that "a debit card fee is not a 'condition' under subsection (3)(d)(A)" and "thus, does not need to be posted on the street sign" because "[a] per-transaction debit-card fee * * * does not affect the price of the fuel at all." To determine whether a debit card fee is a "condition" under OAR 137-020-0150, "we consider the text of the rule and its context, including other portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule's adoption history." Brand Energy Services, LLC v. OR-OSHA , 261 Or.

2018App. 210 , 214, 323 P.3d 356 (2014). "[W]e begin by examining the text of the rule itself, together with its context" to "discern the meaning of the words used, giving effect to the intent of the body that promulgated the rule." Tye v. McFetridge , 342 Or. 61 , 69, 149 P.3d 1111 (2006).

2011Id.; see Abu-Adas v. Employment Dept., 325 Or 480, 485 , 940 P2d 1219 (1997) (in interpreting administrative rules, the court uses the same methodology as it does in interpreting statutes); see also PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 612 n 4, 859 P2d 114 [3] (1993); ODOT v. City of Klamath Falls, 177 Or App 1, 8 , 34 P3d 667 (2001). ‘Context includes other provisions of the same rule, other related rules, the statute pursuant to which the rule was created, and other related statutes.’ Abu-Adas, 325 Or at 485 .” Willamette Oaks, LLC v. City of Eugene, 232 Or App 29, 33-34 , 220

2011Id.; see Abu-Adas v. Employment Dept., 325 Or 480, 485 , 940 P2d 1219 (1997) (in interpreting administrative rules, the court uses the same methodology as it does in interpreting statutes); see also PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 612 n 4, 859 P2d 114 [3] (1993); ODOT v. City of Klamath Falls, 177 Or App 1, 8 , 34 P3d 667 (2001). ‘Context includes other provisions of the same rule, other related rules, the statute pursuant to which the rule was created, and other related statutes.’ Abu-Adas, 325 Or at 485 .” Willamette Oaks, LLC v. City of Eugene, 232 Or App 29, 33-34 , 220

2022Under that analytical framework, we consider the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Schaefer, 312 Or App at 336 -37 (quoting Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014) (internal citation omitted)). “ ‘In construing statutes and administrative rules, we are obliged to determine the correct interpretation, regardless of the nature of the par- ties’ arguments or the quality of the information that they supply to the court.’ ” Id. at 337 (quoting Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 352 Or 648, 662 , 290 P3d 803 (2012) (citing Dept. of Human

2022Under that analytical framework, we consider the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory context.’ ” Schaefer, 312 Or App at 336 -37 (quoting Noble v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448 , 326 P3d 589 (2014) (internal citation omitted)). “ ‘In construing statutes and administrative rules, we are obliged to determine the correct interpretation, regardless of the nature of the par- ties’ arguments or the quality of the information that they supply to the court.’ ” Id. at 337 (quoting Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 352 Or 648, 662 , 290 P3d 803 (2012) (citing Dept. of Human

2017Marshall’s Towing v. Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62 , 116 P3d 873 (2005).

2017Marshall’s Towing v. Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62 , 116 P3d 873 (2005).

2015By its terms, the rule directs courts to base an offender’s criminal history on the number of convictions at the time of sentencing, and it provides that, for crimes committed Cite as 358 Or 147 (2015) 165 after November 1, 1989, “a conviction is considered to have occurred upon pronouncement of sentence in open court.” Nothing in the text of that rule recognizes an excep- tion for convictions arising out of the same criminal episode.

2015By its terms, the rule directs courts to base an offender’s criminal history on the number of convictions at the time of sentencing, and it provides that, for crimes committed Cite as 358 Or 147 (2015) 165 after November 1, 1989, “a conviction is considered to have occurred upon pronouncement of sentence in open court.” Nothing in the text of that rule recognizes an excep- tion for convictions arising out of the same criminal episode.

2015This court explained that the text of the rule “permits consideration of any previous conviction occurring before ‘the time the current crime * * * is sentenced.’” Id. at 314 (quoting the text of the rule; ellipsis in original).

2015This court explained that the text of the rule “permits consider- ation of any previous conviction occurring before ‘the time the current crime * * * is sentenced.’ ” Id. at 314 (quoting the text of the rule; ellipses in original).

2013A.G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 471 , 268 P3d 589 (2011) (applying those principles to ORCP 44 B and C).2 In accordance with those ordinary principles of construction, we examine the text of the rule in its context, along with any adoption history that we find relevant.

2013A.G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 471 , 268 P3d 589 (2011) (applying those principles to ORCP 44 B and C).2 In accordance with those ordinary principles of construction, we examine the text of the rule in its context, along with any adoption history that we find relevant.