text rule in Texas

2012But even if we determined that the text of this rule is ambiguous, we are required to give serious deference to the agency’s reasonable interpretation and, as stated by TCEQ, that interpretation is that the operator may rely on “published and open-file sources.” See Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 624-25 (providing that reviewing court gives deference to a reasonable construction by an agency charged with the statute’s administration if statute is ambiguous).

2012But even if we determined that the text of this rule is ambiguous, we are required to give serious deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation and, as stated by TCEQ, that interpretation is that the operator may rely on "published and open-file sources." See Texas Citizens , 336 S.W.3d at 624-25 (providing that reviewing court gives deference to a reasonable construction by an agency charged with the statute's administration if statute is ambiguous).

2000The text of a rule ... limits judicial inventiveness." Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 620 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 ; see also General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex.1996)(emphasizing "the importance of the trial court's obligation to determine that the protective requirements of Texas Rule 42 are met").

2000The text of a rule ... limits judicial inventiveness.” Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 620 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 ; see also General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex.1996)(emphasizing “the importance of the trial court’s obligation to determine that the protective requirements of Texas Rule 42 are met”).

2025Finally, ES3 cites Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, contending that without evidence of lost profits, the $25,000 bond amount is sufficient as a matter of law. 54 Rule 684 requires the trial court to set a bond when it grants a temporary injunction. 55 The text of the rule provides no guidance on the “amount of security” the Court must require. 56 But courts have held that the purpose of a bond is to protect the enjoined party from any possible damages occurring as a result of an improperly granted injunction. 57 The amount of a bond is within the trial court's sound discretion, but a temporary

2025Finally, ES3 cites Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, contending that without evidence of lost profits, the $25,000 bond amount is sufficient as a matter of law. 54 Rule 684 requires the trial court to set a bond when it grants a temporary injunction. 55 The text of the rule provides no guidance on the “amount of security” the Court must require. 56 But courts have held that the purpose of a bond is to protect the enjoined party from any possible damages occurring as a result of an improperly granted injunction. 57 The amount of a bond is within the trial court's sound discretion, but a temporary

2025Finally, ES3 cites Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, contending that without evidence of lost profits, the $25,000 bond amount is sufficient as a matter of law. 54 Rule 684 requires the trial court to set a bond when it grants a temporary injunction. 55 The text of the rule provides no guidance on the “amount of security” the Court must require. 56 But courts have held that the purpose of a bond is to protect the enjoined party from any possible damages occurring as a result of an improperly granted injunction. 57 The amount of a bond is within the trial court's sound discretion, but a temporary

2025Finally, ES3 cites Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, contending that without evidence of lost profits, the $25,000 bond amount is sufficient as a matter of law. 54 Rule 684 requires the trial court to set a bond when it grants a temporary injunction. 55 The text of the rule provides no guidance on the “amount of security” the Court must require. 56 But courts have held that the purpose of a bond is to protect the enjoined party from any possible damages occurring as a result of an improperly granted injunction. 57 The amount of a bond is within the trial court's sound discretion, but a temporary

2008And, as Frank suggests, the notion would come as quite a surprise to claimants and their counsel who were relying on the Commission’s dual-notice obligation stated in the text of rule 102.5 “ ‘to mean what it says.’ ” Rubio, 185 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866 ). .

2008And, as Frank suggests, the notion would come as quite a surprise to claimants and their counsel who were relying on the Commission's dual-notice obligation stated in the text of rule 102.5 "'to mean what it says.'" Rubio , 185 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 866 ). 12.

2008And, as Frank suggests, the notion would come as quite a surprise to claimants and their counsel who were relying on the Commission’s dual-notice obligation stated in the text of rule 102.5 “ ‘to mean what it says.’ ” Rubio, 185 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866 ). .

2008And, as Frank suggests, the notion would come as quite a surprise to claimants and their counsel who were relying on the Commission's dual-notice obligation stated in the text of rule 102.5 "'to mean what it says.'" Rubio , 185 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 866 ). 12.

2024Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Boeing Co., No. 05-21-00598-CV, 2022 WL 16735379 , at *5 (Tex. App.— Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.); see also Raider Ranch, LP v. Lugano, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (party “seeking to inject its defensive theory into the Rule 91a procedure by means of an exhibit to its answer and motion, finds no support in the text of the rule itself or in the cases”). - 14 - Dissenting Opinion 04-23-00069-CV Rule 91a and the statute from which it was derived make this clear.

2023Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Boeing Co., No. 05-21-00598-CV, 2022 WL 16735379 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.); see also Raider Ranch, LP v. Lugano, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (party “seeking to inject its defensive theory into the Rule 91a procedure by means of an exhibit to its answer and motion, finds no support in the text of the rule itself or in the cases”).

2016See, e.g., City of Houston v. Bates, 406 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2013) (“We begin with the statute’s text and the presumption that the Legislature intended what it enacted.” (citing Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 2010))). .

2013Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex.2010).

2016See, e.g., TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) ("We presume that the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.” (citing In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008))). .

2015More importantly, the text of the rule is consistent with the statutory provisions at issue, and nothing in the text of the 18 provides that “[i]nventory and intangible property are not operating assets for purposes of the exemption.” Id.; see also AHF-Arbors, 410 S.W.3d at 837 (explaining that tax exemptions are construed against person seeking exemption); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 340 S.W.3d at 438 (providing that deference to Comptroller’s interpretation is appropriate where “there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations”).

2012McConnell v. Southside ISD, 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993).

2012McConnell v. Southside ISD , 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993).

2010Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp. , No. 97-1774, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6594 (1st Cir. 1998) ("arbitration clause in 1994 contracts did not apply to pre-1994 contracts when the language of the arbitration clause did not indicate 'that the parties ever contemplated so radical a retroactive renegotiation of their earlier agreements'"); Hendrick , 50 F. Supp. 2d at 535 ("arbitration clause was not retroactive when the text of the clause expressed no language providing that it 'reached back in time to require an employee to arbitrate a claim which had accrued before the contract was signed or the (arbitratio

2006LEXIS 6594 (1st Cir.1998) (“arbitration clause in 1994 contracts did not apply to pre-1994 contracts when the language of the arbitration clause did not indicate ‘that the parties ever contemplated so radical a retroactive renegotiation of their earlier agreements’ ”); Hendrick, 50 F.Supp.2d at 535 (“arbitration clause was not retroactive when the text of the clause expressed no language providing that it ‘reached back in time to require an employee to arbitrate a claim which had accrued before the contract was signed or the (arbitration clause) took effect’ ”); Connett v. Justus Enters. of Ka

2006See Wright , 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina , 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party = s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones , 888 S.W.2d 858 , 859 B 60 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment procee

2006See Wright, 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina, 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party’s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones, 888 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment proceedings in the

2006See Wright , 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina , 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party = s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones , 888 S.W.2d 858 , 859 B 60 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment procee

2006See Wright, 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina, 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party’s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones, 888 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment proceedings in the

2015As this Court explained, “an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to ‘serious consideration,’ so long as the construction is reasonable and does not conflict with the statute’s language…" "We defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules unless it is plainly erroneous or contradicts the text of the rule or underlying statute.” (citations omitted) Id. at 557-58 .

2015Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Tex. Health & Human Servs., 408 S.W.3d 549, 558 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied) (citing Pub.

2006See Wright , 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina , 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party = s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones , 888 S.W.2d 858 , 859 B 60 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment procee

2006See Wright, 173 S.W.3d at 549 (stating that while court may take Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as expression of public policy, they are not required to do so); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina, 979 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating that the existence of law contrary to a party’s position does not relieve party of the burden of preserving error in the trial court); Jones v. Jones, 888 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, order) (holding that even if law changed after summary-judgment proceedings in the

2022Eichner, P.C. v. Dominguez, 623 S.W.3d 358 , 362 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting Sommers for Ala. & Dunlavy, Ltd. v. Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex. 2017)) (“Generally, only a named party to the suit may bring an appeal.”). 2 Although the text of the rule speaks only of “the taking of a deposition on oral examination or written questions” without mentioning production of documents, see Tex. R.

2021See, e.g., Southwell v. State, 80 S.W.3d 647 , 648–49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (rejecting appellant’s motion to unseal record of in-camera hearing).

2020See id.; see also Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508 (stating courts may not “judicially amend a statute by adding words not contained in the language of the statute”).

2020See id. (“The statutory 4 words must be determined considering the context in which they are used, not in isolation.”).

2020Thus, the legal-factual distinction avoids violence 5 to the text of the rule as a whole while preserving the rule’s intended limitation on factual inquiries.3 See Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 59 (“In interpreting statutes, we must look to the plain language, construing the text in light of the statute as a whole.”).