text clause in New York

2004(See e.g., People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 437-439 [1991] [“detail(ing) some general rules governing independent State review,” including that a “noninterpretive analysis of the State provision” is required which “focuses not on the text of the clause but on matters peculiar to this State,” and whether “the Supreme Court’s rule is not adequate to protect New York citizens”]; see also, People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 351 [2001] [“(n)one of the reasons for extending protections of our Constitution beyond those given by the Federal Constitution exist here”]; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474 [1992] [and

2000Video, supra, 68 NY2d, at 303 .) Specifically declining to adopt any “rigid method of analysis” (People v Scott, supra, 79 NY2d, at 490 ), the Court of Appeals has held that a reasoned disagreement with a Supreme Court decision will provide a legitimate basis to interpret article I (§ 12) more broadly than the Fourth Amendment in its protections.

2022Furthermore, giving plaintiffs a private right of action would be inconsistent with the administrative scheme ( see Hammer, 1 NY3d at 299 ), because 15 RCNY 19-02 envisages a permit system managed by DEP.

2021Where, as here, the foreign jurisdiction has afforded an attorney an opportunity to be heard and determines that, in light of the nature and seriousness of the charges, the strength of the record supporting those charges, and the risk and danger of recurrence, an interim suspension is necessary to protect the public interest, this Court may, upon review of the order and record of the proceedings, reciprocally impose an interim suspension ( see Matter of Perskie , 158 AD3d 19 ; Matter of Hummel , 99 AD3d 133 ; Matter of Gray , 110 AD2d 672 , affd 67 NY2d 440 ).

2021Where, as here, the foreign jurisdiction has afforded an attorney an opportunity to be heard and determines that, in light of the nature and seriousness of the charges, the strength of the record supporting those charges, and the risk and danger of recurrence, an interim suspension is necessary to protect the public interest, this Court may, upon review of the order and record of the proceedings, reciprocally impose an interim suspension ( see Matter of Perskie , 158 AD3d 19 ; Matter of Hummel , 99 AD3d 133 ; Matter of Gray , 110 AD2d 672 , affd 67 NY2d 440 ).

2021Where, as here, the foreign jurisdiction has afforded an attorney an opportunity to be heard and determines that, in light of the nature and seriousness of the charges, the strength of the record supporting those charges, and the risk and danger of recurrence, an interim suspension is necessary to protect the public interest, this Court may, upon review of the order and record of the proceedings, reciprocally impose an interim suspension ( see Matter of Perskie , 158 AD3d 19 ; Matter of Hummel , 99 AD3d 133 ; Matter of Gray , 110 AD2d 672 , affd 67 NY2d 440 ).

2016In fact, the text of the rule never mentions “meritorious defense.” The requirement is a gloss added to the rule by the courts, who appear to borrow it from CPLR 317, which allows a person who has never received a summons time to enter a defense if they have a “meritorious defense.” The Court of Appeals appeared to conflate the two CPLR sections in Vogel v Asgrow Mandeville Co. ( 55 NY2d 675 [1981]), when it implied that a “meritorious defense” was required under both CPLR sections.

2006Here, the full text of the claim, as reflected in the small claims case card, reads “$999.00 (WORK) LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK ON 12-20-2005,” which is adequate under the liberal pleading rules of the Civil Court Act (see, e.g., Weiner v Tel Aviv Car & Limousine Serv., 141 Misc 2d 339 [Civ Ct, NY County 1988] [a claimant is not required to allege specific theories, counts, causes of actions, facts, or allegations in its small claims complaint]).

2000The text of the rule itself, which prohibits an inmate from “display[ing], wear-ting], possess [ing], distributing] or us [ing] unauthorized organizational insignia or materials” (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [6] [iii]), plainly encompasses the possession of reading materials (see, Matter of Ernest v Goord, supra, at 747-748; Matter of Sparks v Coombe, 243 AD2d 767, 768 ).

2000Video, 68 NY2d 296, 303 , cert denied 479 US 1091 .) Since the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment and article I (§ 12) of our State Constitution “contain similar language [and] share a common history” (People v Harris, supra, 77 NY2d, at 438), “[i]f a distinction is to be made in what they require * * * it must rest on a noninterpretive analysis of the State provision in which the Court focuses not on the text of the clause but on matters peculiar to this State.” (Supra, at 438.) In its noninterpretive analysis, the Court of Appeals has considered such factors as “ ‘any preexisting State

2000Video, supra, 68 NY2d, at 303 .) Specifically declining to adopt any “rigid method of analysis” (People v Scott, supra, 79 NY2d, at 490 ), the Court of Appeals has held that a reasoned disagreement with a Supreme Court decision will provide a legitimate basis to interpret article I (§ 12) more broadly than the Fourth Amendment in its protections.

2000Video, 68 NY2d 296, 303 , cert denied 479 US 1091 .) Since the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment and article I (§ 12) of our State Constitution “contain similar language [and] share a common history” (People v Harris, supra, 77 NY2d, at 438), “[i]f a distinction is to be made in what they require * * * it must rest on a noninterpretive analysis of the State provision in which the Court focuses not on the text of the clause but on matters peculiar to this State.” (Supra, at 438.) In its noninterpretive analysis, the Court of Appeals has considered such factors as “ ‘any preexisting State

1938(Matter of Gardner, 140 N. Y. 122 ; Matter of Soy, 143 Misc. 217 , and cases cited.) The text of clause twenty-second which speaks of possible inability of the claimed institutions to take the legacies “ in full ” or to accept “ the full amount of the bequests made to them ” indicates that deceased may have had in mind some statutory limitation in the charters of the corporations upon the quantum of property which they might receive; or possibly a limitation upon his own action under section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law.

1938(Matter of Gardner, 140 N. Y. 122 ; Matter of Soy, 143 Misc. 217 , and cases cited.) The text of clause twenty-second which speaks of possible inability of the claimed institutions to take the legacies “ in full ” or to accept “ the full amount of the bequests made to them ” indicates that deceased may have had in mind some statutory limitation in the charters of the corporations upon the quantum of property which they might receive; or possibly a limitation upon his own action under section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law.

1926Some of them are here given: Wharton on Criminal Evidence (Vol. 2, p. 1647) gives the text of the principle: “ The absence of apparent motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a presumption in favor of the innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a motive would be an effect without a cause.” In Wigmore on Evidence (Vol. 1 [2d ed.], p. 356, § 118) these citations covering the subject are found: “ Motive always relevant but never essential. (1) Concedmg an emotion, then, as a circum stance showing the probability of appropriate ens

1896Malice, want of probable cause and termination of former action in favor of the plaintiff being essential to the maintenance of this action, the complaint must aver that the proceeding complained of was malicious; that there was no probable cause therefor, and that such proceeding had terminated in favor of the party bringing this action, and must allege how it was ended.” in support of the doctrine of the text Scotten v. Longfellow ( 40 Ind. 23 ) is cited, and it is said: “ An allegation of tlie ‘ falsity of the charge ’ is not equivalent to an allegation of ‘ the want of probable cause.’ Wan

1896Malice, want of probable cause and termination of former action in favor of the plaintiff being essential to the maintenance of this action, the complaint must aver that the proceeding complained of was malicious; that there was no probable cause therefor, and that such proceeding had terminated in favor of the party bringing this action, and must allege how it was ended.” in support of the doctrine of the text Scotten v. Longfellow ( 40 Ind. 23 ) is cited, and it is said: “ An allegation of tlie ‘ falsity of the charge ’ is not equivalent to an allegation of ‘ the want of probable cause.’ Wan

1892To the same effect are Dusenbnry v. Telegraph Co., 11 Abb.

1866Boardman, 2 Metc. 457 .) These cases fully sustain the doctrine of the text.

1828Id.