text rule in Alaska

2018Husa v. Schofield , 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) ("[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the 'functional equivalent' of a motion or petition to modify."); Boone v. Gipson , 920 P.2d 746 , 749-51 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that because Rule 90.3(h)(2)"contains no indication that 'functional equivalents' of motions for modification ... suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement"). 38 Millette , 177 P.3d at 266 . 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Schofield , 993 P.2d at 408 . 42 Swaney v. G

2018Husa v. Schofield , 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) ("[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the 'functional equivalent' of a motion or petition to modify."); Boone v. Gipson , 920 P.2d 746 , 749-51 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that because Rule 90.3(h)(2)"contains no indication that 'functional equivalents' of motions for modification ... suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement"). 38 Millette , 177 P.3d at 266 . 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Schofield , 993 P.2d at 408 . 42 Swaney v. G

2018Husa v. Schofield, 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) (“[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the ‘functional equivalent’ of a motion or petition to modify.” quoting Boone v. Gipson, 920 P.2d 746, 751 (Alaska 1996));(“Since the exception in [Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2)] only refers to motions for modification, and contains no indication that ‘functional equivalents’ of motions for modification also suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement . . . .”). -18- 1705 physical custodian f

2018Husa v. Schofield , 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) ("[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the 'functional equivalent' of a motion or petition to modify."); Boone v. Gipson , 920 P.2d 746 , 749-51 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that because Rule 90.3(h)(2)"contains no indication that 'functional equivalents' of motions for modification ... suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement"). 38 Millette , 177 P.3d at 266 . 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Schofield , 993 P.2d at 408 . 42 Swaney v. G

2021In keeping with this purpose, the Tonnage Clause does not bar all charges that might be imposed on vessels.101 Vessels may be taxed for general revenue purposes, provided the tax does not discriminate against vessels as such: “in order to fund services 96 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2009). 97 Tonnage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 98 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 . 99 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 6-7 . 100 Id. at 9 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976)). 101 Id. -24- 7524 by taxing ships, a [s]tate must also impos

2021In keeping with this purpose, the Tonnage Clause does not bar all charges that might be imposed on vessels.101 Vessels may be taxed for general revenue purposes, provided the tax does not discriminate against vessels as such: “in order to fund services 96 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2009). 97 Tonnage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 98 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 . 99 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 6-7 . 100 Id. at 9 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976)). 101 Id. -24- 7524 by taxing ships, a [s]tate must also impos

2021State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 263, 265-66 (1935). 95 North Pacific defines the term “ports” in this context as encompassing “all navigable waters.” It therefore argues that the landing tax would violate the Tonnage Clause regardless of where in Alaska’s territorial waters the fish product was unloaded. -23- 7524 The Tonnage Clause was intended to supplement the Import-Export Clause and Commerce Clause, preventing coastal states from indirectly taxing imports and exports by taxing the vessels used to transport them.96 Although the text of the clause prohibits only taxes based on “tonnage” —

2021In keeping with this purpose, the Tonnage Clause does not bar all charges that might be imposed on vessels.101 Vessels may be taxed for general revenue purposes, provided the tax does not discriminate against vessels as such: “in order to fund services 96 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2009). 97 Tonnage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 98 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 . 99 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 6-7 . 100 Id. at 9 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976)). 101 Id. -24- 7524 by taxing ships, a [s]tate must also impos

2021In keeping with this purpose, the Tonnage Clause does not bar all charges that might be imposed on vessels.101 Vessels may be taxed for general revenue purposes, provided the tax does not discriminate against vessels as such: “in order to fund services 96 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2009). 97 Tonnage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 98 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 . 99 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 6-7 . 100 Id. at 9 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976)). 101 Id. -24- 7524 by taxing ships, a [s]tate must also impos

2021In keeping with this purpose, the Tonnage Clause does not bar all charges that might be imposed on vessels.101 Vessels may be taxed for general revenue purposes, provided the tax does not discriminate against vessels as such: “in order to fund services 96 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2009). 97 Tonnage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 98 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 . 99 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 6-7 . 100 Id. at 9 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976)). 101 Id. -24- 7524 by taxing ships, a [s]tate must also impos

2018Husa v. Schofield, 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) (“[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the ‘functional equivalent’ of a motion or petition to modify.” quoting Boone v. Gipson, 920 P.2d 746, 751 (Alaska 1996));(“Since the exception in [Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2)] only refers to motions for modification, and contains no indication that ‘functional equivalents’ of motions for modification also suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement . . . .”). -18- 1705 physical custodian f

2018Husa v. Schofield, 993 P.2d 405 , 409 (Alaska 1999) (“[W]e specifically rejected the idea that documents not mentioned in the text of the rule can be the ‘functional equivalent’ of a motion or petition to modify.” quoting Boone v. Gipson, 920 P.2d 746, 751 (Alaska 1996));(“Since the exception in [Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2)] only refers to motions for modification, and contains no indication that ‘functional equivalents’ of motions for modification also suffice, we conclude that nothing short of a motion or petition for modification satisfies the requirement . . . .”). -18- 1705 physical custodian f

2014The text of the rule is quoted in Wharton v. State, 590 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska 1979). .

1979Miklautsch v. Dominick, 452 P.2d 438, 440 (Alaska 1969).

1979However, you may consider such evidence if you deliberate the question of punitive damages." [5] See note 3, supra, for the text of the instruction. [6] See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comments h and j; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83 , 337 A.2d 893, 903 (1975). [7] As to the difference between design defects and manufacturing defects, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979), n. 15. [8] See, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 , 573 P.2d 443, 450 (1978). [9] In some cases, the plaintiff would also h

1979However, you may consider such evidence if you deliberate the question of punitive damages." [5] See note 3, supra, for the text of the instruction. [6] See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comments h and j; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83 , 337 A.2d 893, 903 (1975). [7] As to the difference between design defects and manufacturing defects, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979), n. 15. [8] See, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 , 573 P.2d 443, 450 (1978). [9] In some cases, the plaintiff would also h

1979However, you may consider such evidence if you deliberate the question of punitive damages." [5] See note 3, supra, for the text of the instruction. [6] See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comments h and j; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83 , 337 A.2d 893, 903 (1975). [7] As to the difference between design defects and manufacturing defects, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979), n. 15. [8] See, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 , 573 P.2d 443, 450 (1978). [9] In some cases, the plaintiff would also h

1979However, you may consider such evidence if you deliberate the question of punitive damages." [5] See note 3, supra, for the text of the instruction. [6] See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comments h and j; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83 , 337 A.2d 893, 903 (1975). [7] As to the difference between design defects and manufacturing defects, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979), n. 15. [8] See, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 , 573 P.2d 443, 450 (1978). [9] In some cases, the plaintiff would also h