text rule in Utah

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2019See Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 18 (directing courts to apply the text of rule 403 to questions regarding the admissibility of rule 404(c) evidence, and not to limit themselves to the factors listed in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 , 295–96 (Utah 1988)).

2018In analyzing the evidence under rule 403, the trial court relied on factors outlined in State v. Shickles , 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), including whether the evidence would arouse the jury to "overmastering hostility." Since this case was tried, our supreme court has explained that "courts are bound by the text of rule 403," State v. Cuttler , 2015 UT 95 , ¶ 18, 367 P.3d 981 (cleaned up), and that "[i]t is always error ... for a court to center its analysis on the Shickles factors, to consider itself obligated to use a particular factor or factors, or to rely inflexibly upon each ... factor," St

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2025Hernandez-Rivera argues that the standard expressed in Boyd is no longer applicable because the Utah Supreme Court has more recently “abandoned tests that go beyond the plain language of [r]ule 403,” citing cases in which the supreme court has emphasized the language of the rule itself as the governing standard, see State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (stating, in the context of the admission of rule 404(b) evidence, that “courts are bound by the text of rule 403” and not the “limited list” of “suggested factors” identified in certain prior case law (quotation simplified)), abroga

2025We know this because, in some sense, all of rule 69B(d)’s provisions are designed to help maximize the price of any property sold: “The purpose of a [sheriff’s] sale is to evolve the full value of the property exposed by fairness and competition and to produce that value in the form of money.” Nat’l Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 559, 562 (1868) (“The law . . . accords to every debtor the chance for a fair sale and full price . . . .”). ¶26 Simply stated, when Talisker waived “any and all rights and defenses tha

2025We know this because, in some sense, all of rule 69B(d)’s provisions are designed to help maximize the price of any property sold: “The purpose of a [sheriff’s] sale is to evolve the full value of the property exposed by fairness and competition and to produce that value in the form of money.” Nat’l Oil & Gas, Inc. v. 8 Cite as: 2025 UT 27 Opinion of the Court Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 559, 562 (1868) (“The law . . . accords to every debtor the chance for a fair sale and full price . . . .”). ¶26 Simply stated, when Talisker

2017Instead, courts are ‘bound by the test of rule 403,’ and it is ‘unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every [Shickles] factor’ in every context.” (citation omitted)); State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (“Since our decision in Shickles, a number of courts have relied heavily on [its] list of factors in weighing evidence under rule 403. . . . [C]ourts are bound by the text of rule 403, not the limited list of considerations outlined in Shickles.”); see also Met v. State, 2016 UT 51 , ¶ 90, 388 P.3d 447 (repudiating the multi-factor test outlined in precedent for determining w

2017Instead, courts are ‘bound by the test of rule 403,’ and it is ‘unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every [Shickles] factor’ in every context.” (citation omitted)); State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 841 (“Since our decision in Shickles, a number of courts have relied heavily on [its] list of factors in weighing evidence under rule 403. . . . [C]ourts are bound by the text of rule 403, not the limited list of considerations outlined in Shickles.”); see also Met v. State, 2016 UT 51 , ¶ 90, 388 P.3d 447 (repudiating the multi-factor test outlined in precedent for determining w

2009See San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir.2007) (en banc) (finding that no standing is necessary in determining whether a party can intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24). .

2009See San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir.2007) (en banc) (finding that no standing is necessary in determining whether a party can intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24). [3] "Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where there is little Utah law interpreting a specific rule, we may look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance." Bichler v. DEI Sys., Inc., 2009 UT 63 , ¶ 24 n. 2, 220 P.3d 1203 .

2025We know this because, in some sense, all of rule 69B(d)’s provisions are designed to help maximize the price of any property sold: “The purpose of a [sheriff’s] sale is to evolve the full value of the property exposed by fairness and competition and to produce that value in the form of money.” Nat’l Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 559, 562 (1868) (“The law . . . accords to every debtor the chance for a fair sale and full price . . . .”). ¶26 Simply stated, when Talisker waived “any and all rights and defenses tha

2025We know this because, in some sense, all of rule 69B(d)’s provisions are designed to help maximize the price of any property sold: “The purpose of a [sheriff’s] sale is to evolve the full value of the property exposed by fairness and competition and to produce that value in the form of money.” Nat’l Oil & Gas, Inc. v. 8 Cite as: 2025 UT 27 Opinion of the Court Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 559, 562 (1868) (“The law . . . accords to every debtor the chance for a fair sale and full price . . . .”). ¶26 Simply stated, when Talisker

2022In conducting the balancing test, a court “has the discretion to consider any relevant factors,” Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 29 (quotation simplified), including but not limited to the Shickles factors, 4 see State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95 , ¶¶ 18–19, 367 P.3d 981 ; id. ¶ 18 (“Courts are bound by the text of rule 403, and it is unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every Shickles factor in every context.”) (quotation simplified); State v. Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶ 15 , 347 P.3d 433 (“Each [Shickles] factor need not be considered in every case, but a district court evaluating 404(b) and 404(c) evi

2018In analyzing the evidence under rule 403, the trial court relied on factors outlined in State v. Shickles , 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), including whether the evidence would arouse the jury to "overmastering hostility." Since this case was tried, our supreme court has explained that "courts are bound by the text of rule 403," State v. Cuttler , 2015 UT 95 , ¶ 18, 367 P.3d 981 (cleaned up), and that "[i]t is always error ... for a court to center its analysis on the Shickles factors, to consider itself obligated to use a particular factor or factors, or to rely inflexibly upon each ... factor," St

2017It then “moor[ed] its rule 403 analysis entirely and _____________________________________________________________ 70 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 71 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 . 72 State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, ¶ 25 , 356 P.3d 173 . 73 Id. 74 Id. ¶ 27. 75 Id. ¶ 34. 76 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 84 ). 19 STATE v. LOWTHER Opinion of the Court exclusively to all of the Shickles factors.” 77 Further, it did not rely on the text of rule 403 to assess the risk of unfair prejudice, but focused on the language in Shickles to assess “the degree to which [the 404(b)

2017It then “moor[ed] its rule 403 analysis entirely and _____________________________________________________________ 70 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 71 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 . 72 State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, ¶ 25 , 356 P.3d 173 . 73 Id. 74 Id. ¶ 27. 75 Id. ¶ 34. 76 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 84 ). 19 STATE v. LOWTHER Opinion of the Court exclusively to all of the Shickles factors.” 77 Further, it did not rely on the text of rule 403 to assess the risk of unfair prejudice, but focused on the language in Shickles to assess “the degree to which [the 404(b)

2017It then “moor[ed] its rule 403 analysis entirely and _____________________________________________________________ 70 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 71 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 . 72 State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, ¶ 25 , 356 P.3d 173 . 73 Id. 74 Id. ¶ 27. 75 Id. ¶ 34. 76 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 84 ). 19 STATE v. LOWTHER Opinion of the Court exclusively to all of the Shickles factors.” 77 Further, it did not rely on the text of rule 403 to assess the risk of unfair prejudice, but focused on the language in Shickles to assess “the degree to which [the 404(b)

2017It then “moor[ed] its rule 403 analysis entirely and _____________________________________________________________ 70 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 71 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 . 72 State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, ¶ 25 , 356 P.3d 173 . 73 Id. 74 Id. ¶ 27. 75 Id. ¶ 34. 76 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32 , 328 P.3d 84 ). 19 STATE v. LOWTHER Opinion of the Court exclusively to all of the Shickles factors.” 77 Further, it did not rely on the text of rule 403 to assess the risk of unfair prejudice, but focused on the language in Shickles to assess “the degree to which [the 404(b)

2026See id. (citing State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70 , ¶¶ 15–16, 321 P.3d 1136 ). ¶38 We must attempt to harmonize the text of rule 23 with our supreme court’s holdings in Fullerton and Larrabee, each of which is binding on us.

2026See id. (citing State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70 , ¶¶ 15–16, 321 P.3d 1136 ). ¶38 We must attempt to harmonize the text of rule 23 with our supreme court’s holdings in Fullerton and Larrabee, each of which is binding on us.

2026The court begins by stating that “the plain text of the rule, in conjunction with the other rules of evidence, suggests that [prior-bad-acts] evidence may be admissible to rebut a fabrication defense,” Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 70 (emphasis added); the court’s use of the verb “suggests” is telling and itself suggests that the text of the rule might not be quite as “plain” as the court describes.