text clause in District of Columbia

2024Rather, the amended text of the rule “clarif[ies] that Rule 12 recognizes the traditional distinction between forfeiture and waiver” and a defendant’s forfeited challenge should be reviewed “for plain error.” Id. at 373 .

2024Rather, the amended text of the rule “clarif[ies] that Rule 12 recognizes the traditional distinction between forfeiture and waiver” and a defendant’s forfeited challenge should be reviewed “for plain error.” Id. at 373 .

2024And in Soto, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rule’s revised text and drafting history made clear that “appellate courts are not to presume that a defendant’s failure to file a timely pretrial motion is a waiver,” that “Rule 12 is generally directed at the district 42 courts, not the appellate courts,” and that, accordingly, “plain-error review applies to claims [governed by Rule 12] raised for the first time on appeal.” 794 F.3d at 652-55 .9 * * * 9 I acknowledge that the federal circuits are split on this issue and that several circuits have held that, even under Rule 12 as amended, unpr

2024And in Soto, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rule’s revised text and drafting history made clear that “appellate courts are not to presume that a defendant’s failure to file a timely pretrial motion is a waiver,” that “Rule 12 is generally directed at the district 42 courts, not the appellate courts,” and that, accordingly, “plain-error review applies to claims [governed by Rule 12] raised for the first time on appeal.” 794 F.3d at 652-55 .9 * * * 9 I acknowledge that the federal circuits are split on this issue and that several circuits have held that, even under Rule 12 as amended, unpr

2023Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17 , 19 (2017)). 2 We previously declined the opportunity to address the implications of Nutraceutical Corp. in Accenture Sub, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 283 A.3d 130 , 136-37 (D.C. 2022) (holding instead that in any event equitable tolling would be inapplicable on the facts presented). 7 precludes equitable tolling turns . . . on whether the text of the rule leaves room for such flexibility.” Id. at 714.

2022In other words, the text of the rule must not “leave[] room for such flexibility.” Id.

2022Moreover, “the simple fact that a [rule] is phrased in an unqualified manner does not necessarily establish that [equitable relief] is unavailable.” Id. at 715 .

1998The text of this instruction can be traced back three-quarters of a century to the case of Laney v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 56 , 294 F. 412 (1923).

1998The text of this instruction can be traced back three-quarters of a century to the case of Laney v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 56 , 294 F. 412 (1923).

1994Justice Marshall could not find, in the text of the clause itself or the Supreme Court’s previous cases, support for the MacDonald majority's holding that "after the first official accusation has been made, the dropping of charges prior to a second official accusation wipes the slate clean.” Id. at 16 , 102 S.Ct. at 1506 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). .

1994Justice Marshall could not find, in the text of the clause itself or the Supreme Court’s previous cases, support for the MacDonald majority's holding that "after the first official accusation has been made, the dropping of charges prior to a second official accusation wipes the slate clean.” Id. at 16 , 102 S.Ct. at 1506 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). .

1994Justice Marshall could not find, in the text of the clause itself or the Supreme Court’s previous cases, support for the MacDonald majority's holding that "after the first official accusation has been made, the dropping of charges prior to a second official accusation wipes the slate clean.” Id. at 16 , 102 S.Ct. at 1506 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). .

1994Justice Marshall could not find, in the text of the clause itself or the Supreme Court’s previous cases, support for the MacDonald majority's holding that "after the first official accusation has been made, the dropping of charges prior to a second official accusation wipes the slate clean.” Id. at 16 , 102 S.Ct. at 1506 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). .